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Why Don’t Judges Case Manage?
HON. JENNIFER D. BAILEY*
The problems of cost and delay experienced by parties
seeking civil justice have been the subject of complaints for
nearly one hundred years, going back to the days of Roscoe
Pound.1 In the past few years, court leadership across the
country has emphasized judicial case management as a significant tool for delivery of cost-effective, fair, and timely
civil justice. The declining civil caseload has brought new
urgency to these problems as evidence grows that litigants
are deserting the civil justice system. Calls for case management to contain cost and delay have come from the Chief
Justice of the United States, the Conference of Chief Justices, state bar and Supreme Court commissions, and the
American Bar Association. The continuing demand for case
management in virtually every lawyer survey, state bar commission, task force, and civil justice report over recent years
evidences that judicial case management is not occurring on
a day-to-day basis in today’s civil courtrooms. Notwithstanding broad calls for judicial case management, most
judges still don’t case manage—if they did, calls for case
management would not be persistent and relentless.
If court leaders are going to rely on civil case management as a critical tool in improving civil justice, it is critical
to understand how judges in everyday courtrooms view civil
case management and how to best encourage its utilization.
*

Administrative Judge, Circuit Civil Division, Eleventh Judicial Circuit,
Miami, Florida. This Article represents thesis work completed in Duke University
Law School’s LL.M. in Judicial Studies program. Thanks to Duke for the opportunity to participate in the program, Dean David F. Levi, Professor Jack Knight,
and the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal for their guidance and advice, and to Yanitza
Madrigal for her excellent research/technical assistance.
1
See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
513, 537–38 (2006) [hereinafter Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century] (discussing Roscoe
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964)).
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This thesis reports the results of an empirical investigation
by survey into judicial attitudes among Florida circuit civil
trial judges regarding utilization of case management in the
handling of civil disputes in courts of general jurisdiction.2
The results of surveying Florida circuit judges demonstrate
that the lack of widespread civil case management is less a
deliberate choice due to resistance or philosophical objection than it is a product of the lack of a definition of what
“civil case management” means and the scope of that task,
a perceived lack of time and support, and a failure to incentivize its adoption through data sharing and performance
measures. Through this research, I hope to provide one
state’s perspective on this challenge to provide guidance to
my state and others in implementing this cultural shift across
civil justice.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1073
I. PRIOR SURVEYS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH .................... 1083
II. FRAMING THE ISSUE.......................................................... 1094
III. STATE VS. FEDERAL: THE STATE COURT CASELOAD ........ 1098
IV. FLORIDA AND ITS COURTS: EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CASE
MANAGEMENT IN FLORIDA’S CIRCUIT CIVIL COURTS ...... 1104
A. Research Methods .................................................... 1108
B. Trial Court Administrator Survey Results ................ 1114
C. Judicial Survey and Interview Results: Evaluation by
Factor ....................................................................... 1120
1. AWARENESS....................................................... 1121
2. DEFINITION: WHAT IS THE MEANING AND SCOPE
OF CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT? ........................ 1132
3. PHILOSOPHICAL OPPOSITION ............................. 1153
4. CROSS-INCENTIVES: ELECTIONS AND
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BAR ......................... 1160
5. INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA AND LOCAL COURT
CULTURE ........................................................... 1173
6. LACK OF TIME, STAFF, AND TECHNOLOGY
SUPPORT ............................................................ 1191
CONCLUSION.............................................................................. 1209
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See FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1)(c) (2018) (granting the Florida county courts jurisdiction over civil disputes not exceeding a sum of $15,000 in value).

2019]

WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE?

1073

INTRODUCTION
Courts acknowledge the existence of profound challenges of
cost and delay to civil justice today. There is mounting evidence that
state civil courts are losing their relevance as a meaningful forum to
resolve disputes. The civil caseload in state courts have been in a
steady decline for at least ten years.3 Over the ten-year period between 2006 and 2015 state civil caseloads declined a total of eleven
percent (11%).4 Since 2009, when caseloads peaked due to the influx in foreclosure and collection cases resulting from the great recession, civil caseloads have declined by twenty-one percent
(21%).5 In comparison, the Federal court civil caseload remained
relatively stagnant over the span of twenty-seven years, increasing
about nine percent (9%) between 1986 and 2013.6
Concerns about the increasing costs of discovery and the exploitation of flaws in the civil process as a means to extract strategic
benefit in litigation are manifest.7 Complaints about cost and delay
are universal.8 Parties and courts alike decry abusive tactics and lack
3

See RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURTS
CASELOADS 1, 4 (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/EWSC%202015.ashx [hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK].
4

Id. (defining civil caseloads to include case types such as tort, contract, real
property, mental health, and small claims).
5
Id. (stating that 2009 saw 19.5 million incoming civil cases and that the
average drop from year-to-year was 3.5%).
6
Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District
Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2015).
7
See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost
in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 772 (2010); Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and the
Lip, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 227, 242 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Defining the
Problem]; CORINA GERETY & BRITTANY KAUFFMAN, INST. FOR THE ADV. OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE PROCESS: 2008–2013, at 26 (2014); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 412 (2009) [hereinafter Tidmarsh, Resolving
Cases].
8
See Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 552; Judith Resnik, The
Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793,1813 (2014) [hereinafter Resnik,
Privatization of Process]; Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of
American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1501 (2016).
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of management that distorts the value of a case, usually either by
consequence of cost (mostly discovery) to the defendant or delay to
the plaintiff.9 The cost of the litigation process, as opposed to the
merits of the case, has come to define the value of cases.10 As one
commentator has vividly stated, “[n]ourishing the fiction that justice
is a pearl beyond price has its own price.”11
The perception that courts cannot cost-effectively deliver timely
results has also caused people with modest cases to simply surrender
their rights or disputes because of the burden going to court represents.12 The perception is that it is simply not worth it.13 The 2015

9
See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke: Where
Do We Stand on Calibrating the Pretrial Process?, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
643, 646 (2014) [hereinafter Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke]; GERETY & KAUFFMAN, supra note 7, at 26 (“Attorneys . . . have expressed that in
some circumstances targeted and tailored discovery can lead to a more efficient
(i.e., less costly) resolution than little or no discovery, and cost-conscious lawyers
are aware when the cost of obtaining marginal information will exceed the benefit.”).
10
See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial As Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 655–56 (2011) (stating that the “settlement value” of a case “depends largely upon” the costs associated with the discovery process).
11
E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 321 (1986).
12
John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States,
122 YALE L.J. 522, 551 (2012) (“Discovery is costly, so costly that the prospect
of having to bear those costscan dissuade a potential litigant from advancing a
meritorious claim or defense.”). Cf. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE
IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 15 (2014), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/
documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_in_the_contemporary_usa._aug._
2014.pdf (“58% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that ‘lawyers are not
affordable for people on low incomes.’”); Freer, supra note 8, at 1501 (“[D]issatisfaction with the delay and expense of litigation led many to extoll the virtue of
less formalized process.”).
13
Langbein, supra note 12, at 551–52; Memorandum from GBA Strategies
to Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters 1
(Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Public%20
Trust%20and%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx [hereinafter Memorandum from GBA Strategies] (“[P]ersistant concerns about customer
service, inefficiency, and bias are undermining the public’s confidence in the
courts and leading them to look for alternative means of resolving disputes or
addressing problems that would have previously led them into the court system.”);
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State of the State Courts survey conducted for the National Center
for State Courts found that fifty-four percent (54%) of those interviewed believed that the court system is “inefficient, intimidating,
and expensive.”14 The public perceives that “attorneys are getting
rich by running the meter” as opposed to resolving disputes swiftly
and cost-effectively.15
Many parties have turned to alternatives such as arbitration, private judges, or mediation.16 The 2015 State of the Court Survey also
found that fifty-four percent (54%) of the surveyed public believe
that “[a]lternative ways to resolve disputes, like mediation, are
faster, cheaper, and more responsive to the needs of the people they
serve than the court system.”17 Globalization and alternative methods of dispute resolution are marginalizing the American litigation
system.18 The United States Supreme Court has elected to treat private arbitration and public adjudication as mechanisms of “equal
dignity.”19 Courts now face competition as a forum for dispute resolution and are losing out.20 As far back as 1995, the Federal Judicial
Conference Long Range Plan warned of the possible results:
Those civil litigants who can afford it will opt out of
the court system entirely for private dispute resolution providers. . . . [J]udges are able to spend fewer
of their working hours in civil trials than ever before,
and the future may make the civil jury trial—and perhaps the civil bench trial as well—a creature of the
past. . . . [C]ourts, rather than being forums where
Cf. GERETY & KAUFFMAN, supra note 7, at 26 (“[C]ost-concious lawyers are
aware when the cost of obtaining marginal information will exceed the benefit.”).
14
Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2.
15
Freer, supra note 8, at 1514.
16
Nagareda, supra note 10, at 692; Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2–3.
17
Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 3.
18
Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 540.
19
Freer, supra note 8, at 1492 (“In approving this expansion [of the Federal
Arbitration Act], the [Supreme] Court increasingly makes clear that it sees nothing special about court litigation—that it an arbitration are mechanisms of equal
dignity.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631, 1636–39 (2005).
20
Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2–3; Freer, supra
note 8, at 1501.

1076

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1071

the weak and the few have recognized rights that the
strong and the many must regard, could become an
arena for second-class justice.21
As noted by United States District Court Judge Lee Rosenthal in an
article penned with Professor Steven Gensler,
[T]here seems to be a growing sense of shared conviction that without effective judicial case management, the age-old problems of cost and delay will so
frustrate lawyers and litigants that they will continue
to leave the judicial system with fewer and fewer
cases tried, or they will simply avoid the system altogether.22
At a time when technology and transparency is changing every
aspect of life, the courts seem creaky, flawed, and vaguely irrelevant
in the immediacy of information available in modern life. A 2014
National Center for State Courts survey conducted by Accenture
found that, of those citizens surveyed, seventy-four percent (74%)
believed that the “[j]ustice system needs to improve . . . [s]peed and
efficiency” and fifty-two percent believed that the “[j]ustice system
needs to improve . . . [c]ost.” 23As a solution to these problems,
sixty-three percent (63%) believed digital technology could “speed
up outcomes,” sixty-two percent (62%) believed digital technology
could “reduce public costs,” and fifty-four percent (54%) believed
digital technology could “reduce personal cost to individuals involved.”24 The idea that courts deliver services and that litigants are
“valued customers” is a new concept to many working in the court
system, “but it captures the basic idea that people entering the court-

21
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 19–20 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtslongrangeplan_0.pdf.
22
Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U.
KAN. L. REV. 849, 855 (2013) [hereinafter Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing
Judge].
23
Citizen Support for Digital Justice to Reduce Cost and Speed Up Outcomes, ACCENTURE (2015) https://www.accenture.com/nz-en/insight-2014-accenture-citizen-survey-digital-justice-infographic.
24
Id.
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house react to both the services delivered and the manner of delivery.”25 The idea that those customers can take their dispute resolution business elsewhere is even more startling to some.26 “[S]tate
courts find themselves in an unfamiliar position of facing competition for customers,”27 while, at the same time, continuing to do business as usual as complaints of judicial disengagement “persist and
abound.”28
The decline in the civil court caseload has ramifications for democracy. As far back as 1997, sociologist Tom Tyler warned of a
“public ‘crisis of confidence’ in the legal system.”29 As summarized
by the National Center for State Courts:
[I]t is through courts that those seeking justice can
obtain it, regardless of wealth or power. Courts exist
to assure that asymmetries of power do not dictate
the outcome of disputes. . . . [I]n our common-law
system, a public record of court decisions is essential
for establishing and updating our legal system. When
disputes are resolved in private venues, information
is denied to the public and to those seeking to ensure
appropriate regulation of social and economic
life. . . . [T]he judiciary plays a key role in ensuring
checks and balances on the power and actions of the
executive and legislative branches.30
The critical role of reliable court systems as a component of stable
democracies is reflected in world economic reports, which include

25

Brian Ostrom et al., Creating a New Generation of Courts, 47 CT. REV. 80,
80–81 (2011).
26
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. AND ST. JUST. INST., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE:
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIG. IN ST. CTS., at iii (2013),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx
[hereinafter LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION].
27
Memorandum from GBA Strategies, supra note 13, at 2.
28
Rosenthal, Defining the Problem, supra note 7, at 238.
29
Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 872 (1997).
30
Richard Y. Schauffler, The Rise and Fall of State Court Caseloads, in
TRENDS: UP CLOSE, at 2 (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Trends in the State Courts
April 2017), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/2184/.

1078

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1071

the evaluations of the adequacy and availability of civil court resolutions in comparing national economies.31
The chief justices of state supreme courts recognized that re-establishing and maintaining the reputation of state courts as a legitimate forum, providing timely and affordable opportunities to resolve disputes, is essential. In 2013, the nation-wide Conference of
Chief Justices created a committee to evaluate data, make recommendations, and develop guidelines “for the purpose of improving
the civil justice system in state courts.”32 After two years of analyzing existing pilot projects, surveys, research, and empirical data, the
Civil Justice Improvements Committee made thirteen comprehensive recommendations to the Conference of Chief Justices, which
are memorialized in their Call to Action report (“CJI Report”),33 and
framed the problem in the following way:
Americans deserve a civil legal process that can
fairly and promptly resolve disputes for everyone—
rich or poor, individuals or businesses, in matters
large or small. Yet our civil justice system often fails
to meet this standard. Runaway costs, delays, and
complexity are undermining public confidence and
denying people the justice they seek. This has to
change.34
The CJI Report’s proposals lead off with the following recommendation (“Recommendation One”): “Courts must take responsibility for managing civil cases from time of filing to disposition.”35
The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted the
31

See, e.g., ECON. DEP’T, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., POLICY
NOTE NO. 18, WHAT MAKES CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE? 2 (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Civil%20Justice%20Policy%20Note.pdf
[hereinafter WHAT MAKES CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE?] (“Well-functioning judiciaries guarantee security of property rights and enforcement of contracts. . . . [which] strengthens incentives to save and invest[.]”).
32
CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES,
CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL 4–5 (2016),
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Civil-Justice/NCSC-CJI-ReportWeb.ashx [hereinafter CJI REPORT].
33
Id.
34
Id. at 2.
35
Id. at 16.
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recommendations in the CJI Report in 2017, “urg[ing] all state
courts to consider the Recommendations of [the CJI Report] as appropriate guidance in their endeavors to achive demonstrable civil
justice improvements with respect to the expenditure of time and
costs to resolve civil cases,” which signals a strong endorsement of
judicial case management.36 The CJI Report’s Commentary on Recommendation One succinctly summarizes the problem:
Our civil justice system has historically expected litigants to drive the pace of civil litigation by requesting court involvement as issues arise. This often results in delay as litigants wait in line for attention
from a passive court—be it for rulings on motions, a
requested hearing, or even setting a trial date. The
wait-for-a-problem paradigm effectively shields
courts from responsibility for the pace of litigation. . . . The party-take-the-lead culture can encourage delay strategies by attorneys, whose own interests and the interests of their clients may favor delay
rather than efficiency. In short, adversarial strategizing can undermine the achievement of fair, economical, and timely outcomes.37
This initiative by state supreme court chief justices followed the
2010 Conference on Civil Litigation held by the Federal Civil Rules
Advisory Committee at Duke University Law School (the “Duke
Conference” or the “Duke Conference Report”).38 Similar to the CJI
Report, the Duke Conference Report also demanded strong case
management: “There was nearly unanimous agreement that the disposition of civil actions could be improved, reducing cost and delay,
by advancing cooperation among the parties, proportionality in the
36

A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 102, at 1 (Feb. 6, 2017).
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 16.
38
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM.]; DUKE CONFERENCE SUBCOMM., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT OF THE DUKE CONFERENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE 79 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2014-04.pdf [hereinafter DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT].
37
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use of available procedures, and early and active judicial case management.”39 The Duke Conference Report referenced surveys and
reports from the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”), the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System, the American Bar Association section on
litigation and the National Employment Lawyers association
(“NELA”), along with perspectives from the Lawyers for Civil Justice, the Civil Justice Reform Group, and the U.S. Chamber Institute
for Legal Reform.40 As described by attendees, “Many users of the
current scheme—whether speaking from the perspective of plaintiffs or defendants, business or public interest, government or private litigants—complained that a wide variety of cases took too long
and cost too much to resolve.”41 The report identified that
judges must be considerably more involved in managing each case from the outset, to tailor the motions
practice and shape the discovery to the reasonable
needs of that case. The challenge is to achieve this on
a consistent, institutional basis without interfering
with the independence and creativity of each judge
and district responding to the specific mix of cases
and docket conditions, and without interfering with
the effective handling of many cases under existing
rules and practices.42
Rather than intiating a complete overhaul of the current case management system, many users believe that the simplest solution
would be to increase judicial engagement and intervention.43 This
reflects the common and strong belief that judicial management is
the key stone to the reasonable needs of a case. The Duke conference
remedy reflected a strong, shared belief that judicial management is
essential to tailoring the pretrial process to the reasonable needs of
the case.44

39
40
41
42
43
44

DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 79.
Id. at 79, 82–83, 115.
Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 645.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 38, at 4.
Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 645.
Id.

2019]

WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE?

1081

The consensus on the need for court case management extends
to every level of court. In his 2015 report on the State of the Judiciary, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts extolled the virtues of civil case management in just, speedy, and inexpensive delivery of civil justice:
Judges must be willing to take on a stewardship role,
managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery
and the pace of litigation. Faced with crushing dockets, judges can be tempted to postpone engagement
in pretrial activities. Experience has shown, however, that judges who are knowledgeable, actively
engaged, and accessible early in the process are far
more effective in resolving cases fairly and efficiently, because they can identify the critical issues,
determine the appropriate breadth of discovery, and
curtail dilatory tactics, gamesmanship, and procedural posturing.45
Chief Justice Roberts continued that emphasis in his 2016 report:
As I explained in my 2015 Year-End Report, the Judicial Conference—the policy making body of the
federal courts—has revised the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to emphasize the judge’s role in
early and effective case management. Those procedural reforms encourage district judges to meet
promptly with the lawyers after the complaint is
filed, confer about the needs of the case, develop a
case management plan, and expedite resolution of
pretrial discovery disputes. The reforms are beginning to have a positive effect because already extremely busy judges are willing to undertake more
active engagement in managing their dockets, which

45

C. J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FED. JUDICIARY 10–11 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year
-endreport.pdf [hereinafter 2015 YEAR-END REPORT].
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will pay dividends down the road. A lumberjack
saves time when he takes the time to sharpen his ax.46
Since 2010, multiple state civil justice commissions and pilot
projects across the country have called for active court case management as key to delivering better value in civil justice by reducing
cost and delay.47 These calls echo the calls of prior decades. The
46

C.J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FED. JUDICI6–7 (2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016yearendreport.pdf [hereinafter 2016 YEAR-END REPORT].
47
See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE ESCALATING COSTS OF CIVIL LITIG., WASH.
STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 3 (2015),
https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/legal-community/committees/eccltask-force/reports/eccl-final-report-06152015.pdf?sfvrsn=3a993cf1_2; INST. FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE OREGON COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY 1–3
(2010), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/civil_case_
processing_oregon_courts2010.pdf; COMM. ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, ARIZ. SUPREME COURT, A CALL TO REFORM 1–3, 7–9 (2016), http://www.azcourts.gov/
Portals/74/CJRC/Master%20CJRC%20Final%20Report%20and%20Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter ARIZ. CALL TO REFORM]; News Release, N.J. Courts,
Supreme Court Committee on Expedited Civil Actions Releases Report (Apr. 15,
2014), https://www.njcourts.gov/pressrel/2014/pr140415b.pdf; IOWA CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, REFORMING THE IOWA CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at v–
viii (2012), https://www.iowacourts.gov/media/cms/FINAL03_22_12_0E9941A
E5D491.pdf; CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
CIVIL RE-ENGINEERING CONCEPT PAPER 2–4 (2014), https://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media
/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Web%20Documents/Civil%20Justice%20Initiative/ Connecticut%20Concept%20Paper%20Civil%20Re-engineering.ashx; CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, NEW HAMPSHIRE: IMPACT OF
THE PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY/AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE (PAD) PILOT RULES 1,
19–22 (2013), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/%E2%80%8CPDF /Topics/Civil%20Procedure/12022013-Civil-Justice-Initiative-New%E2%80% 8CHampshire.ashx [hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE: PAD PILOT RULES]; Nat’l Ctr. for
State Courts, Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California Pilot Program, CIVIL ACTION, Winter 2004, at 1–2 [hereinafter Complex Litigation: Key
Findings]; JUDICIAL BRANCH STATE OF IDAHO, ADVANCING JUSTICE: PROMOTING FAIR AND TIMELY CASE RESOLUTION (2013), http://idahodocs.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16293coll3/id/251137; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, STATEWIDE CASEFLOW
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE IDAHO DISTRICT COURTS 1 (2014),
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/idaho_state
wide_caseflow_management_plan.pdf; Andrew A. Powell, It’s Nothing Personal, It’s Just Business: A Commentary on the South Carolina Business Court
Pilot Program, 61 S.C. L. REV. 823, 839–42 (2010); MINN. SUPREME COURT
ARY
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judicial branch is confronting the truth that the “interests, values,
and rights of all participants in the legal process are court responsibilities. . . . Fairness is desired by everyone, with court customers
wanting this result through a process that is predictable, timely, and
cost-effective.”48
I. PRIOR SURVEYS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
There have been multiple surveys over the past decade establishing strong support for civil court case management as a solution to
the challenges plaguing the civil justice system.49 In 2007, the
American College of Trial Lawyers (the “ACTL”) and the Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System (the “IAALS”)
began a joint project “to examine the role of discovery in perceived
problems in the United States civil justice system and to make recommendations for reform” in which they surveyed ACTL members

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE TASK
FORCE 4–5 (2011), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2012/other/ 120214.pdf; JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS COMM. OF THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE: PILOT PROJECT REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL CASES, at ii (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/tab_vi_appendix_f_sdny_pilot_project_for_complex_litigation_0.pdf; Howard Berchtold et al., Bureau of Justice Assistance Criminal Courts
Tech. Assistance Project, Differentiated Cases Management Concept and Application to Civil Case Management, NACM ANNUAL CONFERENCE (July 23, 2010),
https://nacmnet.org/sites/default/files/conferences/PastConferences/PastConferences/2010Annual/Civil%20DCM.pdf; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH & BAR: ON
THE ARIZONA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2010), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/survey_arizona_bench_bar2010.pdf [hereinafter SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH]; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, SURVEY OF THE OREGON BENCH & BAR: ON THE
OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1–2 (2010), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/survey_oregon_bench_bar2010.pdf; LEE SUSKIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A CASE STUDY: REENGINEERING UTAH’S
COURTS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
at i–ii (2012), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/ documents/publications/survey_oregon_bench_bar2010.pdf.
48
Ostrom et al., supra note 25, at 80.
49
See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2012/CostCiv2.pdf.
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beginning in 2008.50 The results of this survey identified the need
for serious repair of the civil justice system, and called for judges to
have a more proactive role in the direction, timing, and cost-containment of a case beginning at the outset of the case, from filing to trial,
including designing the scope of discovery.51 The survey also identified rule enforcement as an issue.52
In response to the problems the survey identified, the
ACTL/IAALS survey recommended that judges hold prompt initial
conferences after service of a complaint to effectively manage all of
their cases.53 The survey noted that “[e]arly judicial involvement is
important because not all cases are the same and because different
types of cases require different case management.” 54 Seventy-four
percent (74%) of the respondents reported that early intervention by
the judge helped narrow the issues in the case.55 The survey called
for courts to set realistic timetables for discovery and to establish
trial dates at the first pretrial conference.56 The report specifically
discussed how continuing trial dates, or the failure to establish firm
trial dates, increases the cost and delay of cases and, to fix this issue,
called for courts to enforce firm trial dates.57 The ABA Section on
Litigation surveyed its members in Fall 2009.58 The respondents to
the ABA survey agreed that litigation was too expensive, costs
would be reduced by expediated disposition, and judges help with

50

AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1–2 (2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/final_report_on_the_joint_project_of
_the_actl_task_force_on_discovery_and_the_iaals_1.pdf.
51
Id. at 2.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 13.
54
Id. at 19.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id. at 20.
58
SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIG., AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SOME PROPOSALS (2010), http://www.us
courts.gov/sites/default/files/aba_litigation_section_civil_procedure_in_the_21st
_century_0.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY].
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narrowing issues and limiting discovery.59 The ABA Section on Litigation also endorsed case management as a critical tool in reducing
cost and delay.60
In 2010, IAALS conducted another survey, this time to collect
data from federal and state trial judges about the civil justice system.61 The majority of the participating judges acknowledged that
civil justice takes too long.62 Seventy-five percent (75%) of state
trial judges and eighty-eight percent (88%) of federal judges believed that early intervention by a judge helps to narrow issues.63
Federal respondents felt that early Rule 16 pretrial conferences lead
to faster case resolution and improved time management.64 Seventy
percent (70%) of responding state and federal judges believed that a
case management order setting deadlines should be entered early in
the case and control the litigation going forward. The respondent
judges, both state and federal, overwhelmingly indicated that both
the time required for discovery and requests for extensions and continuances by attorneys were significant causes for delay.65 Interestingly, the state and federal judges were more reserved when asked
to self-examine their own role in delay, with a much lower rate of

59

Id. at 5.
See id. at 4.
61
Corina Gerety, Trial Bench Views: IAALS Report on Findings from a National Survey on Civil Procedure, 32 PACE L. REV. 301, 301 (2012).
62
Id. at 303.
63
Id.at 314.
64
Id. at 302.
65
Id. at 329 (displaying that eighty-two percent (82%) of state trial judges
and eighty-four percent (84%) of federal trial judges indicated that the “time required to complete discovery” was a significant cause of delay, while eighty-three
percent (83%) of state trial judges and eighty-five percent (85%) of federal trial
judges indicated that “attorney requests for extensions and continuances” were a
significant cause of delay).
60
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judges indicating their belief that delayed rulings and court continuances were causes of significant delay.66 At the same time, a majority of responding judges grant pleading extensions ninety percent
(90%) of the time.67
In 2009, the FJC conducted a survey of attorneys focused on the
costs of litigation and discovery as well as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, amongst other topics.68 The survey placed the attorneys
into three groups: (1) those who primarily represented plaintiffs; (2)
those who primarily represented defendants; and (3) those who represented both plaintiffs and defendants equally.69 The survey asked
two complementary questions: (1) should the Rules be amended to
encourage judicial case management and (2) should the Rules be
amended to discourage judicial case management?70 To the first
question, approximately forty-three percent (43%) of the respondents who represented both plaintiffs and defendants equally agreed
or strongly agreed, thirty percent (30%) felt neutral, and only
twenty-six percent (26%) disagreed or strongly disagreed.71 However, to the second question, only eleven percent (11%) of the respondents who represented both plaintiffs and defendants equally
agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-two percent (32%) felt neutral, and,

66

Id. (displaying that only sixty-five percent (65%) of state trial judges and
seventy-five percent (75%) of federal trial judges indicated that “[d]elayed rulings
on pending motions” were a significant cause of delay, while only sixty-seven
percent (67%) of state trial judges and sixty-five percent (65%) of federal trial
judges indicated that “[c]ourt continuances of scheduled events” were a significant cause of delay).
67
Id. at 330.
68
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
1 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/CivilRulesSurvey
2009.pdf.
69
Id. at 2.
70
Id.at 66–67.
71
Id. Of the respondents who represented primarily plaintiffs, approximately
thirty-three percent (33%) agreed or strongly agreed, twenty-nine percent (29%)
felt neutral, and thirty-five percent (35%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Id. Of
the respondents who represented primarily defendants, approximately thirty-four
percent (34%) agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-four percent (34%) felt neutral,
and thiry percent (30%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Id.
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most interestingly, fifty-three percent (53%) disagreed or strongly
disagreed.72
Notwithstanding the broad enthusiasm for judicial case management and the resulting rule changes to encourage it, there remains a
dearth of data on case management’s effectiveness.73 Important topics, such as whether case management delivers better value in terms
of cost and timely resolution of issues, and what tools and resources
judges need to case manage effectively have not been the subjects
of objective measurement.74 Most of the measurement data that does
exist comes from state pilot projects, small in scale, which have been
summarized in excellent reports from the Civil Justice Initiative75
and IAALS.76 Previous efforts at federal measurement were conducted in the 1990s with the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act
(“CJRA”);77 however, the CJRA pilot program has largely failed to
provide definitive empirical results on whether case management
projects are actually effective and efficient.78
A 1996 study conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice
is arguably the most significant study of federal civil justice reforms
that has, as of now, been conducted.79 The study “summarizes three
72

Id. at 67–68. Of the respondents who represented primarily plaintiffs, approximately sixteen percent (16%) agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-three percent
(33%) felt neutral, and forty-six percent (46%) disagreed or strongly disagreed.
Id. Of the respondents who represented primarily defendants, approximately
eleven percent (11%) agreed or strongly agreed, thirty-seven percent (37%) felt
neutral, and forty-nine percent (49%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Id.
73
Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60
DUKE L.J. 669, 672 (2010) [hereinafter Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire] (“But
even though we are nearly thirty years into the case management era, many practical questions about the real-world effectiveness of judicial case management remain at least partly unanswered.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. REV 374, 380 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges].
74
Id.
75
See generally, e.g., CJI REPORT, supra note 32.
76
See generally, e.g., GERETY & KAUFFMAN, supra note 7.
77
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2016)).
78
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 716 (explaining that
insufficient participation and individualized case management, as well as inconsistent tracking, were reasons for the CJRA’s failure to provide meaningful empirical data).
79
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY,
AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
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technical reports that document RAND’s evaluation of the
[CJRA].”80 The study found that “what judges do to manage cases
matters” in several different respects.81 The RAND study found that
early judicial case management, including setting a trial schedule
early, firm and shortened discovery cutoffs, and appropriate settlement conferences, significantly reduced time to disposition.82 While
the study found that costs were significantly increased by early case
management, the study also found that this increase could be offset
by the decrease in discovery costs associated with firm and shortened discovery cutoffs.83 This combination of early case manangement and firm discovery cutoffs, RAND concluded, resulted in “no
cost penalty for a reduced time to disposition of approximately four
to five months.”84
With regard to the relationship between time and cost, RAND
explained its conclusions in the following way:
Early judicial case management has significant
effects on both time and cost. We estimate a 1.5 to 2
month reduction in median time to disposition for
cases that last at least nine months, and an approximately 20-hour increase in lawyer work
hours. . . . [However] costs to litigants are also
higher in dollar terms and in litigant hours spent
when cases are managed early. These results debunk
the myth that reducing time to disposition will necessarily reduce litigation cost.85

THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/

pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR800.pdf.
80
Id. at v. The three reports summarized in the RAND study are the following: (1) Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act in Pilot and Comparison
Districts; (2) An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice
Reform Act; and (3) An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral Evaluation
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act. Id.
81
Id. at 1–2.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 2.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 14.
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The RAND study also found that early judicial case management shifted work earlier in the case, but found that active management of discovery reduced costs during the discovery phase. Specifically, early judicial case management involves a tradeoff between
shortened time to disposition and increased lawyer work hours.86
Despite this tradeoff, the study found that, “[s]horter time from setting a discovery schedule to discovery cutoff is associated with both
significantly reduced time to disposition and significantly reduced
lawyer work hours.”87 Of all the different factors investigated in the
study, judicial management of discovery is the only technique that
produced the effect of reducing lawyer work hours, and, in turn, litigation costs.88
The RAND study also found that, “in terms of predicting reduced time to disposition, setting a schedule for trial early was the
most important component of early management.”89 This provides
solid evidence of most lawyers’ continued obsession with a trial
date.90 Although most cases are disposed of by means other than
trial,91 the continued obsession with trial dates results in management by way of an extremely rare event;92 in other words, trial dates
are a cultural loadstar that guides lawyers and judges to earlier dispositions and thus, reduced litigation costs.93 Interestingly, eightyfive (85%) of the judges surveyed in pilot districts with regard to
case management before and after the CJRA responded that the
CJRA made “no difference” in the way they managed cases.94

86

Id.
Id. at 16.
88
Id. at 26.
89
Id. at 14.
90
See generally, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note
58, at 7.
91
Langbein, supra note 12, at 524–25.
92
See id. at 26 (stating that lawyer work hours are driven predominantly by
factors other than case management and that “[w]hen time to disposition is cut,
lawyers seem to do much the same work, but do it in less time”).
93
Id. at 14; David C. Steelman, What Have We Learned About Court Delay,
“Local Legal Culture,” and Caseflow Management Since the Late 1970s?, 19
JUST. SYS. J. 145, 159–60 (1997).
94
KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 24. Furthermore, ninety-two percent
(92%) of the judges in comparison districts also believed the CJRA made “no
difference” in the way they managed cases. Id.
87
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The RAND Study is twenty-three years old;95 however, other
studies are even older. Steven Flanders conducted a study in 1975
“of civil cases that were terminated in six large courts.”96 This study
found that judges who used strong case management controls settled
cases within 366 days while judges who used limited or no case
management controls resolved cases within 682 days.97 The study
also found that judges who used strong case management controls
tried cases within 472 days while judges who used limited or no case
management controls tried cases within 945 days.98
One of the other empirical challenges in evaluating civil case
management as a tool to reduce cost and delay is answering the inherently subjective questions of how much is too much and how
long is too long. Some indicia can be evaluated: for example, a survey conducted by the American Institute of Certified Professional
Accountants estimated that continuances increase hours of expert
witness preparation.99 Forty-four percent (44%) of the survey’s respondents estimated an increase between eleven to twenty-five percent (11–25%), another thirty-two percent (32%) estimated an increase of more than twenty-five percent (25%).100 Ninety-six percent (96%) of respondents said their preparation time, and therefore
costs, increased due to continuances.101 The AICPA survey provides
tangible evidence of costs due to continuance.102
Research on litigants’ perspectives of trial suggests that satisfaction with the court is more likely to be influenced by considerations
of procedural fairness than it is by absolute cost or time.103 Delay

95

Id. at 5.
Steven Flanders, Commentary, Blind Umpires—A Response to Professor
Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 516–18 (1984).
97
Id. at 519.
98
Id.
99
AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ANOTHER VOICE: FINANCIAL EXPERTS ON REDUCING CLIENT COSTS IN CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2012),
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/financial_experts_on_reducing_client_costs_in_civil_litigation.pdf.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE PERCEPTION
OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARIBITRATION,
AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 77 (1989) [hereinafter LIND ET AL.,
96
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was a similarly elastic concept.104 Specifically, while “[c]ase delay
did affect the litigant’s attitudes, . . . what mattered was not the absolute delay but rather the litigants’ personal evaluations of whether
the delay was reasonable.”105 Furthermore, evaluations of case delay
showed no consistent relationship to how litigants’ actually perceive
fairness.106 Accordingly, research shows that “delay-reducing efforts should be targeted at those aspects of delay that are most likely
to be seen as unreasonable.”107
Another challenge to measuring the success of case
management derives from a lack of consistent definition of the appropriate parameters of case management and the wide degree of individualization employed in judicial approaches.108 As a result, frustration with the progress on civil justice innovation may
be driving leaders to demand case management on
faith.109 Without specific evidence of efficacy, however, skeptics properly note that case management
THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE] (“The litigants’ judgments of fairness and their satisfaction with the court showed remarkably little relation to the cost of the case or
how long it took to resolve. . . . Economic concerns of all sorts seemed to play at
most a minor role in determining litigants’ attitudes. . . . Case delay did affect the
litigants’ attitudes, but what mattered was not the absolute delay but rather the
litigants’ personal evaluations of whether the delay was reasonable.”); E. Allan
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litgants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 953, 980, 984 (1990)
[hereinafter Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder]; Tyler, supra note 29, at 882
(“[S]tudies of people’s reactions to their experiences in court and mediation suggest that there is little relationship between objective indicators of cost and delay
and litigant’s subjective evaluations of their experience with the legal system.”).
104
See PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 78.
105
Id. at 77.
106
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 103, at 971.
107
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 77.
108
See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 321 (2008); see also, e.g., Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century,
supra note 1, at 575–76; Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Legislation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 41, 43, 90–91 (2008); Flanders, supra note 96, at
507; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 722–23; Gensler &
Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 647–48.
109
Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm.
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 19, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/
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may be “either an effective tonic for undue cost and
delay or a snake-oil solution that is doomed to leave
the patient sick.”110
The challenge of conducting good empirical study is understandable, given the myriad of species of individualized judicial case
management. For example, the RAND study took five years to complete.111 Debate about the ability of case management to reduce cost
and delay is nothing new, nor is it unique to the United States. But
it remains critically important. One of the focuses of the latest wave
of empirical studies is to determine whether case management has
fulfilled its promise. If case management does not help at all, or, as
Professor Tidmarsh recently suggested, it turns out to be counterproductive, then we need to quickly start taking steps to turn around
the battleship.112 Accordingly, the need for additional study is important.
Despite the lack of empirical data, the proliferation of specialized courts that serve high-profile constituencies and have a high
degree of court case management provide practical evidence of the
need for judicial case management. For example, the expansion of
Multidistrict Litigation courts,113 the success of Delaware’s Court of
Chancery as a forum of choice,114 and the spread of business courts
in many jurisdictions115 all demonstrate that case management is
beneficial to the success of the courts and support the existence of a
rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-may-2010 (discussing the 2010 Duke Conference proposals on how to manage cost and delay in litigation and stating that “[p]leas for universalized case
management achieved virtual, perhaps absolute, unanimity”); Steven BaickerMcKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 353, 353, 365–
68 (2015) (“Survey data suggest an uncommon agreement between plaintiffs and
defendants that more judicial involvement leads to quicker, less expensive and
more satisfying results.”).
110
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 727.
111
KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79.
112
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 729.
113
John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 2225, 2229–31 (2008).
114
Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34
J. CORP. L. 771, 773–74 (2009).
115
John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1918, 1922–23 (2012).
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market demand for judicial case management in complex matters.116
However, the breadth of continued calls for judicial case management reform117 demonstrates that, notwithstanding years of debate
and rule changes promoting case management, it is simply not occurring or being enforced in day to day dockets.118
In sum, for decades civil case management has been repeatedly
identified as one of the most effective tools to move cases fairly,
justly, effectively, and efficiently through the civil courts. Case
management as a means by which courts can differentiate and tailor
management of each case according to its need has been the subject
of justice research and advocacy efforts since the late 1970s.119 Despite the cheerleading, the pleas from bar leadership, the mandates
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the proof from different
pilot projects across the states,120 civil case management is still not
generally employed.121 The proof of its absence as part of standard

116

See, e.g., Complex Litigation: Key Findings, supra note 47, at 6.
CORINA GERETY, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
EXCESS & ACCESS: CONSENSUS ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE 7–
8 (2011) [hereinafter GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS].
118
See, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 58, at 13;
SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH, supra note 47, at 3, 51–52.
119
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES COURT DELAY REDUCTION
COMM., AM. BAR. ASS’N, LITIGATION CONTROL: THE TRIAL JUDGE’S KEY TO
AVOIDING DELAY 7 (1996) (discussing THOMAS CHURCH JR. ET AL., NAT’L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN
TRIAL COURTS (1978)); NANCY E. GIST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET: DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT 1 (1995),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/dcm.txt.
120
See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 2–3, 26–30; Gensler & Rosenthal,
The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 854; Baicker-McKee, supra note 109,
at 365–68; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, 647–50;
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 2–4, 15–38.
121
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 735–37; BaickerMcKee, supra note 109, at 358, 368–71; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After
Duke, supra note 9, at 650; CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 4; GERETY, EXCESS &
ACCESS, supra note 117, at 14–15, 18; Freer, supra note 8, at 1520–21. Cf. Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 854 (stating that, even
though the research on and use of case management has increased in recent years,
lawyers and judges did not implement the 1983 changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure until recently due to various worries).
117
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court operations is evident by the repeated continuing clarion calls
for its adoption as the best option for improving civil justice.122
II. FRAMING THE ISSUE
This historical background leads to the key questions that the
following research seeks to address: given the broad call for judicial
case management, what are the attitudes of rank and file judges?
Why do judges make the decisions they do about whether or not to
case manage? Is this a conscious decision or a product of the workload? Do judges have a handle on their overall caseload in terms of
types of cases? What might incentivize judges to engage in civil case
management? When advocates recommend civil case management,
what do they mean, and what does their audience understand them
to mean? These questions are particularly timely for state courts
given the new technological opportunities now available due to the
recent shift to digital files in state courts,123 which was over twentyfive years behind the federal shift to the electronic PACER system,124 and endorsed by the policy recommendations reflected in the
CJI Report.125 For example, Florida, the chosen research location,
only began the shift towards digital court files in the civil circuit
courts in 2009.126
As a matter of practice, there are three approaches to civil case
management:

122

CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 2–3, 16; Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at

358.

123

See Jenni Bergal, Courts Plunge into the Digital Age, PEW (Dec. 8, 2014),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/12/8/
courts-plunge-into-the-digital-age (“We’ve got 50 states and everybody is doing
some kind of e-filing project. That was not true even at the beginning of this year.
It’s really exciting[.]” (quoting Jim McMillan, a technology consultant for the
National Center for State Courts)).
124
25 Years Later, PACER, Electronic Filing Continue to Change Courts,
U.S. CTS., (Dec. 9, 2013), www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/12/09/25-years-laterpacer-electronic-filing-continue-change-courts.
125
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 15–38 (listing recommendations on judicial
case management).
126
In Re: Statewide Standards for Electronic Access to the Courts, AOS09-30
(Fla. July 1, 2009) (adopting and incorporating the Florida Supreme Court
Statewide Standards for Electronic Access to the Courts); see also FLA. R. JUD.
ADMIN. 2.520, 2.525.
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Traditional deferential case management, with near
complete reliance on litigants to progress the case to
resolution requiring only the obligation to provide a
hearing date or trial upon request, and in the absence
of such a request, allows continued inactivity.
Reactive court case management, in which the court
routinely gets involved upon a request for enforcement or ruling by a party, and additionally recognizes
an obligation to act when there is period of inactivity
in the case or the case is aged beyond the judge’s tolerance level;127 and
Proactive court case management which recognizes
an obligation to provide consistent momentum
through a court-supervised case management plan
designed from the outset to ensure effective progress
through case stages, with a defined anticipated resolution deadline, whether by trial or settlement, without unnecessary delay between events.128

Under the traditional deferential approach, case management is
perceived as a responsibility of the lawyers and parties, rather than
the courts, because the litigants themselves know their case the best
and know what it needs and when it needs it.129 In this approach,
courts are theoretically available to assist upon request; parties can
call on the court when they need it.130 As illustrated by the continuing demands for stronger course case management previously detailed, this approach is widespread among judges.131 The effectiveness of this approach is measured by the timeliness of access and the

127

KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 734; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial
Judges, supra note 73, at 384.
128
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 671–72; Gensler &
Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 871–74; WHAT MAKES
CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE?, supra note 31, at 6.
129
Molot, supra note 108, at 29, 32, 39; Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra
note 1, at 562–63; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384–86.
130
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384.
131
See, e.g., GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS, supra note 117, at 14; CJI REPORT,
supra note 32, at 4.
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discipline and effectiveness of enforcement.132 Furthermore, because this approach requires cases to compete for judicial attention
on an on-demand, first-come-first-served basis depending on the
availability of resources, the urgency of the issues in any given case
does not always guarantee access.133 In other words, access depends
on which cases are earlier in the judge’s queue and how much time
and attention those cases require.134 Additionally, many lawyers
complain existing rules are not effectively invoked or timely enforced.135 Therefore, most court leaders—Chief Justices, Chief
Judges, and innovative individual judges–reject this party-based
deferential approach,136 particularly as they are regularly asked to
account for case statistics to legislatures and the public. Its lack of
success may be reflected in the declining reputation of and diminishing caseloads in state courts.137
While the reactive approach to court case management recognizes the responsibility of courts to manage cases to a timely and
efficient resolution, court involvement under this approach is ad hoc
and irregular, triggered only by a request of the parties or inactivity
in the case.138 The length of inactivity sufficient to capture judicial
attention is individually defined,139 except where specific procedural

132

Molot, supra note 108, at 29.
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 414–15; Molot, supra note
108, at 39–40.
134
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 414–15.
135
Molot, supra note 108, at 90; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke,
supra note 9, at 645. For example, a survey conducted in 2010 in connection with
judicial enforcement of Arizona’s mandatory disclosure rules found that only
twenty-one percent (21%) of judges enforced the rules almost always or often,
nineteen percent (19%) enforced the rules half the time, and fifty-five percent
(55%) enforced the mandatory disclosure rules almost never or occasionally.
Therefore, Rule changes designed to promote improvement are ineffective if not
enforced. SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH, supra note 47, at 26.
136
See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 417; GERETY, EXCESS
& ACCESS, supra note 117, at 7–8.
137
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 11; EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at
1–2.
138
Molot, supra note 108, at 39–40; KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1;
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 734; Nagareda, supra note 10,
at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384.
139
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384; CJI REPORT, supra note
32, at 12.
133
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rules are utilized such as for lack of prosecution.140 Progress occurs
from court event to court event, with limited intermediate deadlines
and no effort to reduce unnecessary delay between events.141 There
is no defined overall plan for the case and no end date in the horizon.142 Rather, ultimate deadlines are created when a party notices
the case for trial, which generates a trial order with deadlines
counted backwards from a putative trial date.143 However, even the
efficacy of those trial preparation deadlines is based on compliance,
access, enforcement, and the judge’s continuance policy.144
The proactive court case management approach has been embedded in the federal rules since the 1983 amendments, which made
Rule 16(b) conferences available and civil case management orders
increasingly common among federal judges.145 Furthermore, proactive court case management has been emphasized with great enthusiasm in federal courts since the Duke Conference.146 The proactive
approach requires the judge to establish a case management plan at
the inception of a case, which includes setting reasonable intervals
for intermediate deadlines, with the goal that at each deadline the
case is ready to move to the next phase and towards resolution.147
Under these plans, for example, a case would not be continued for
140

See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(e) (permitting action by the court, including
dismissal for failure to prosecute, if nothing has occurred in the case for a period
of 10 months).
141
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12, 21.
142
See id. at 21–22; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 670–
71.
143
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384; see, e.g., FLA. R. CIV.
P. 2.085(e)(1) (providing specific timing from filing to resolution).
144
See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 99, at 4–5;
KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS, supra note 117,
at 12–13.
145
Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 358; Rosenthal, Defining the Problem,
supra note 7, at 238–41; Langbein, supra note 12, at 555; Joanna C. Schwartz,
Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1655, 1678
(2013).
146
DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 79; Gensler & Rosenthal,
Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 647–50. See generally, e.g., THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., CIVIL
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 5–8 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL].
147
See, e.g., CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 146, at 6–
7.
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failure to complete discovery because the completion of discovery
would have been assured by a prior deadline before the trial date.148
The success of proactive court case management depends on the issuance of a reasonable plan, preferably issued in collaboration with
the parties, the monitoring and enforcement of the intermediate
deadlines, and the degree to which the parties and the court engage
in managing the case through the process.149
However, one of the continuing challenges for court case management is the degree of highly variable individualized practice
among judges and the lack of common standards and definitions.150
Urging courts to undertake systemic case management without defining the task may be weakening advocacy efforts.151 What do
judges, staff, and lawyers envision? The following research is designed in part to determine how these questions of definition and
scope affect adoption of court case management.
III. STATE VS. FEDERAL: THE STATE COURT CASELOAD
The research and debate on case management in academia has
focused on federal courts, and in doing so, has omitted the majority
of American civil litigation.152 As of December 2018, there were
677 authorized United States District Court judgeships.153 According to 2016–2017 data compiled by the National Center for State

148

Id. at 31–37.
Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 652–53; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 111, at 5–8; CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12,
16, 18.
150
See Bone, supra note 108, at 321; Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note
1, at 575–76; Molot, supra note 108, at 41, 43, 90–91; Gensler, Caught in the
Crossfire, supra note 73, 722–23.
151
Molot, supra note 108, at 42; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73,
at 419–20.
152
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/ (last visited
Dec. 17, 2018) (“More than 95% of U.S. Cases are filed in state courts.”); Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004).
153
Vacancy Summary for December 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.us
courts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018
/12/summary (last updated Dec. 1, 2018).
149
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Courts, responding states reported 10,199 trial judges in general jurisdiction state courts across the country.154 Florida alone has 599
circuit court trial judges.155 United States District Courts are “courts
of limited jurisdiction,”156 while “state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction” and are open to all non-federal disputes.157 Unsurprisingly, the breadth of the state court docket poses management challenges. “The development of tracking systems in state courts presents a much different situation because of differences in the cases
that populate the state court docket.”158 In 2016, 291,851 civil cases
were filed in federal district courts.159 In 2015, there were over
7,000,000160 civil cases filed in state court general jurisdiction or
single tier courts.161 Florida had 176,740 new case filings in civil
circuit court during the 2015–2016 fiscal year.162
While all courts are loosely coupled organizations in which a
judge has the responsibility for his or her own docket without a traditional boss, state courts face particular organizational challenges.
First, because judges in state courts frequently change over the life
of a case, either due to rotation, election, or elevation,163 these
154

NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORG., at tbl. 3.2a (S. Strickland et al. eds., 2017), www.ncsc.org/sco.
155
FLA. STAT. § 26.031 (2018); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note
154, at tbl. 3.2a.
156
Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376 (2012).
157
State Courts vs. Federal Courts, JUDICIAL LEARNING CTR., http://judiciallearningcenter.org/state-courts-vs-federal-courts/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
158
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 708 n.174.
159
U.S. District Courts – Judicial Business 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.us
courts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2016 (last visited
Dec. 19, 2018).
160
EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 3.
161
Forty-two states divide their caseload between general jurisdiction courts
and limited jurisdiction courts, which hear a defined caseload, usually below a set
dollar amount in controversy or covering specific areas like landlord/tenant. EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 3–5.
162
FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, FLORIDA’S TRIAL COURTS
STATISTICAL REFERENCE GUIDE FY 2015–16, at 4-2 to 4-5 (2016),
https://www.flcourts.org/content/download/218355/1976076/Chapter-4_CircuitCivil-FY15-16.pdf.
163
E.g., ARIZ. CALL TO REFORM, supra note 47, at 21 (“We note that a strict
practice of rotating judges . . . can inject additional delays and inefficiencies into
civil cases, when judges who have become familiar with the parties and the issues
in an ongoing case are suddenly replaced by a new judge with no background in
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changes introduce uncertainty to the risk calculation for parties pursuing litigation and can generate cost and delay, which is often due
to each judge’s differing approach to case management.164 This is
distinct from the federal system, in which a single judge holds a lifetime appointment within a geographic area and enjoys the support
of a magistrate judge, law clerks, and other staff.165
Additionally, as one judge emphasized in his interview, state
court is much more informal than federal court.166 As opposed to the
typical Federal court practice of submission of written motions and
briefing followed by a written ruling without a hearing,167 state court
relies much more significantly on oral argument at a hearing event,
which results in a verbal ruling subsequently reduced to writing.168
As hearings are typically requested and set by attorneys as opposed
to the court, the progress of the case is dictated by the diligence of
counsel in setting hearings and calendar time availability.169 In Florida, outside of specialty courts, it is rare for courts to issue rulings
without a hearing first.170 As opposed to written rulings, state court
justice is typically delivered in person face-to-face.171 “Many of
the case, and sometimes no background in civil law. Abrupt judicial rotation requires a new learning curve for the new judge.”).
164
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12.
165
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATORS
IN OTHER COUNTRIES 15–16, 19 (4th ed. 2016).
166
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 4 (transcript on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 4].
167
Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 864–65.
168
Id. at 849–50; HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR. & DEBRA M. SALISBURY,
TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 15:3–§15:5 (2018 ed. 2017)
[hereinafter TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
169
TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, § 15:4
at 261–63; see infra Section IV.C.
170
See TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, §
15:4, at 261–63.
171
Time spent in court face to face with litigants and their lawyers is frequently referred to as “bench presence.” Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common
Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91
NORTE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1915 (2016) [hereinafter Resnik, Revising Our Common Intellectual Heritage]. State court judges have a much larger bench presence
than do federal court judges. Compare TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, § 15:4, at 261–62 (“When a motion is served, the court
usually conducts a hearing to determine what order is proper unless the motion
can be heard ex parte beause it is granted as a matter of course or because no
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these interactions are decidedly trial-like in substance and outcome,
though they may not be recorded as formal trials.”172 Further,
[w]hile trials are on the decline in state courts just as
they are in federal courts, state court litigation differs
in important ways. In person interactions between
judges and parties are still the primary means of conducting business ins tate courts. Judges and parties
routinely interact in open court to process and dispose of litigation; few cases are resolved based on
written peladings and motions.173
The potentially significant impact that successful innovations to
improve costs and reduce delays would have is obvious, as such innovations would benefit almost all cases in state courts.174 Further,
such innovations could also have a potentially commensurate benefit to public trust and confidence in the court system, since state
courts are are the ‘community courthouses’ from which most people
seek resolutions to their disputes.175 However, to further understand
judicial attitudes about case management, it is important to understand the civil caseload.176 As discussed, the state caseload is far
more diverse than a typical federal docket.177 Understanding what is
being managed is a first step in understanding how to manage it.178
The National Center for State Courts surveyed 152 civil courts
in ten urban counties across the United States to examine caseloads

substantive rights of a party are affected.”), with Resnik, Revising Our Common
Intellectual System, supra, at 1915 (stating that “[f]ederal judges spent less than
two hours a day on average in the courtroom” (citing Jordan M. Singer & Hon.
William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal District
Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2014))).
172
Anna E. Carpenter et al., Studying the New Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L.
REV. 249, 277 (2018).
173
Id. at 255.
174
See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 4.
175
See id. at 3.
176
See id. at 8.
177
See Markus B. Zimmer, Overview of Specialized Courts, 2 INT’L J. CT.
ADMIN. 56–57 (2009), http://doi.org/10.18352/ijca.111.
178
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 8. You cannot manage what you do not
measure. In fact, inventorying the caseload is part of the first recommendation
from the Conference of Chief Justices. Id. at 16.
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between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013.179 The resulting study, entitled The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, included
925,344 cases, which is approximately five percent (5%) of the state
civil caseload across the country.180 The resulting study established
that nearly sixty-four (64%) of the caseload was contract cases, most
of which were debt collection and landlord/tenant disputes.181 Only
seven percent (7%) of the caseload consisted of tort cases.182 Of that
amount, product liability and malpractice made up five percent
(5%), which was less than one percent (1%) of the total caseload.183
Even among contract cases, the average judgment was $9,428, indicating that the number of complex commercial cases was a small
percentage of the overall contract docket.184
In another study, the National Center for State Courts Court Statistics Project found that, in 2015, contract cases represented fiftyone percent (51%) of the entire civil caseload, while torts case represented only four percent (4%) of the entire civil caseload.185 Furthermore, the study found that tort case filings declined twenty-one
percent (21%) between 2000 and 2015.186
Another significant characteristic of the civil caseload in state
courts is the prevalence of self-represented litigants. In 1992, the
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts found that both plaintiffs and
defendants were represented by counsel in ninety-five percent
(95%) of state court cases.187 By 2013, the Landscape study found
179

LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at iii. The NCSC surveyed the following ten counties: (1) Maricopa County, Arizona (Phoenix); (2)
Santa Clara County, California (San Francisco); (3) Miami-Dade, Florida; (4)
Oahu, Hawaii; (5) Cook County, Illinois (Chicago); (6) Marion County, Indiana
(Indianapolis); (7) Bergen County, New Jersey; (8) Cuyahoga County, Ohio
(Cleveland); (9) Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh); and (10) Harris
County, Texas (Houston). Id. at 15.
180
Id. at iii.
181
Id.
182
Id. at iv.
183
Id. at 19.
184
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 24.
185
EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 26. Based on this national data, I
included in my survey to Florida judges a question about the prominence of contract cases in their overall caseload. See infra Figure 33.
186
EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 8. See also CJI REPORT, supra
note 32, at 9 (“Tort cases . . . have largely evaporated.”).
187
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 31 (discussing the
1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, which was part of a large-scale national
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that, while plaintiffs were still represented by counsel in ninety-two
(92%) of the cases, defendants were represented in only twenty-six
(26%) of cases and both sides had representation in only twenty-four
percent (24%) of cases.188 The growing number of self-represented
litigants compromises the traditional assumption that the competing
interests of the parties will promote case momentum and that the
court can rely on parties to enforce the rules.189 Due to the simple
lack of knowledge on the part of pro se litigants and inattention from
plaintiffs, these cases can languish.190
Our modern civil justice system was not designed—outside of the small claims context—for lay
people. It was designed by and for lawyers, with a
baseline assumption of party control over litigation. . . . At the outset, lay people may lose a case
simply because they do not understand the need to
show up. If they do make it to the courthouse, they
struggle with basic procedures and paperwork and
may never make it to the hearing room. They lose
meritorious cases due to procedural challenges or because they misunderstand substantive law.191

study of civil caseloads conducted by the US Department of Justice Bureau of
Justice Statistics in 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2005).
188
Id. at 31. Florida has not conducted a similar study, however, Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Jorge Labarga appointed a statewide commission on
Access to Civil Justice that identified similar challenges involving self-represented litigants in Florida. FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 1, 3–4 (2016), http://www.flaccesstojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
06/ATJ-Final-Report-Court-06302016-ADA.pdf; About Us, FLA. COMM’N ON
ACCESS TO CIV. JUST., http://www.flaccesstojustice.org/ (last visited Dec. 19,
2018).
189
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 35; CJI REPORT, supra
note 32, at 34. On the traditional model of litigation with counsel, see generally
David Marcus, From “Cases” to “Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Stability in Civil Procedure, 56 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1231, 1237 (2012); Molot, supra
note 108, at 39.
190
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 34. For a discussion on how technology can
help to cure the inequality faced by self-represented litigants, see James E. Cabral
et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
241, 259 (2012).
191
Carpenter et al., supra note 172, at 260–61.
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While much of the debate about civil case management focuses on
complex cases, relatively simple cases may be even more likely to
benefit from civil case management because, among other things,
the disproportionate presence of self-represented litigants in simple
cases require increased judicial supervision to keep pro se cases
moving.192
An examination of the academic research on case management
also evidences the significant challenges in evaluating the management issues confronting the courts and my fellow judges: we do not
know our caseload.193 The docket in our heads does not match the
docket in our files. There is a disconnect between the most prevalent
case types on the docket and judge’s perception of where case management benefits most likely lie. This suggests that judges tend to
overestimate the complexity of their caseloads.194 Certainly, most of
the discussion around case management centers on complex
cases.195 However, as Judge Rosenthal and Professor Gensler point
out, “[i]n many ways, it is the smaller cases that benefit the most
from judicial management because they can least bear the costs of
needless (and avoidable) discovery and motions practice.”196
IV. FLORIDA AND ITS COURTS: EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CASE
MANAGEMENT IN FLORIDA’S CIRCUIT CIVIL COURTS
I chose Florida as the location for this research not only because
of my close personal proximity, but also because it is one of the
largest and most diverse states. Florida is the third largest state by
population, with 21,299,325 residents in July 2018.197 The state’s
192

Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 859; CJI
REPORT, supra note 32, at 33–34; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke,
supra note 9, at 645.
193
See, e.g., CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 12, 31–32.
194
See id. at 8.
195
Id.
196
Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 859.
197
National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2018, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest
/2010s-national-total.html#par_textimage_2011805803 (follow “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and
Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018 (NST-EST2018-01)” hyperlink under
“Population Estimates, Population Change, and Components of Change) (last updated July 1, 2018).
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economy relies on international trade, tourism, agriculture, construction, space, health, and tech services.198 The state mirrors the
country’s political division with the majority of voters almost evenly
split between the two most prominent political parties—4.4 million
registered Republicans and 4.6 million registered Democrats—
while 3 million registered Independents represent the majority of recently registered voters.199 Florida’s twenty-nine electoral votes
went to Republican Donald Trump in 2016, while they went to Democrat Barack Obama in 2012 and 2008.200 The state’s pivotal razorclose vote count in the 2000 election between George W. Bush and
Al Gore is notorious.201 Florida’s range from rural conservative to
urban liberal makes it an ideal location for this research as responses
will almost certainly be varied among differing viewpoints across
the state.202
Florida’s twenty circuit courts further reflect the diversity of the
state.203 There are twenty circuits throughout the state, which represent a wide cross-section of population characteristics: from large
urban circuits such as Miami, to small multi-county, largely rural
circuits.204 They range in size from Monroe County, home of the
Florida Keys, with a population of 73,873 in 2011 and four circuit
court judges, to Miami-Dade County, with a population of

198

Florida Quick Facts, STATEOFFLORIDA.COM, www.stateofflorida.com/
facts.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
199
Martin Savidge, Florida: The Swingiest Swing State, CNN (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/politics/election-2016-donald-trump-hillaryclinton-florida/index.html.
200
Florida, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/Florida (last visited
Dec. 19, 2018).
201
See generally Frank Cerabino, Ten Years Later, Infamous 2000 Election
Ballot Recount Still Defines Palm Beach County to Many, PALM BEACH POST
(Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/ten-years-later-infamous2000-election-ballot-recount-still-defines-palm-beach-county-many/uscC5ni
N1BtOOs 7d33V8GL/.
202
Steve Schale, Everything You Wanted to Know About Florida 2016 But
Were Afraid to Ask, OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2016, 2:44 PM).
203
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, REP. NO. 15-13, A REVIEW OF FLORIDA CIRCUIT COURTS 1
(2015),
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/1513rpt.pdf
[hereinafter OPPAGA REPORT].
204
Id. at 2; Schale, supra note 202.
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2,554,766 in 2011 and eighty circuit court judges.205 For statistical
analysis, the Florida Office of the State Court Administrator categorizes the circuits as small, medium, large, and very large.206 Florida’s circuit civil caseload is generally assigned on a one judge-one
case basis. Master calendars are not favored in Florida, and the research conducted with the state’s trial court administrators reflected
that there are no master calendar systems in use in the circuit civil
caseload across the state.207 Florida’s circuit dockets are generally
divided up into subject divisions: felony criminal; juvenile dependency/delinquency; family divorce/paternity/child support; probate/trusts/guardianship; and general civil cases.208 In most large
and mid-size circuits, judges are assigned to a single division, for
example civil, family or felony.209 In some circuits—particularly in
multi-county or small circuits—judges are assigned to multiple division types and hear a mixed docket, such as civil and probate or
civil and family.210 Florida’s circuit court judges have general jurisdiction over all civil disputes in excess of $15,000.211
In addition, the Florida judicial branch faces challenges in accumulating data on its caseload. In Florida, the Clerks of Court are
separate constitutional officers and are not under the direct supervision of the judicial branch.212 It is the responsibility of the Clerks of
each circuit to manage and assemble all caseload data; however,
there is no uniform system used across all of the circuits.213 Currently, there is almost no statewide data on pending civil cases by
action type; rather, the only caseload data provided by the local
Clerks of Court to the Office of the State Court Administrator is information on filings and dispositions.214 Therefore, Florida is lacking any definitive information regarding its pending civil case count
205

OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203, at 16; Florida Quick Facts, supra note

146.

206

FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 4-6.
Email Survey of 20 Trial Court Administrators (Nov. 2017 to Jan. 2018)
(on file with author).
208
OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203, at 1–2.
209
See id., at 3–4.
210
See id.
211
Id. at 1.
212
Id. at 3.
213
Id. at 4–6.
214
See generally, e.g., id.; FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra
note 162. According to the Florida Office of the State Court Administrator, in
207
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by action type. As a result, it is difficult to acquire caseload data for
case management.
While Florida’s judicial branch leadership has publicly endorsed
case management as a key to the future of the branch in its Long
Range Plan 2016–2021,215 there has been no separate initiative regarding civil justice or emphasis on broad-based civil case management with trial judges and, as illustrated by the following research,
the emphasis has not translated to engagement at the trial-judge
level. Although many state bar associations or supreme courts have
formed blue-ribbon commissions or committees to address the civil
justice system innovation, Florida has not yet established such a
commission.216 Therefore, Florida judges have not yet been exposed
to the publicity about civil case management that typically follows
such a branch effort.217
In sum, Florida state circuit court judges serve as good study
subjects for the survey on trial court attitudes about civil case management, as they represent the courts of general jurisdiction in the
state and have experience managing various cases.218 I benefitted as
2015, real property/foreclosure cases represented 44.4% of the state civil circuit
court filings, contract cases represented 21.9% of filings, auto and other negligence cases represented 18.3%, and product liability and malpractice cases constituted 1.8% of the state filings. Id. at 4-16. The percentages may be significantly
higher if the caseloads of the limited jurisdiction county courts had been included.
See EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3, at 7 (finding that Florida had a thirtyfour percent (34%) contract case filing rate in 2015).
215
See generally FLA. SUPREME COURT, JUSTICE: FAIR AND ACCESSIBLE TO
ALL—THE LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FLORIDA JUDICIAL BRANCH
2016-2021, http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/581/urlt/2016-2021-Long
-Range-Strategic-Plan-Floridaweb.pdf [hereinafter THE LONG RANGE PLAN].
This plan contains specific goals designed to improve case management, including the following: (1) “1.2 Ensure the fair and timely resolution of all cases
through effective case management;” (2) “1.3 Utilize caseload and other workload
information to manage resources and promote accountability;” and (3) “4.3 Create
a compatible technology infrastructure to improve case management and meet the
needs of the judicial branch and court users.” Id. at 3–4.
216
As discussed, Florida’s efforts to date have focused on access to justice in
the civil system as opposed to broader civil justice innovation. See generally, e.g.,
FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 188.
217
Id.
218
Florida’s Circuit Judges have previously served as guinea pigs for judicial
research, such as during the Circuit Judge’s Conference in 2006. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 13 (2007).
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a circuit court judge, the administrative judge for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and a member of this group, as it enabled me to secure
the necessary access to distribute the surveys.219 In addition, although case management received significant attention during the
foreclosure crisis in Florida’s state courts between 2008 and 2015,
that case management effort was directed solely at the tsunami of
foreclosure cases.220 Accordingly, among the other benefits discussed, Florida represented a relatively neutral territory in which to
identify judicial attitudes about case management.
A. Research Methods
To get the most accurate and complete picture of the environment of the Florida civil circuit courts, I gathered two different sets
of information: (1) information from current circuit court judges
across the state as to the character and management of the pending
civil caseload in circuit courts; and (2) information from circuit trial
court administrators (“TCAs”) for each of Florida’s twenty circuits
about the level of civil case management occurring in their circuits.221 All twenty circuits provided the requested information.
The inquiries related to civil case management asked about the
existence of any systemic case management programs in place, institutional support for case management, specialty divisions, standardized procedures, the degree of individualization among the circuit’s civil judges, data measurement and distribution, and the “local
court culture” of each circuit.222 The purpose of gathering this information from both judges and court administrators was to identify
whether the information gathered from the judges matched the information gathered from the trial court adminstrators in the same
circuit, or whether there were disconnects and disagreements between the two sets of information. The caseload information was
gathered to gauge the judges’ knowledge of the constellation of
219

See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 6; infra Section IV.A.
In Re: Final Report and Recommendations of the Foreclosure Initiative
Workgroup, AOSC13-28, 1 (Fla. June 21, 2013) [hereinafter Foreclosure Initiative Workgroup].
221
Time constraints prohibited also surveying attorneys about their case management experiences as a means to corroborate or refute judge and trial court administrator perceptions. This additional step invites further study.
222
The surveys and questionnaires used in this research are on file with the
Author and the University of Miami Law Review. They are available upon request.
220
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cases on their dockets and to compare the cases types between circuits. However, comparing the various circuits’ civil case types
proved to be an unanticipated patchwork task.
Research within the judiciary was approached through two vehicles: (1) a quantitative written survey for judges; and (2) qualitative telephone interviews I conducted with judges. The first vehicle,
the quantitative written surveys, was conducted between late July
and December 2017 and contained a series of statements targeted
towards factors that the prior pilot projects, academic research, studies, and surveys discussed above have identified as influencing case
management decision-making.223 Specifically, the written survey
targeted the following factors:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lack of awareness of case management;
Misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;
Philosophy of judicial independence and perception of case
management as an administrative versus judicial function;
Cross-incentives such as elections, bar polls, attorney fees
and ambition;
Institutional inertia or “local court culture;” and
Lack of time or support to case manage.

The written survey asked judges to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each particular statement, including an
option for “no opinion.” The survey responses were anonymous as
to the judge’s own identity, but requested information about the circuit in which each judge sits as well as each judge’s years of service.
This permitted analysis of the responses based on both experience
level and geographic diversity. The title, “Civil Case Management
Survey on Judicial Views,” appears in large bold letters at the top of
the survey, and the instructions provided a deliberately broad and
generic definition of case management: “In considering these questions, please use the following definition for Case Management:
Case management is the entire set of actions that a court takes to

223

Any mention of standard judicial survey questions and TCA interview
questions can be found in the surveys and questionnaires on file with the Author
and the University of Miami Law Review.
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monitor and progress cases, from filing to disposition to post-disposition, to assure that each case is resolved fairly, justly, cost-effectively and without undue delay.”
I conducted the survey research in two phases. Initially, the survey was handed out to a live audience on July 23, 2017 in Orlando
at the annual Florida Circuit Court Judge’s Conference, the educational opportunity for judges to secure their required continuing judicial education requirements.224 In addition to currently sitting circuit court judges, “senior judges,” who are retired judges who sit
upon request to assist circuits when needed, also attend this conference.225 The instructions with the survey informed judges that they
should participate only if they had judicial experience in the civil
division, relying upon judges to self-police in terms of their response. Of the 457 judges at the conference,226 123 responded to the
survey at the conference, representing a twenty-seven percent (27%)
response rate. It is important to note, however, that the attendance
records did not break down the number of judges who had been or
were currently assigned to a civil docket. It also did not break down
the number of sitting judges versus the number of retired senior
judges at the conference. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the
exact number of potentially qualified responders who were in attendance at the conference but declined to respond.227
As a result, because I wanted to ensure that the attitudes of currently sitting judges were adequately represented in the results, I
also mailed the survey to all circuit court judges in Florida. The instructions included with the mailed survey made very clear that if
the judge had taken the survey in person at the conference, he or she
should not take the survey again. The survey was mailed to all sitting
circuit court judges, and an additional 177 responses were returned.
Again, it is impossible to determine how many judges were eligible
to complete the survey as there is no effective way to track whether
224
Judges must attend one conference every three years to satisfy their educational requirements. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.320.
225
Senior Judges, FLA. SUPREME CT., http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/
employment/senior-judges.shtm (last visited on Nov. 3, 2018).
226
Email from Charles Hydovitz, Conference Manager, to Jennifer Bailey,
Circuit Court Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida (Aug. 24, 2017)
(on file with University of Miami Law Review).
227
Judges were instructed that they should execute the survey only if they had
civil judicial experience and not all judges have been assigned to a civil docket.
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a given judge had ever been assigned to circuit civil dockets, even if
they were now sitting elsewhere due to judicial rotation.228 This effort relied on judges accurately following the directions and only
executing the survey if they actually had civil experience, for which
there is no good control. In addition, although the survey instructions were very clear, it was handed out live and then again by mail,
and the possibility exists that some judges may have filled out the
survey twice.229
As a result of the two-phased effort, a total of 303 surveys were
received. The results of the survey are reflected in the analysis that
follows, which includes graphs that depict the responses to each
statement. Each graph includes the statement being surveyed listed
at the top, followed by a number indicating its respective position in
the survey sequence. Each survey included an invitation to volunteer
for a follow-up interview. Responses to that invitation were fairly
robust, in that forty-seven judges volunteered to be interviewed.
These volunteers were the subject of the next phase of research.
The second vehicle I conducted was qualitative, journalisticstyle interviews with the volunteer circuit court judges. Each interview included a set of open-ended questions directed at judicial
background and experience, why and how the individual judge case
managed, and the perception of what motivated judicial colleagues.
The interviews took, on average, between forty-five and seventyfive minutes. Because the group volunteered for interviews, it is fair
to conclude that the volunteers were actively interested in case management, which was further revealed in the interviews themselves. I
conducted twenty-one230 qualitative interviews with judges from
most circuits across the state, most of which were done via telephone
228

Rotation is the process by which circuit judges change assignments to different divisions of the court. Circuits can have differing rotation procedures and
schedules and, generally, they are divided into criminal, civil, family, juvenile,
and probate sections. See generally FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.215.
229
A number of conscientious judges contacted me to make sure that I had
received their first survey at the conference and to ask whether they could ignore
the mail-out version, which offered some comfort in terms of attention to the directions. An additional set returned the mail survey to me in blank with a note that
they had already executed it.
230
Time limitations due to thesis deadlines prevented interviewing all volunteers. I selected interviewees based on geography, circuit size, and those who responded when I asked for interview dates and times.
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but a few from my own circuit were done in person. In terms of
experience, judges ranged from two-and-a-half to twenty-seven
years on the bench. These interviews provided additional insights
into the data gathered through the surveys. Notwithstanding the
built-in bias from the volunteer process, a diverse set of perspectives
emerged.
The qualitative interview began by securing basic information
about the judges: total years on the bench, years of civil judicial experience, and available staff support. The questions then turned to
individual definitions of case management and how that judge case
managed. The next questions directly addressed factors related to
why judges may or may not elect to case manage. As in the first
phase of research, the factors were derived from pilot projects, prior
surveys, and other academic research. These factors are the same
factors that the written survey was designed to test:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lack of awareness of case management;
Misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;
Philosophy of judicial independence and perception of case
management as an administrative versus judicial function;
Cross-incentives such as elections, bar polls, attorney fees
and ambition;
Institutional inertia or “local court culture;” and
Lack of time or support to case manage.

I asked for each judge’s reactions and comments with regard to the
individual factors. Virtually all respondents answered enthusiastically and thoughtfully. I took detailed written notes for each interview. I used a standard interview sheet with the questions listed, so
that each judge would be asked each question with similar language,
without missing or skipping questions. In order to assure complete
and candid responses, I guaranteed that the identity of each judge I
interviewed would remain anonymous.
The results of the qualitative interviews, as discussed further below, reflected that there is no real uniform understanding amongst
judges regarding what the standard definition and scope of “civil
case management” is. While each judge was asked what “case management” meant to them, each judge had his or her own individual
definition, which then framed and animated their subsequent responses. Therefore, the qualitative interviews further revealed the
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inherent variation in approaches to case management amongst the
judges, which provides challenges to the broad-based adoption of
civil case management that is currently proposed.
The Trial Court Adminstrator surveys were drafted with a series
of open-ended questions about administrative support among the
circuits for civil case management, utilization of differentiated case
management in the civil division of the subject circuit, use of standardized procedures or forms for civil case management, use of single
judge assignment to cases versus master calendar, data distriubiton
and performance report distribution, and TCA perception of how
judges manage civil cases in their circuit. These questions were delivered to the Trial Court Adminstrators for every circuit by email,
and the responses were delivered by email and executed by the adminstrators or their designees. Every circuit responded. Responses
were received between October 2017 and January 2018. The purpose of these surveys was to gauge the judicial awareness of available resources, use of data available to them, and whether the administrator’s reports correlated to the judges’ perceptions.
It would be fair and reasonable to question the ability that a sample of a single state’s judges has to extract broader conclusions about
court case management and identify the barriers to its universal
adoption. While Florida seems like a fertile soil from which to glean
such attitudes, it is still only a single state, and many states may
rightfully assert they have little in common with the third most populous state in the nation.231 However, while Idaho, for example, may
have little in common with Miami, it is likely to have much in common with small or mid-size rural communities in Florida, and those
attitudes are likely to be reflected herein. There are more than twenty
million people currently living in Florida, who span across an array
of different communities and, for those who participate in litigation
at some point in their lives, file a wide variety of civil cases. In short,
the most logical response to such criticism is that we have to start
somewhere if we are to determine how the national efforts towards
implementation of uniform civil case management can succeed.
Finally, it would also be fair to criticize the qualitative effort,
specifically, due to the potential self-selection bias of the judges
who volunteered for the qualitative interviews. While it is true that
231
National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2018, supra
note 197.
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no judge who volunteered for the interviews professed animosity to
case management as a tool or concept, the survey data—both my
own and in the past—suggests that such animosity exists, albeit in a
minority.232 These are the judges who will be the most difficult to
convince of the benefits that case management will have on themselves, the court, and most importantlhn]y, the litigants we serve.
Other than capturing their observations in the anonymous written
survey responses, engaging with these judges presented an insurmountable problem in this setting.
B. Trial Court Administrator Survey Results
All of the TCA’s reported that their circuits use a one judge/one
case system, in which a single judge is assigned to handle all the
cases—from filing to disposition—in their assigned civil docket, as
opposed to a master calendar system, in which cases move from
judge to judge based on the procedural status of the case.233 In practice, judges in Florida rotate among substantive assignments periodically, which may result in multiple judges being assigned to a case
if it is not resolved within a single rotation timespan.234
When asked whether the circuit had a formally structured civil
case management system, only four circuits answered that they
did.235 The Eighteenth Circuit, located mid-way up the east coast of
Florida, sets a case management conference when a case has been
inactive for a specified period of time and, if appropriate, sets up a
schedule of dates culminating in a trial date.236 A scheduling conference is held when cases are noticed for trial.237 In the Sixteenth Circuit in the Florida Keys, case management orders are issued for the
general civil caseload at the judge’s discretion at commencement of
232

See infra Figure 7. See, e.g., Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note
73, at 689–92; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 650.
233
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.215.
234
Id.
235
There is no data available comparing case closure rates between these circuits and other circuits, which might be a source of further study. Interestingly,
there was no reference to these systems in any of the interviews.
236
E-mail from Mark Van Bever, Trial Court Adm’r, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 05, 2017, 12:17 EST) (on file with the University of
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Eighteenth Circuit TCA Response].
237
Id.
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the case.238 In the Tenth Circuit, mid-state, a case management conference is set when there has been a lack of activity in the case,239
and in the Twentieth Circuit, a case management order is sent out at
the inception of the case.240
None of the TCAs reported any kind of routine differentiated
case management based on case types across the divisions of their
general civil circuit dockets.241 Differentiated case management is
only utilized in establishing specialty courts within civil circuits.
Four large circuits (Eleventh–Miami, Thirteenth–Tampa, Fifteenth–
Palm Beach, and Seventeenth–Fort Lauderdale) use specialty divisions to segregate and handle different case types—such as family

238

E-mail from Paunece Scull, Dir. Case Mgmt., Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of
Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 17, 2017, 09:14 EST) (on file with the University of Miami
Law Review).
239
E-mail from Nick Sudzina, Trial Court Adm’r, Tenth Judicial Circuit of
Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 16, 2017, 13:14 EST) (on file with the University of Miami
Law Review) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit TCA Response].
240
E-mail from Sheila Jerome, Civil/Family Div. Dir., Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 10, 2017, 11:19 EST) (on file with the University of
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Twentieth Circuit TCA Response].
241
During the foreclosure crisis in Florida, many circuits had separate foreclosure divisions to handle caseload backlogs, which also included specially designated funding for senior judges and case manager positions. See generally Foreclosure Initiative Workgroup, supra note 220. However, most funding for those
divisions terminated in 2015 and most of these divisions have been closed as the
case backlog has been nearly resolved. See Paul Owners, South Florida Foreclosures ‘Tantalizingly Close to Normal,’ SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 12, 2017, 9:26 AM);
Kimberly Miller, Expiring Foreclosure Court Money May Help and Hurt Homeowners, PALM BEACH POST (May 11, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/business/real-estate/expiring-foreclosure-court-money-may
-help-and-hurt/nmDkG/.
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law, complex business litigation, complex tort, asbestos, and tobacco cases.242 One smaller circuit, the Eighth Circuit, has a specialized division to which extraordinary writs are assigned.243
In terms of case management staff positions, most circuits have
a limited number of positions dedicated to reviewing cases for inactivity, lack of prosecution, and lack of service.244 Each case manager
works on a ratio of one case manager to between two and twelve
judges, with the exception of the Twentieth Circuit which has case
managers on a 1:1 or 1:2 ratio for their case management system.245
Five circuits have no civil case managers assisting judges.246
While standard form orders such as trial orders and pretrial compliance orders are widely used, there was no evidence that any
broader standardized approach to case management is used across

242

E-mail from Maria Harrris, Circuit Civil Operations Div. Dir., Eleventh
Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div.,
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Nov. 13, 2017, 15:48 EST) (on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Eleventh Circuit TCA Response];
E-mail from Robyn Gable, Trial Court Adm’r, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla.,
to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit
of Fla. (Oct. 16, 2017, 16:59 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law
Review) [hereinafter Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response]; Eighteenth Circuit TCA
Response, supra note 236.
243
E-mail from Bridget Baker, Dir. of Court Operations, Alachua Cty. Family
and Civil Justice Ctr., Eighth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 23, 2017,
10:03 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter
Eighth Circuit TCA Response].
244
OPAGGA REPORT, supra note 151, at 11–18. There are five circuits in
which TCAs report using case managers to assist with unresolved and aged foreclosure cases from the foreclosure crisis. As these are not part of the regular
docket but are rather still directed at special backlog reduction efforts, I discounted those positions as they do not benefit the general caseload.
245
Twentieth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 240.
246
E-mail from Susan Wilson, Dir. of Research and Data, Second Judicial
Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh
Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:03 EST) (on file with the University of
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Second Circuit TCA Response]; E-mail from
Walt Smith, Court Adm’r, Twelfth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey,
Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 05, 2017,
12:17 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter
Twelfth Circuit TCA Response]; Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note
242.
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judges’ dockets. Even within the systems referenced above, it appears, based on the responses, that individual judges decide whether
and how to use those case management systems within their caseload.
The TCA responses also indicate that, across the board in Florida, every judge sets his or her own case management procedures
with the exception of minor standardization in part of the Twentieth
Circuit.247 However, even in the Twentieth Circuit, there is some
individual “tweaking” of case management procedures set forth in
those counties that use the system.248 Otherwise, the degree of consistency between judges in a geographic location depends on personal relationships between the judges.
In terms of data or reports that enable judges to identify case
management issues, seven circuits do not distribute any routine data
or reports to their judges.249 Of the remaining thirteen circuits, the
data or reports distributed are geared towards case age, inactivity,

247

Twentieth TCA Response, supra note 240.
Id.
249
Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; E-mail from Virginia B.
Norton, Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Fourth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D.
Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct.
23, 2017, 10:03 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Fourth Circuit TCA Response]; Eighth Circuit TCA Response, supra note
243; E-mail from Matthew Benefiel, Trial Court Adm’r, Ninth Judicial Circuit of
Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Fla. (Jan. 22, 2017, 16:21 EST) (on file with the University of Miami
Law Review); Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; E-mail from
Thomas Genung, Trial Court Adm’r, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla.
(Oct. 23, 2017, 10:03 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review)
[hereinafter Nineteenth Circuit TCA Response].
248
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and clearance rates.250 Two circuits provide reports on jury trials.251
No circuits routinely generate and distribute reports on time standard compliance or reports that track disposition of intermediate court
events such as pending motions, requests for hearings or matters under judicial advisement.
All TCAs reported that the majority of court events are set upon
request by attorneys, either by contacting the judicial office or by
online scheduling. Cases are typically only set by the court where
the judge has identified an issue due to the age of the case, inactivity,
or some other attention-grabbing issue which prompts a reaction by
the court, or where a trial order is initiated, usually in response to a
notice for trial from a party.252
250

E-mail from Sondra M. Lanier, Court Adm’r, Third Judicial Circuit of Fla.,
to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit
of Fla. (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:37 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law
Review) [hereinafter Third Circuit TCA Response]; E-mail from Jonathan Lin,
Trial Court Adm’r, Fifth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin.
Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 17, 2017, 11:21
EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Fifth Circuit
TCA Response]; E-mail from Gay Inskeep, Trial Court Adm’r, Sixth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 09, 2017, 11:15 EST) (on file with the University of
Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Sixth Circuit TCA Response]; E-mail from
Mark Weinberg, Court Adm’r, Seventh Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 9,
2017, 16:13 EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter
Seventh Circuit TCA Response]; Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239;
Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; Twelfth Circuit TCA Response,
supra note 246. The term “clearance rate” measures how a court is keeping up
with its caseload and whether judges are closing as many cases as are being filed.
In Florida, it is described as:
The clearance rate is a useful measure of the responsiveness of a court to
the demand for services, and is nationally recognized as a measure of
court performance. The rate is determined by dividing the total number
of cases disposed by the total number of cases filed during a specific time
period.
FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 10-3.
251
Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; E-mail from Kathleen
Pugh, Trial Court Administrator, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer
D. Bailey, Admin. Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct.
6, 2017, 3:37 PM EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review).
252
See TRAWICK’S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 168, §
15:5, at 261–63.
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In the large majority of civil cases, TCAs reported that there are
no case management or scheduling orders issued at the commencement of the case as a standard procedure.253 Case management is
usually triggered by inactivity, and scheduling usually occurs
through deadlines set forth in a pretrial or a trial order once a case is
noticed for trial.254 The exception is, again, the Twentieth Circuit,
which sets a standard case management conference at 150 days in
three of five counties in the circuit.255
When asked about local court culture and case management,
court administrators acknowledged that their circuit’s procedures
are largely based on the discretion of each individual judge.256 Most
TCAs reported that attorneys drove case progress as opposed to the
court taking responsibility.257 At the same time, every circuit
acknowledged the court’s responsibility to control the pace of litigation. Many reported that judges tend to grant attorneys leeway until delay in the case becomes an issue, and that every judge has different standards.258 However, most judges still move cases from
court event to court event based on what the parties set down before
them. When asked specifically whether judges or attorneys set the
pace, every TCA reported that, while it differs widely by judge, progress and pace is largely attorney-driven.259
The TCAs’ responses included their thoughts on why judges do
not engage in civil case management.260 There were two common
253

See, e.g., Fourth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 249; Seventh Circuit
TCA Response, supra note 250; Nineteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note
249.
254
Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239; Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242.
255
Twentieth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 240.
256
See, e.g., Eighth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 243.
257
See, e.g., Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; Third Circuit
TCA Response, supra note 250; Fifth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250;
Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239.
258
Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239; Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; Fourteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242.
259
See, e.g., Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; Third Circuit
TCA Response, supra note 250; Fifth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250;
Tenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 239.
260
See, e.g., Second Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246; Third Circuit
TCA Response, supra note 250; Fourth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 249;
Seventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250; Nineteenth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 249.
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refrains: a lack of resources and lack of case management support
personnel. Trial court administrators across the board indicated that
case management in their circuits suffered due to the lack of support,
technology as well as staff. The lack of consensus among the judges
within each circuit was also evident in the responses: differences in
the degree to which judges rely on attorneys to drive cases, the appropriate time to intervene when a case is inactive, and how to prioritize the judge’s time and attention between cases make any systemic initiative on the part of court administration difficult. At the
same time, all the TCAs expressed confidence in and admiration of
the judges’ dedication to timely resolution of the matters before
them.
C. Judicial Survey and Interview Results:
The discussion that follows grouped survey questions aimed at
specific factors with the interview responses that expanded on that
factor. The grouping includes questions that occurred at different
points in the survey in an effort to test responses for consistency,
and each graph includes a number denominating the numeric order
of the question in the survey. In many instances, the total responses
reflected in the survey do not total 100% because respondent judges
skipped or missed a question. The incidence of these omissions was
typically one to two percent (1–2%) of respondents, the highest total
skip rate was four percent (4%).
As referenced earlier, the research was designed to address the
following factors, which have emerged as potential influences affecting the success and use of judicial case management:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lack of awareness of case management;
Misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;
Philosophy of judicial independence and perception of case
management as an administrative versus judicial function;
Institutional inertia or “local court culture”;
Cross-incentives such as elections, bar polls, attorney fees
and ambition; and
Lack of time or support to case manage.
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The first three factors—awareness, misunderstanding, and philosophy—are individual considerations for a judge. The last three factors—local culture, cross-incentives, and support—are institutional
considerations which consider the effect of outside influences on the
case management choice. The next Sections discuss each factor, including both the related survey results and insights gained from the
qualitative interviews. The results will also be discussed in further
detail based on data subsets, which take a closer look at the results
based on the size of the circuits—large, medium, and small—and
experience level of the judges—zero to three years (new), three to
six years, six to nine years, nine to twelve years, twelve to eighteen
years, and over eighteen years261 with regard to those results in
which some distinct difference appeared between subset responses.
1. AWARENESS
When identifying causal factors in judicial decision-making
about case management, the first question is whether judges are
even aware of case management as a tool in the civil judge’s
toolbox. The traditional deferential approach of judges sitting back
and resolving only the matters put to them by the parties is still the
dominant mode of operation in civil courts,262 but does that mean
that judges are not aware that case management is part of the job?
Case management is implicit in both the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.010 provides that, “[t]hese rules shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action.”263 As noted in the comment to the rule, “whether
an action is to be determined in the manner contemplated will depend, in great measure, upon the attitudes of judges and lawyers in
approaching legal controversies and in employing and applying the
rules.”264 Civil case management is taught as a routine topic at judicial education conferences and was extensively utilized during the
261

While I do not also include graphs that depict these results of the data subsets, such graphs are available and on file with myself and the University of Miami
Law Review.
262
See, e.g., GERETY, EXCESS & ACCESS, supra note 117, at 14; CJI REPORT,
supra note 32, at 4.
263
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010.
264
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 comment to 1967 amendment.
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foreclosure crisis.265 While case management is emphasized as a
means to improve judicial performance in the Florida Judicial
Branch’s Long Range Strategic Plan,266 the means to implement
those goals is undefined.
As one interviewed judge put it, “[a]re you asking me if judges
are oblivious?”267 Anonymous survey responses to a set of questions
testing basic awareness of case management indicate that while
some judges are, in fact, oblivious, most are not.

While eighty-eight percent (88%) of total respondents agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement “judges have a responsibility to
assume early and continuous control over the pace of litigation,”
eight percent (8%) of total respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed and four percent (4%) had no opinion.268 Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545, entitled “Case Management,” states
that, while “parties and counsel shall be afforded a reasonable time
to prepare and present their case,”
The trial judge shall take charge of all cases at an
early stage in the litigation and shall control the progress of the case thereafter until the case is determined. The trial judge shall take specific steps to
265

See generally THE LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 215; Foreclosure Initiative Workgroup, supra note 220.
266
See generally, THE LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 215.
267
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 13 (transcript on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 13].
268
Figure 1.
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monitor and control the pace of litigation, including
the following: (1) assuming early and continuous
control of the court calendar.269
A further breakdown of the data reveals that a significant seventeen
percent (17%) of newer judges—those who have only zero to three
years’ experience—disagreed with the statement. Most support was
found from respondents in larger circuits, who strongly agreed at
sixty-nine percent (69%), nearly twenty points higher than the
small- to medium-sized circuits.

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 also provides that
“[j]udges and lawyers have a professional obligation to conclude litigation as soon as it is reasonably and justly possible to do so.”270
Accordingly, this statement resulted in only three percent (3%) reporting no opinion and five percent (5%) reporting strong disagreement.271 Interestingly, eleven percent (11%) of newer judges disagreed. The consistent agreement in responses to these questions indicates that judges are aware of the court’s responsibility to manage
and progress litigation.

269
270
271

FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545(a)–(b).
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545(a).
Figure 2.
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As discussed, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.545 imposes the obligation “to concluded litigation as soon as it is reasonably and justly possible to do so” on both judges and lawyers.272
However, few judges expressed confidence in litigants’ ability to do
so, with only seventeen percent (17%) strongly agreeing/agreeing
and five percent (5%) expressing no opinion.273 In contrast, seventyseven percent (77%) stronglydisagreed/disagreed.274 This frames
the challenge for courts: if courts do not think the parties and the
lawyers can execute this task, how are courts to supervise and ensure
the promise of reasonable, swift justice? This result highlights disconnects between broad conceptual knowledge of the obligation to
case manage and the actual execution of case management on a dayto-day basis. All of the interviewed judges repeatedly raised issues
of strategic delay, overburdened lawyers, financial incentives, and
inattention as compromising litigant dependability in providing for
case momentum. At the same time, interviewed judges emphasized
the need to collaborate with lawyers to assure that reasonableness
pervades any case management effort. Ideally, each case should get
what it needs at the time it needs it as much as organizationally possible.

272
273
274

FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545(a).
Figure 3.
Id.
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A similar response was reflected here with sixty-four percent
(64%) expressing disagreement, but a much higher eighteen percent
(18%) having no opinion.275 This is a large “no opinion” set for such
a basic question about handling a docket; it represents a 250% increase in “no opinion” responses from the earlier-referenced question about litigant reliability and reflects a somewhat startling ambivalence about attorney roles.276 A total of eighty-one percent
(82%) disagreed, strongly disagreed, or had no opinion, which again
suggests judges do not rely on lawyers to move cases.277 Only eighteen percent (18%) agreed that lawyers reasonably progress cases on
their own.278 Again, many judges professed no opinion, in ranges
from ten to twenty-seven percent (10%–27%) across the data subsets based on size of circuit and experience. This speaks to a potential absence of case management by lawyers and judges.

275
276
277
278

Figure 4.
Compare Figure 4, with Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Id.
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Overall, eighty-four percent (84%) of the judges interviewed
agreed with this oft-quoted principle279: “justice delayed is justice
denied.”280 In practice, this adage means that the result must be delivered while the outcome is still meaningful.281 For case-management purposes, this question recognizes the importance of timely
access. The six percent (6%) who disagreed or strongly disagreed
indicate that, while they are the clear minority, there is a group of
judges in the dissent. In terms of data subsets, responders from large
circuits strongly agreed nearly twenty-three percent (23%) more often than those from smaller circuits.
Interviewed judges defined this issue in terms of providing access.282 Every judge agreed that timely access resolves issues and
279

Figure 5.
See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied,
2 NEXUS 21 (1997); Alexander B. Aikman, An Essay on Restoring Case Flow
Management to “The Heart of Court Management, CT. MANAGER, Spring 2013,
at 6, 16 (2015).
281
See Chemerinsky, supra note 280, at 39.
282
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 1 (transcripts on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 1]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 2 (transcripts on file with the University
of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 2]; Telephone Interview
4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 10 (transcripts on
file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview
10]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 11 (transcripts on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 11]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 14 (transcripts on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 14]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 17 (transcripts on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 17]; Telephone Interview
280
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moves cases.283 Several judges had interesting observations about
how their colleagues evaluated their own ability to deliver justice.284
They observed that judges who do not case manage viewed justice
delivery at the level of the individual case, without really evaluating
how that case affected other pending matters,285 while judges who
do case manage viewed justice delivery across their entire docket,
to ensure that each case received justice.286 The related questions to
this two-tiered view of case management were designed to investigate how the judges surveyed viewed the scope of their obligation
to deliver timely justice. The following questions were interspersed
through the survey to test those concepts.

The rate of agreement in this statement is similar to the above
question at eighty-eight percent (88%),287 which reinforces the view
that the timeliness of resolutions is a significant aspect of judicial
effectiveness. Again, judges in large circuits strongly agreed at a rate
twenty points higher than judges from smaller circuits. The results
of this statement suggest that judges understand that timely access
is essential.288 At the same time, the most common traditional deferential and reactive approaches to case management suggest that
with Anonymous Judge 21 (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law
Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 21].
283
See supra note 282.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Figure 6.
288
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282 Telephone Interview 2,
supra note 282; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 9 (transcript on file
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court involvement is sought only after an issue has erupted, which
requires waiting in line to be heard.289 Proactive case management
contemplates pre-established access points designed to prevent delay and problems from accruing.290 These results inidicate that all
three approaches can work, depending on the degree of timeliness
of access and how a judge prioritizes their workload, as the responses indicates a fundamental understanding that delay compromises the Court’s mission and implicates the public’s confidence in
the courts to resolve their issues.
However, the disarray in addressing this problem was captured
in the following set of questions.

The responses to this statement evidenced the opposition and the
work that advocates for case management must face. While only
twenty-seven percent (27%) of total responding judges agreed or
strongly agreed, twenty-one percent (21%) had no opinion.291 In
other words, roughly fifty percent (50%) of responding judges either
do not think about case management or had no opinion. Fifty one
percent (51%) rejected the statement. Interestingly, newer judges
with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 9];
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 19 (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 19].
289
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384, 414–15.
290
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 671–72; Gensler &
Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 871–74; WHAT MAKES
CIVIL JUSTICE EFFECTIVE?, supra note 31, at 6.
291
Figure 7. It is important to note that one percent (1%) of the judges surveyed provided no response to this statement.
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had strong opinions: They strongly disagreed at a significantly
higher rate of seventeen percent (17%).
Additionally, the responses frame a larger question: If attorneys
and parties cannot be trusted to reliably progress cases and delay
threatens justice, how does timely justice get delivered if judges are
not thinking about case management? This series of responses
seems to acknowledge problems but avoids confronting court responsibility for solutions.

This statement appeared halfway through the survey and was designed to test the consistency of the responses and identify potential
definitional issues. Total responding judges agreed or strongly
agreed at ninety-four percent (94%), while only two percent (2%)
strongly disagreed, and three percent (3%) either had no opinion or
did not respond to this statement.292 There were high levels of agreement across all the data sets, with little disagreement. However, it is
difficult to reconcile the broad agreement on this statement if
roughly fifty percent (50%) of judges are not thinking about case
management daily, as reflected in the previous results.293 This draws
the larger question into crisper focus: how can case management be
part of the judge’s job if half of the bench has no opinion or does not
think of case management as part of their daily work? These results
imply that judges know that case management is their responsibility
but lack the specifics to implement it on a daily basis.
Most of the interviewed judges either strongly objected to, or
indicated disagreement with, any assertion about the civil bench’s
292
293

Figure 8.
See supra Figure 7.
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lack of awareness as a contributing factor to a lack of civil case management.294 Judges generally felt that the frequency of reference to
case management suggested that only deliberate ignorance could
produce a lack of awareness. All interviewed judges felt that nearly
every judge is aware of case management, but whether they chose
to employ it or not is a different issue. If judges say they are not
aware, interviewees believe it to be an excuse or a result of willful
ignorance.295 A few judges expect that there is a small number of
judges—the very old and the very new—who might not be as aware
as they should be.296 The interviewed judges generally felt that case
management was the subject of education and awareness, but that
simply raising it as an issue is insufficient without incentivizing
judges to engage—“lip service.” “We need to get past just raising
this at New Judges’ College,” said one judge.297
While these comments point to a generalized awareness, they
also point to a lack of more specific understanding of the responsibility, a failure to define the scope of what civil case management
entails, a lack of information about its direct benefits for the judge
both personally and to the parties and the branch, and the lack of any
real accountability. The deference given to individual choices by individual judges managing their docket their own way prevents systemic case management in the interviewed judges’ views, due to the
consequential lack of uniformity on procedures. Many complained
that there is no strong leadership consensus that case management is
important or has value in individual cases or systematically. These
judges all case managed as a result of their own initiative, because

294

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 3 (transcript on file
with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 3];
Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288;
Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282; Telephone Interview with Anonymous
Judge 12 (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 12]; Telephone Interview 13, supra note 267; Telephone
Interview with Anonymous Judge 15 (transcript on file with the University of
Miami Law Review); Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 20 (transcript on file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview 20].
295
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294.
296
E.g., Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282.
297
Id.
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they see it as essential to being a good judge, as opposed to any institutionalized incentive. Many commented that there were no consequences for judges whose dockets reflected undue delay, disarray,
lack of access, or for judges who lacked work ethic. Judges repeatedly commented that case management must be established as a high
priority and that judges must be told that if “you don’t engage in
civil case management, you are letting the system down and people
are not going to get justice.”298
One of the most significant insights about case management
awareness from the interviews was in regard to judges comparing
civil case management with criminal case management, particularly
since most Florida judges rotate through a criminal assignment.299
Multiple judges pointed out that criminal court has an extremely
structured case management process.300 Every criminal case has a
series of deadlines—from arrest, to a constitutionally guaranteed
bond hearing, to arraignment to trial.301 A criminal case always has
a future date and deadline.302 This structure is intentionally designed
and imposed without question, systemically, by the judges assigned
to criminal dockets.303 In other words, criminal case management is
not viewed as optional or a matter of judicial choice.304 The interviewed judges compared the criminal system with the apathy towards civil case management simply because, as the civil system
currently exists, it is individually judge-dependent in choice, design,
and execution.305

298

Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 10,
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 13,
supra note 267; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 16 (transcript on
file with the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview
16]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 18 (transcript on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 18]; Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.
300
Id.
301
See Steps in a Criminal Case in Florida, AYO & IKEN,
https://www.myfloridalaw.com/criminal-defense/steps-criminal-case/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2018); supra note 299.
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In sum, the responses to the statements targeting awareness established that a strong majority of judges understand that the responsibility to case manage exists. If judges are aware of civil case management and that they cannot rely on lawyers to move cases forward,
but are simply not exercising case management, then execution may
be an issue, which implicates the next targeted factor: a misunderstanding or lack of definition of case management;
2. DEFINITION: WHAT IS THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF
CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT?
One issue echoed both in the academic debate and in the interviews I conducted was the wide variation in how judges defined the
scope and execution of civil case management.306 As Professor Elliott noted, the “specific techniques advocated by self-styled managerial judges vary so widely that it is not clear what, if anything,
they have in common.”307 Objections and resistance to civil case
management are extremely dependent on how the scope of the job
is defined.308 As noted, there are three general approaches to civil
case management: deferential, reactive, and proactive.309
In the traditional party-dependent deferential approach, the
judge employs wide judicial discretion to make management decisions on a case-by-case and an event-by-event basis upon request of
an initiating party.310 Historically, this entailed deference to the parties regarding case progress: “Unless and until one of the parties requested some sort of judicial action . . . judges did not intervene” in
the pretrial process.311 Additionally, “[t]he parties might undertake
discovery, negotiate settlement, or let the case lie dormant for years

306

See Elliott, supra note 11, at 309, 316–317. Elliott’s article illustrates how
this issue has existed for decades by describing a 1985 workshop in which federal
judges were asked to manage the same hypothetical case. The results revealed
“dramatic differences” in the ways each judge would have managed the case. Id.
307
Id. at 309.
308
See Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 1, at 515–16, 559–60, 568.
309
See supra Part II.
310
KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 27; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra
note 73, at 384.
311
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384. Accord Molot, supra
note 108, at 29, 39–40.
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— all without judicial scrutiny.”312 This is the methodology used in
the decades following the initial adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and follow-on efforts by the states. After initial
adoption of the 1983 amendments initiating federal case management rules, the first debates began about the discretionary character
of case management and the scope of judicial action.313 What is encompassed by civil court case management? What are the appropriate parameters of judicial action?
Traditionalists, led eloquently by Professor Judith Resnik, deplored judicial case management as the abandonment of the neutral
adjudicatory role. Resnik decried “managerial judging” in an influential 1982 article in the Yale Law Journal.314 She worried that
“[j]udicial management has its own techniques, goals, and values,
which appear to elevate speed over deliberation, impartiality, and
fairness.”315 Traditionalists like Resnik expressed alarm about unreviewable and potentially biased decision-making focused not on justice, but rather on a judge’s case disposition statistics, with parties
strong-armed into settlements and alternative dispute resolutions
(“ADR”) promoted as a means to reduce cost and delay.316 Resnik
expressed concern that the movement of cases from open court to
ADR compromises the public’s opportunities to have firsthand
knowledge about the claims brought, the disputants, and the decisions made.317 Other commentators expressed concern that the emphasis on case management had fundamentally changed the role of
the judge from a reactive and neutral umpire to an active manager
obsessed with efficiency, front-loading, and adjudication without
trial.318 They raised concern about judges injecting themselves into
a case of which they have little knowledge, expressing the long-held

312
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384. See, e.g., BaickerMcKee, supra note 109, at 371–78 (detailing three long trials in which discovery
and/or settlement proceeded with minimal court intervention).
313
Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 653.
314
See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73.
315
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deferential belief that the lawyers know their case best.319 They argued that the lawyers should control the case, and that momentum
is a choice that the parties can make themselves.320
Given the changes in federal pleading and summary judgment
law that created opportunities to dispose of cases at early stages,321
traditionalists are particularly concerned about pretrial adjudication.
While these concerns are less pronounced in state courts, in which
dismissals on pleadings and summary judgments occur much less
frequently than in federal court,322 these debates contributed to uncertainty about the definition and scope of the case management task
and continue to reinforce any tendency to defer to the attorneys.323
One commentator has proposed a useful methodology for distinguishing between practices in case management.324 UCLA Professor Joanna Schwartz distinguished between those “gateway” managerial processes that move a case in or out of court, such as definitive
pleading rulings, summary judgment rulings, forced ADR, and judicial involvement in settlements, versus those “pathway” processes
that move a case from event to event to consistently progress to the
resolution of the parties’ choice, whether settlement or trial.325 Traditionalists express much more alarm over judicial activism in gateway case management and pay less attention to pathway management, but they blur the distinction by referring to all actions as “case
management.”326 For example, as expressed by Professor Jay Tidmarsh,
Case management has taken on a life of its own, and
dismissals for failure to abide by court-imposed
scheduling deadlines, issue-narrowing requirements,
and final pretrial orders fill the reporters. Many cases

319
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 645
(1989).
320
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321
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
322
LANDSCAPE OF LITIGATION, supra note 26, at iv.
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See Elliott, supra note 11, at 321.
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Schwartz, supra note 145.
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are determined on the criteria of efficiency and obedience to judicial will rather than on their merits.327
For purposes of considering the path forward for civil case management, these accusations regarding decisions which dispose of cases
on technicalities may be more fairly treated as concerns regarding
the underlying federal rules and substantive law affecting gateway
decisions, as opposed to an animating feature of case management.328 These are concerns for which there is little parallel in current state systems, particularly in the absence of uniform state conformity with reformation of federal pleading standards.329
A large portion of the attorney surveys regarding civil case managemet conducted within the last decade reflect a demand for more
management and reflect less evidence of the overreaching anticipated by Resnik over the last thirty-five years. A 2012 survey by the
Federal Judicial Center investigated practice with regard to the early
case management conference prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(b).330 Rule 16(b) conferences were not held in fifty
percent (50%) of the respondents’ cases, either due to settlement, a
local exemption, or “other.”331 Of those held, only thirty-one percent
(31%) reported live conferences; the other nineteen percent (19%)
reported telephonic conferences.332 Additionally, twelve percent
(12%) of respondents who originally indicated they did not have a
Rule 16(b) conference reported that they conferred via “correspondence.”333 Fifty-seven percent (57%) of respondents reported that the
conference lasted between ten and thirty minutes.334 Twenty-three
percent (23%) reported that the conference lasted less than ten

327
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minutes, which means eighty percent (80%) of cases had a 16b conference that lasted less than thirty minutes.335 Ninety-four percent
(94%) respondents reporting said the 16b conferences almost always
resulted in a scheduling order.336 During the course of the case, the
scheduling order was modified fifty percent (50%) of the time.337
However, only fifteen percent (15%) of respondents reported that
deadlines were enforced.338 The respondents were asked to rate the
involvement of the presiding judge in the management of the case
on a scale of one to five, five being very involved.339 The average
response was 2.6 for all cases.340 Where a 16b conference occurred,
judicial involvement was rated at 2.9, and at 3.1 where there were
substantive discussions about the case.341 These survey results refute
early concerns about dictatorial managerial judging occurring
through proactive case management in the federal courts.342
Advocates for court case management see the traditionalist objections as untethered to reality. In a 1983 response written to Professor Resnik’s Managerial Judges, Professor Steven Flanders
charged that traditionalists like Resnik confuse genuinely questionable approaches with all accepted and essential case management
approaches.343 He agreed, as do most case management advocates,
that judges should never strong arm settlements or set abusive deadlines.344 Judicial case management advocates, led enthusiastically
by United States District Court Judge Lee Rosenthal and Professor
Steven Gensler, point out that “[c]alibrating [application of] the
rules to individual cases is one good way to describe case management.”345 They argue that if existing rules are not used, and those
rules are adequate and well-designed, as the surveys generally suggest they are, then the critical elements in bridging the gap between
335
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the rules and their enforcement are access, judicial engagement, and
involvement in cases that need it.346 Instead of shaping the litigation
process in response to a request by a party to rule one specific issue
at a time, advocates recommend that processes should be calibrated
and designed for the case at outset, creating a plan for the path forward.347
Furthermore, the engaged court case management process is one
of more visibility, not less, from the judge.348 Advocates describe a
case management platform for dialog between the judge, the lawyers, and the parties in order to get information, clarify issues, set
timelines and priorities with reasonable deadlines.349 The case management conference becomes the opportunity to give the judge the
salient information about the case that the judge needs to understand.350 It is not and should not be a process of pushing reluctant
parties to settle. Rather, it should be a process of tailoring pretrial
work to get the necessary information in a cost-effective manner and
to value the case, which may result in settlement or trial depending
on the parties.351 The goal is not to push settlement, but given that
settlement is the resolution for the vast majority of cases, to permit
settlement earlier as opposed to later with less work, less cost, and
consequently, less waste.352 So long as adjudication remains a viable
option, the choice to settle is voluntary.353 Advocates speculate that
greater judicial case management may result in more trials by reducing the distortive exploitation of pretrial process, which leaves the
parties with resources to try their case within a timeline in which
resolution is still meaningful.354 Judges who are trusted to deliver
fair trials under a traditional construct should be equally trustworthy
to manage pretrial processes fairly.355 Further, the ideal of engagement that Professor Resnik espouses has not been evident in courts
346
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for decades: lawyers and clients in routine adversarial litigation have
little contact, and clients report little control over their lawsuits.356
In the meantime, advocates point out, crowded dockets and
overzealous litigants compete for the attention of the most expensive
resource in the courthouse: the judge’s time. Without case management, there is no organization or prioritization of those demands.357
As a result, justice process flaws are exploited to distort the value of
anemic claims and minimize the value of meritorious claims.358 As
Professor Tidmarsh pointed out, “[t]he judicial discretion that the
‘on the merits’ principle dictates also increases direct litigation
costs, because discretion allows judges to reinvent the procedural
wheel for each case and gives parties an incentive to argue over the
shape of the wheel.”359 The concerns enunciated by the traditionalists focus on the risk of case management in an individual case, but
fail to acknowledge the risks to other cases that failure to manage or
inconsistent management could impose.360 Professor Jonathan
Molot recognized that “[i]n an overcrowded court system, partisanship’s tendency to string out the litigation process meant fewer court
resource for other pending cases,”361 noting that there is a real risk
overzealous litigants might not just inflict harm on their immediate
adversaries, but also clog dockets and deprive future litigants of
their day in court.362 Even Professor Resnik acknowledges the problem and seems to call for management at some level to solve it:
Court services, particularly judges’ time, have become scarce commodities. A continually expanding
356
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number of consumers are seeking access to the
courts, but are forced to wait. One (apparent) cause
for the wait is the queue—the line created by claimants already waiting for judicial services. A second
cause comes from some claimants, already in the
courthouse, who appear to abuse their places at the
head of the line by monopolizing court time. Attorneys, motivated by their own interests or those of
their clients, seem to be the critical actors in the apparent misuse of court resources. According to proponents of judicial management, judges . . . should
take charge of the system and allocate their time in a
prudent, coherent, and fair manner.363
Such a process necessarily contemplates case management.
During the qualitative interviews, I asked each judge to provide
their definition of case management. One judge described case management as a “nebulous concept”;364 another used the word “amorphous.”365 All agreed that there is wide individual variation in how
judges define case management. One judge stated that “[a] lot of us
have different philosophies or thoughts about what works best for
us depending on individual judges’ personalities; different methods
work for different judges:”366 others said it’s a widely held belief
that case management is part of the job, but different judges define
it in different ways.367 A judge in a leadership position referenced
the “different concepts that we all have,” and that there are different
skills for managing a civil case and managing a civil docket.368 All
agreed that defining the scope of case management is a challenge to
universal engagement.
These observations were consistent with the varying approaches
to court case management. Interviewed judges each described their
363
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365
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University of Miami Law Review); Telephone Interview 13, supra note 267; Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299.
368
Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282.
364

1140

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1071

approach to case management. One group focused on ensuring that
the lawyers and the parties were complying with court rules, deadlines, and orders—primarily referencing keeping the case moving
towards resolution by reactively policing inactivity and following
up on problems as opposed to preventing delay in the first instance.
The second group focused on the proactive approach of creating a
defined schedule at inception, with anticipated court interaction, creating expectations over the life of the case as opposed to event from
event—all with the goal of consistent progress to resolution whether
by trial or settlement at the parties’ choice by a relatively certain
date.
All this debate about the role of the judge, the lawyers, the justice principles, and competing interests involved may have produced
a corresponding ambivalence on the bench about case management.
“There is no broad normative consensus to unite reformers. Although there is a widespread feeling that the system needs repair,
there is no clear sense of how serious the problems really are, what
to do about them, or even whether they can be solved at all,” 369
observed Professor Robert Bone. Tidmarsh observed:
[W]e tossed upon the ocean, buffeted in the 1980s by
concerns for inefficiency and by disaffection with the
sharp practices of a lawyer-driven, costly, and dilatory litigation system. Political pressures to reform
procedure to achieve short-term policy objectives
blew in during the 1990s. Transnational pressures
and the concern for the ‘vanishing trial’ brought water into the boat in the 2000s. ….[W]e are still afloat
on Pound’s ocean. We cannot—or at least have not—
imagined a fresher and better approach to procedure.370
Many state judges, particularly without the strong rule-based directives and autonomy of the federal system, may have mixed reactions to directives to case manage because of a lack of clear scope.
The surveys indicate that most lawyers and judges find the rules

369
370
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themselves adequate, but lacking enforcement.371 The survey referenced above conducted by IAALS and the ACTL, the FJC, the
ABA, and the Duke Conference conveners indicate strong support
for case management, but a reality in which case management rarely
occurs in a meaningful way.372 As noted by Gensler and Rosenthal,
“[t]he current Civil Rules are built upon the expectation that judges
will manage their cases. But the rules themselves provide little guidance on the critical questions of calibration and scale necessary to
guide judges on how to manage.”373 The need for a definition is evident:
For every excess that managerial judging’s critics
identify, its defenders identify other cases in which
judicial case management has facilitated efficient
resolutions and saved valuable court resources.
Without a conceptual framework to weigh these
costs and benefits, scholars have been unable to
agree on a course of reform. . . . [W]e must move
beyond simply weighing the tradeoffs that surround
new judicial practices and develop a framework to
help us decide which costs are worth bearing and
which are not.374
There is a further distinction between state and federal courts
that is important. In many cases in state court, a formal case management conference may be unnecessary given the broad diversity
of the character of the cases.375 There are many noncomplex cases
in state court that could still benefit from a case management structure in the form of a schedule without the necessity of a formal conference, particularly uncontested or minimally contested matters
that still need deadlines to progress.376 The significant number of
371
See SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA BENCH, supra note 47, at 3. Rule changes
designed to promote improvement are only as effective as their enforcement.
372
DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 82–83; See also Lee III &
Willging, supra note 7, at 775.
373
Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke, supra note 9, at 643.
374
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375
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self-represented litigants is particularly impacted by a lack of predictable and consistent structure for cases moving through the court
system, as the lack of consistency in practices among judges creates
confusion, consumes staff resources, and enhances perceptions of a
deck that is stacked against those who cannot afford a lawyer.377 Inability to understand the process of how a case will move through
the court system, because of a lack of systemic consistency, contributes to pro se frustration and consumes valuable staff resources in
providing guidance one case at a time.378 Ad hoc management contributes to issues of public trust.379
Given these realities, which have been repeatedly established by
empirical data cited above, the need for an operative definition has
emerged as a factor to be explored in this research. What is included
in case management? Who is supposed to be doing what? Both statements on the survey and the qualitative interviews conducted attempted to explore the role of definitional issues in case management adoption. What should and should not be done? What is the
extent of court responsibility?

LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1488 (2009). Issues regarding foreclosure case processing
contributed to a landmark Justice Department settlement addressing abusive litigation and servicing practices. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Gov’t and
State Att’ys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortg. Servicers to Address Mortg. Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-generalreach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest.
377
Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 859; CJI
REPORT, supra note 32, at 33–34; Gensler & Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke,
supra note 9, at 645; LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 35.
378
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 35.
379
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 3; Molot, supra note 108, at 39–40; KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at
734; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note
73, at 384.
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The next series of questions was designed to identify attitudes
and beliefs that shape the potential scope of court case management.

This question was designed to test the tendency of judges to rely
upon the parties: the traditional deferential approach. Ninety-one
percent (91%) of judges put the responsibility for rule compliance,
deadlines, and order enforcement on the litigants.380 At the same
time, the responses here conflict with the reality established in the
results discussed previously: two-thirds of judges do not believe that
litigants will reasonably progress a case or conclude litigation as
soon as reasonably or justly possible.381 Accordingly, this response
appears to indicate, consistent with decades of broader survey results, that while courts believe that the responsibility should lie with
the litigants, courts know that litigants will not, cannot, or are unable
to exercise this responsibility.
This is also an interesting metric from the standpoint of the state
and national trend of growing self-representation, which generally
suggests that self-represented litigants are ill-equipped to police litigation effectively, especially if the other side is represented.382 The
statement, as phrased, suggests responsibility, but does not specify
a hierarchy of responsibility, so it is unclear whether the respondents
380
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382
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envision this statement as responsibility in tandem with the court, or
whether litigants bear the lion’s share of responsibility for policing
compliance. Again, very large circuits were eighteen points higher
than small or mid-size circuits in their rate of strong agreement.
The results also ignore the uncontested, one-sided case where
there is no conflict to produce momentum. Most of the court-generated case management described across the judicial interviews occurred as a result of a one-sided failure to comply with the rules
deadlines over an extended period of time: failure to serve within
120 days, failure to prosecute the case in any way over ten months.
These results seem to establish that Florida judges, even those who
are strong case management advocates, manage reactively, rather
than proactively.

The high level of agreement to this statement speaks to this conflict between the shared responsibility of lawyers and judges when
examined in relationship to the views expressed about the enforcement obligations of the litigants.383 The broad agreement also speaks
to the initial observations of the interviewed judges. This is an easy
statement to agree with, but there is an absence of definition as to
what this entails and how and when it should occur. How are judges
to know when enforcement is needed? Traditionalists rely upon parties.384 Court case management advocates want to supplement with
diligent attention from the court.385 Reactive case managers look to
383
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385
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act upon requests and cases in limbo,386 and proactive case managers
look to ensure compliance by monitoring and preventing failure to
comply by setting clear deadlines, consequences, and prophylactic
future dates.387 All three approaches are dependent on the court
providing prompt access for enforcement issues, instead of incentivizing bad behavior by delaying access to enforcement.388 This
challenge was captured in the next series of questions.

While agreement to this statement was unanimous,389 very large
counties strongly agreed nearly twenty points higher than other circuits. This statement is designed to highlight the question of how
judges view case management on an individual case level fitting into
the larger challenges of case management across an entire docket.
These results show that judges universally acknowledge the need to
provide a timely hearing at an individual case level without regard
to other demands.

386
KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 1; Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 734; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 672–73; Resnik, Managerial
Judges, supra note 73, at 384.
387
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This unanimity was also evident among the interviewed judges.
Each strongly emphasized the importance of prompt access to hearings as an absolutely essential component to state court case management.

Following the question as to policing compliance, ninety-five
percent (95%) of respondents agreed that effective enforcement
must be timely.390 This question also recognizes that delayed enforcement is less effective. Parties for whom delayed access results
in rulings of declining value would agree, which is again driven by
access.391 Where cases are one-sided, or involve a self-represented
party, a substantial lag in enforcement can occur unnecessarily,
causing delay in a case.392 This question implicates the broader
scope issue previously referenced: how can courts promptly respond
to a rule or order violation requiring enforcement when there is no
corresponding compliance monitoring in the first instance? In other
words, relying upon the diligence of the parties—previously established as the subject of significant skepticism by all judges393—

390
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392
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seems like a poor management choice, as reflected in the current
state of affairs. Delays reward and incentivize bad behavior.394

This statement targeted how judges view their responsibilities to
a single case versus the demands across a docket.395 In Florida, most
hearings that are not short five-minute matters set on a multi-case
calendars are set by specific request, or “special set hearings.”396
Those hearings are typically scheduled in the chronological order in
which the request is received.397 If many cases are requesting hearing time, then the time available may be pushed to a more remote
future date, which will delay the case.398 In some instances, a delay
in getting a hearing may extend beyond the useful date of securing
the resolution.399
For example, getting a hearing on a motion to compel discovery
is of little use if it is set after the trial date is scheduled. As a practical
matter, the number of cases which need hearings always affects the
available time. The responses here suggest that fifty-three percent
(53%) of judges believe that a hearing should be made available
based on the needs of the requesting case, and thirty-three percent
394
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(33%) acknowledge that the number of cases waiting for hearings
will affect the timeliness of dates offered. At fourteen percent
(14%), this is one of the higher no opinion findings, which, combined with the agreement categories, totals forty-seven (47%), very
nearly equaling the disagreements. This suggests an overall lack of
clarity of thought as to this problem and is consistent with prior answers about the failure to think about case management.400

This statement is the converse of the statement above.401 The
eighty-two percent (82%) of judges who agree or strongly agree
seem to indicate that the needs of the individual case are the appropriate measure—only nine percent (9%) of judges disagree or
strongly disagree.402 The need to deliver a timely resolution may
drive a more aspirational response to this question as opposed to the
above question, which reflects the difficulties of juggling busy dockets. Smaller circuits agreed or strongly agreed at a rate of ninety-five
percent (95%).
A significant number of the interviewed judges expressly differentiated between case management at the case level and at the
docket level. They expressed the view that managing at the individual case level was insufficient if other cases’ needs were not being
met.403 Parties who are evaluating their court experience do not have
any appreciation for the demands of a docket.404 They will evaluate
400
401
402
403
404
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the competency of the court and the efficacy of the court system on
being able to get their hearing in their case heard within a reasonable
time.405 Interviewed judges strongly emphasized the need for consistent awareness of how long parties are waiting for hearing dates,
as well as the need to adjust schedules and prioritize on a continual
basis through use of case management in order to deliver prompt
access at the case level across the docket. In other words, providing
access is the judge’s job.406
Given the lack of data being distributed to Florida judges on any
routine basis, judges have to search out the vantage point for caseload overviews. They will not know how long parties are waiting for
hearings unless they monitor their settings or they ask. Judges have
to actively engage with their staff to determine when hearings and
trials are being routinely set, clearance rates, and continuance numbers. These are not organic systemic operations in most circuits, and
as result, depend heavily on the engagement of the individual judge,
based on interview comments. At the same time, many of the judges
expressed that this docket view is essential to public trust and confidence in the courts, the reputation of the judicial branch overall,
and ties into the importance of timeliness in justice delivery.

Judges are very clear about their obligation to deliver rulings
quickly after a hearing.407 However, some of the data from national
surveys suggest that the reality does not always comport with this

405
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vision of justice.408 These results establish that once enforcement is
sought, courts must be prompt in ruling on enforcement.

This statement was designed to identify how judges believe case
progress can be impacted. Ninety percent (90%) of judges agreed
that setting deadlines is an important tool, with only five perfect
(5%) disagreeing and three percent (3%) expressing no opinion.409
This view is ratified in the interviews. Judge after judge emphasized
the importance of consistently enforcing deadlines and a firm trial
date to ensure a case progresses forward.410 Equally, judge after
judge emphasized that access to hearing time is key.411 When a hearing looms, parties frequently resolved the contested matter without
the necessity of a court hearing or ruling, and the judge’s involvement is reduced to signing an agreed order memorializing the parties’ resolution. Access to prompt hearings produces prompt resolutions.412 Equally, keeping problem cases on “a short leash” minimized the amount of conflict and delay in the case according to the
interviewed judges.413 Many reported that cases that were problem-

408
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atic were scheduled for case management events on a frequent basis.414 By providing access, the court can deliver clear guidance, prevent additional controversies from accruing, and frequently reorganize the relationship between warring lawyers. Strong case management resulted in less court involvement, not more, as opposed to the
combatants seeking hearings on a continual ad hoc issue by issue
basis with no end in sight.

Judges were much more uncertain about how and why cases go
off track. Only fifty-six percent (56%) agreed with this statement,
still a majority, but twenty-three percent (23%) had no opinion and
twenty percent (20%) disagreed for a total of forty-three percent
(43%).415 This question was designed to begin to distinguish between proactive judicial case management, in which cases consistently have prospective upcoming deadlines, and reactive case management, which reacts to periods of inactivity or requests for action
with judicial intervention to restore momentum. Given the strong
belief that attention correlates to deadlines,416 the ambiguity of these
responses suggests the overall uncertainty about how to assure constant progress toward resolution.
The broad tendency to reactive case manage among the interviewed judges reinforced the observation of ambivalence. Interviewed judges again emphasized the contrast between criminal
cases, which had consistent deadlines as a result of system architec-
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ture, and civil cases, in which deadlines were inconsistently set absent individual case management.417 The high number of no opinion
responses again seems to demonstrate confusion about responsibility. The prior responses affirm that lawyers pay attention to cases
with deadlines,418 that parties and lawyers cannot be trusted to progress cases alone,419 yet there is apparent reluctance to acknowledge
the role of court events in moving cases along. There is no ambiguity
in the view of the interviewed judges. They all believe that dates and
deadlines, fairly and consistently enforced, are essential.420

Three quarters of responding judges disagreed with this statement, clearly seeing a role for the court in getting cases to trial.421
Only sixteen percent (16%) agreed, while eight percent (8%) expressed no opinion.422 However, consistent with trends reflected
above, judges with less experience agreed more often. Twenty-three
percent (23%) of new judges agreed, twenty percent (20%) of judges
with between three to six years of experience agreed, and twentyfour percent (24%) of judges with six to nine years of experience
agreed. In contrast, judges with twelve or more years of experience
agreed at only eleven percent (11%).
417
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In addition, the trial date remains the star by which virtually
every case is navigated. The survey results on this statement reinforce the continuing obsession with a trial date as being the driver
of case progress, notwithstanding the overall lack of trials.423 Large
law firms bill by the hour for substantial discovery based-processes,
and plaintiffs have shifted to litigation consortia and committees.
Yet, as observed by Professor Tidmarsh, four fifths of cases entering
the litigation process resolve without trial424:
[O]ur procedural system is structured around the belief that a case will be resolved at a culminating, allissues jury trial. A fair question is to ask whether the
entire procedural system should be designed around
that most rare occurrence, the vanishing jury trial. If
form follows function, a procedural system designed
to develop the types of information useful to settlement or summary disposition, and to structure the litigation process in stages most conducive to settlement or summary disposition, is more logical.425
Every judge interviewed described the essential role trial dates play
in managing cases, while at the same time acknowledging how few
cases actually go to trial.426
3. PHILOSOPHICAL OPPOSITION
One of the unique challenges to courts as an enterprise is the
nature of the organizational relationship between judges. In terms of
institutional design, most local courts have a chief judge, and state
judicial branches are run by the Chief Justice.427 There are generally
Administrative Judges that run specific divisions within a circuit—
such as Civil, Felony, and Juvenile.428 However, these leaders do
not have the authority generally to select or fire judges and they do
423
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not have the authority to offer any kind of pay incentive or penalty—
the type of hiring, firing, incentives and threats that run the private
sector.429 Judge Posner, discussing what judges maximize, points
out that judicial salaries can neither be lowered nor raised based on
performance.430 Posner identifies other elements that can affect judicial behavior: popularity, prestige, public interest, and reputation.431 However, there are no direct consequences for stellar or poor
performance.432 The individual judge’s boss is the taxpayer and the
voter.433 The taxpayer pays salaries.434 The voter, in states such as
Florida which have elections, determines whether a judge keeps his
or her job if opposition is filed.435
As a result, the interviewed judges expressed that individual
judges frequently assert their independence as elected constitutional
judicial officers when asked or instructed by their Chief Justices,
their Chief Judges in their circuit, or their Administrative Judge to
follow certain procedures.436 Furthermore, interviewed judges indicated that judges may reject case management as inconsistent with
their judicial philosophy based on a view that the job belongs either
to the lawyers or administration. One judge interviewed estimated
that forty to fifty percent (40% to 50%) of judges assigned to civil
dockets think case management is an administrative function as opposed to the judge’s job,437 although the survey respondents roundly
rejected this view.438 While inconsistent with the previous survey
results, the estimate is consistent with the minimal utilization of civil

429
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case management across not only the state, but also other jurisdictions.439
Most of the interviewed judges felt that the philosophy argument
was a relic of a bygone era, and that judges understand that case
management is part of the job but simply don’t see the incentive or
means to engage. Many interviewed judges characterized this approach in essentially the following way: why should I care if they
don’t care? It’s their case.440 One said that “many judges have the
attitude [of] just let me do my calendar for that day, get on with it,
and go home.”441 However, the large majority of interviewed judges
rejected that attitude, with one judge stating that judicial philosophy
is just an “excuse.”442 Another judge stated the following: “I do not
agree with the ‘just the umpire’ view. I am the umpire when it comes
to decision making and rulings, but I am the manager when it comes
to moving the case.”443

While fourty-seven (47%) of judges disagree with this statement, which suggests the view that case management is not optional
439
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as a matter of judicial independence; 444 there is a sizable no opinion
response. A solid thirty-three percent (33%) minority agrees that the
decision to case manage is an issue of judicial independence. Combined with eighteen percent (18%) who expressed no opinion, these
responses evidence a fifty-one to forty-eight (51-48) split.445 This
split is difficult to reconcile with the prior strong responses to the
overall questions about case management as part of the judge’s
job.446 It is equally difficult to reconcile with mandates contained in
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Rules of Judicial
Administration.447 Interestingly, new judges agreed with this broad
statement of independence at a rate twenty points higher than any
other data subset.
The challenge of this survey response may reflect not only some
of the definitional and scope issues about case management previously referenced,448 but also how courts define judicial independence. As one interviewed judge stated, “judicial independence is
how you decide the issues, not how you move cases.”449 Overall,
interviewed judges pointed out that being part of a court system suggested that how cases move through that system should not significantly deviate from standards and norms simply because of the philosophy of which judge is assigned a case by blind-filing. Some
spoke more harshly: “Judicial independence is an excuse that justifies nothing but laziness. Part of our job and part of our oath is that
we will work to maximize efficieny [and] maximize service to the
folks who pay our salaries, the citizens of our counties.”450
The negative response may be magnified by the degree to which
case management currently depends on the individual processes of
individual judges, as opposed to broad frameworks of structure and
support within civil courts among the circuits. Virtually every trial
court administrator across the circuits responded that there was a
lack of a systemic case management framework, and case manage-
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See, e.g., supra Figure 8.
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See supra Section IV.C.2.
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ment was up to the individual judge. Without staff support, technology support, and a systemic framework, it is understandable that
judges would see this as a discretionary choice.451
During the interview process, several judges pointed out the systemic contrast with criminal felony assignments. Although judges
seldom think of the process in this manner, criminal court is very
case management oriented from arrest forward: constitutional guarantees of first appearance, bond, statutory arraignment timeframes,
speedy trial.452 All of these features give a preexisting structure to
criminal cases in which they always have an upcoming future date
and specific events occur on deadlines.453 It is extremely rare for any
judge to question the criminal court structure in their circuit, in particular due to the complexities of the timelines as well as the need to
coordinate with other stakeholders: state attorneys, public defenders
or criminal counsel, jail/corrections to bring the defendant to court,
and law enforcement agencies to coordinate and provide testimony/evidence etc.454 As the interviewed judges pointed out, judges
who see civil case management as a discretionary function of judicial independence do not even think about that independence in the
criminal context.455 This suggests that a supportive framework that
assists the case management execution is critical to systemic improvement. If courts are going to ask judges to handle all civil case
management on their own, then it is likely judges will view those
choices as individual, discretionary, and optional—in other words,
based on judicial independence.
Furthermore, many of the interviewed judges emphasized the
need for strong leadership and support to incentivize civil case management adoption. One of the points they repeatedly raised was that,
while the time standards have been embedded in the Florida Rules
of Judicial Administration for decades,456 there is no accountability
451
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for the time standards and there is no mandate for compliance.457
However, the loosely-coupled character of court organization—in
other words, no direct boss—makes it difficult to mandate change.
As one judge stated, “you cannot force anyone if they view their job
selfishly, themselves first, prioritizing convenience and minimizing
work.458 Judge Posner’s article on what judges maximize also includes an interesting discussion about the influence that leisureseeking has on judicial behavior, which he defines as an “aversion
to any sort of ‘hassle,’ as well as to sheer hard work.”459 Similarly,
leisure-seeking behavior was the subject of critical comment by interviewed judges with regard to judges who disregard their case
management responsibilities.460

No judges strongly agreed with this statement, and only a few
agreed.461 Of those that agreed, nine percent (9%) of judges with
zero to three years’ experience made up the largest presence. Still,
eighty-seven percent (87%) of those new judges disagreed. Disagreement was strong across all data subsets, which is consistent with
earlier questions and establishes awareness of case management and
that it is, in fact, part of the judicial task.462 While interviewed judges
felt that many used this excuse to justify avoiding responsibility for
457
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458
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case managing,463 the survey respondents rejected such an assertion.464

The fact that eighty-nine percent (89%) of judges agreed with
this statement465 establishes a clear consensus on the least controversial case management approach: reactive case management to get
the case moving in the face of inactivity. This sort of case management can occur through a lack of prosecution notice, a case management conference being set by the court after inactivity of a specific
duration, or requiring other action to be taken.466 This issue has implications not only for contested matters, but also for uncontested
matters that may frequently lose the attention of the prosecuting firm
and languish.467 This is the basic level of case management, which
the vast majority of judges who do undertake case management understand the best and are most comfortable with exercising. However, the results do show there is still a core group of six percent
(6%) or so of judges that clings to the traditional deferential approach,468 where the case belongs to the lawyers to progress or fail
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to progress as they see fit.469 As one judicial branch leader acknowledged that there is genuine disagreement about what role the judge
should play and how far the judge should go:
Everybody in Florida understands time standards and
is aware of case management, that the judge has to
be involved in the management of the case, and that
judges don’t just call balls and strikes. For justice to
be relevant, just, and fair, that means timeliness . . . . A docket is a pipeline. You have to keep
current or everything gets saturated and just stops.470
Another judge pointed out that this is a public trust and confidence
issue: people need timely results to trust the judiciary.471
The results of the statements discussed in this Section demonstrate a wealth of good intentions on the part of the bench: most
judges understand what their obligations are in terms of providing
access and timely resolutions. However, the results also demonstrate
the ambiguity that exists regarding how those goals are accomplished and the environment in which the court’s business is conducted.
4. CROSS-INCENTIVES: ELECTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS
WITH THE BAR
When asked about the factors, interviewed judges spoke
strongly about the current court system and the factors of cross-incentives, institutional inertia, and lack of support. The subject of
cross-incentives is a challenging inquiry. The prior interviews and
results evidence that judges do not trust parties to timely move cases
to resolution.472 At the same time, judges in Florida come to the

469
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bench by appointment or election, and must thereafter stand for election every six years.473 A judge will be re-elected without opposition
if no candidate files to run against him or her.474 Unopposition can
be a result of judicial reputation or perceived community support
liable to generate significant campaign contributions.475
The survey results do reflect a willingness of many judges to
acknowledge these concerns. However, the high level of no-opinion
responses to the inquiries about cross-incentives appear to implicate
a reluctance to acknowledge basic concerns that are repeatedly
voiced when judges talk “off the record” about case management
pros and cons. To be frank, the survey statements were intentionally
framed as an attempt to assess what judges thought attorneys believed, which leaves open the opportunity for judges to abdicate,
professing that they are not in position to assess attorney opinon.
However, this discomfort was not evident in other parts of the survey, as the level of no opinion responses regarding these factors
were significantly higher than those in response to other questions
about what lawyers and parties do or think. These concerns potentially implicate self-interest, which may be why judges are reluctant
to acknowledge them. The high level of “no opinion” responses to
these statements suggests that the responding judges profess complete indifference to personal and professional consequences in contemplating case management. However, as noted by Judge Posner,
“[p]olitics, personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity play
too large a role in the appointment of . . . judges to warrant treating
the judiciary as a collection of sainted genius-heroes miraculously
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immune to the tug of self-interest.”476 While integrity, honesty, candor, intellect, fidelity, and honor shape the vast majority of judicial
conduct, we should not be so naïve or self-congratulatory as to deny
the shadows of fear, laziness, greed, ego, ambition, and power in the
judiciary.
These statements asked about potential influences or bias that
some judges may want to pretend do not exist, but are evident in
public and bar perceptions about why judges fail to case manage.477
Interviewed judges acknowledged the concerning reality of crossincentives and acknowledged that they make a deliberate choice to
ignore pressures from the bar, their colleagues, and local court culture. They acknowledged the reality of push back from lawyers,
which was also evident in the survey responses. One judge, a strong
case manager, openly acknowledged that she is able to wield a firm
case management approach because the majority of lawyers who litigate before her come from a neighboring urban area outside her
circuit—so they cannot vote against her or run against her.478
In 2015, professional court manager Alexander Aikman wrote
an unusually forthright article about the lack of utilization of case
management.479 Aikman was blunt about this factor:
Some judges believe that if they seek to shorten the
time to disposition and do not grant the ‘standard’
continuance time—or whatever time the attorneys
request—they risk being contested at the next election . . . . The risks of a contest and losing are too
great to save a few days here and there.480
In addition, judges are constantly asked to enforce rules against
the attorneys whom they must rely upon for public support in the
event of an election. These same lawyers are the lawyers who many
judges generally believe exploit the legal process based upon the
survey questions discussed above. Further, lawyers have financial
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incentives in how they handle cases.481 As previous scholars have
noted, “[t]he discovery-based processes of modern litigation have
been conducive to the growth of large law firms and hourly billing.
American litigators prefer to leave no stone unturned, provided, of
course, they can charge by the stone.”482
Some interviewed judges felt that the identified cross-incentives—concern about attorney attitudes, perceptions of being a
threat to fees, bar polls, election opposition or elevation—were a
motivating consideration for only a minority of judges. One estimated that minority to be around ten to fifteen percent (10% to
15%).483 Across the board, judges said that there are lawyers who
don’t like case management, and that judges can experience push
back. Further, interviewed judges attributed the resistance to rejection of any kind of change, while others felt more self-interest was
involved. As one judge state, “they want to run on their time clock
and billable hours. Billable hours play a significant role in why cases
drag on and on, and are a significant concern to me.”484 One judge
said point blank, “you case manage, you are going to be unpopular.
Lawyers would rather be in charge. Participatory/directive judges
are all accused of ‘micromanaging.’”485 Interestingly, this judge
hailed from the only circuit in Florida that reports institutionalized
case management—the Twentieth Circuit—in which one might expect that universal adoption should have prevented differences in
judicial case management deployment.
The interviewed judges all agreed that these cross-incentives
should never be a consideration, but also felt that judges who did not
acknowledge that they were aware of these concerns were not being
forthright. The point, the interviewees said, is to realize the concern
but then deliberately set it aside in the decisions about how to run
the docket. They generally felt that the advantages of court case
management would become apparent to naysayer attorneys once
they experienced the benefits. The consistently high level of no
opinion responses to statements about this factor underscores the
481
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problem of ambivalence: judges know there are issues of cost, delay,
and process manipulation and they know that they cannot rely on the
parties and litigants to solve those issues; yet, they step back from
acknowledging their mandated role in solutions. They don’t trust the
lawyers to move the cases, but may be reluctant to examine what
may influence attorney interaction on case management.

This statement was designed to test the judges’ sensitivity to the
court’s reputation for delay. If there is general consensus that litigants do not reliably progress cases,486 who is getting blamed? The
results show that a large majority of judges believe that the court is
blamed. Seventy-eight percent (78%) of judges agreed with this
statement, with only five percent (5%) disagreeing and sixteen percent (16%) professing no opinion.487
Interviewed judges agreed that there is a “disconnect” between
lawyers and clients. According to the interviewed judges, there is
delay and resistance to case management on the part of lawyers that
their clients do not know about and would not agree with if it meant
their cases would move faster. As one judge described it, the problem with the view that the “cases belong to the litigants and if they
don’t care, I don’t care,” is that the litigants may actually care but
that is not being conveyed to or recognized by the judge.488 Others
point out that many lawyers don’t understand that the court has an
obligation to move cases, have never heard of or read the Florida
Rules of Judicial Administration, and are almost certainly unaware
486
487
488
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of the time standards.489 In the meantime, one judge expressed the
sentiment that the bar throws courts under the bus, telling clients it’s
the court when delay is due to lawyers’ laziness or lack of attention
to the case, or too much work, or due to billing motivations. Interviewed judges seemed to agree with Proffessor Gensler that “[a]
sure first step in using culture change to control costs in discovery
would be simply to get lawyers to abide by their existing rules-based
and ethical duties.”490
As a public trust and confidence measure, experience has shown
that judges have no idea of and no control over the explanations offered by lawyers to clients as to the reasons for delays or what expectations have been created. However, if a case management order
is issued at an early stage of the case, the court has set out a clear
path, created clear expectations, and made a promise to litigants
about what it plans to do with the case, as opposed to the open noend-in-sight ad hoc procedures without some form of court case
management.

Nearly three quarters, or seventy-two percent (72%), of responding judges agreed with this statement.491 Only fourteen percent
(14%) disagreed.492 Another fourteen (14%) did not opine, which
again evidences judicial ambivalence about acknowledging or confronting process exploitation. The data subset group of small circuits
489
490
491
492
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showed the least amount of agreement, with sixty percent (60%) of
smaller circuits agreeing, while the balance of circuits and experience levels ertr in general consensus.
The impact of this perception was strongly ratified by interviewed judges, with one judge stating that “civil cases just languish
because lawyers are billing by the hour . . . the legislature believes
that the bar and the judges are in a conspiracy.”493 Several judges
commented on some attorneys who delay for strategic advantage,
and specifically referenced that such conduct violates of a line in the
Florida Bar’s Oath of Admission, which all those admitted to the
Florida Bar must pledge: “I will never . . . delay anyone’s cause for
lucre or malice.”494 As one commentator noted, “[r]eforming procedural systems is not an easy task. Expectations about litigation become settled, and the status quo becomes reinforced by the hundred
thousand lawyers who do quite well under the present system.”495
Many interviewed judges agreed with other commentators, as well
as members of the bar, that the conduct of litigation frequently imitates that of “spoiled children”, with courts being required to provide
“adult supervision.”496
But what to do about it? Having recognized the risk of exploitation by the attorneys, the next questions were designed to test
judge’s views of case management as a response to prevent such
manipulation. These responses were particularly interesting in that
all had a very high “no opinion” responses—implying that judges
either prefer not to speculate on attorneys’ views or refuse to
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acknowledge these views. In the following statements, roughly onethird of responding judges confronted these issues head-on.

This statement was designed to start drawing out the cross-incentives that are routine anecdotal impediments to case management. The equivocal responses of no opinion were high, at thirty-six
percent (36%).497 The agreement level, at thirty-nine percent (39%),
evidences judicial awareness that attorneys can experience court
case management as threatening their unilateral control over case
pace.498 The twenty-three percent (23%) disagreement level suggests that a minority of judges take the view that attorneys are not
threatened by case management.499 Agreement was most strongly
expressed in large (38%) and very large (47%) circuits and experienced judges of eighteen plus years (45%).
Interviewed judges repeatedly stressed that attorney case management resistance reflected attorney desire to keep control of case
progress despite clear rule mandates for court responsibility.
“Judges are afraid of being accused of being too proactive and of
drawing opposition at election time. Judges are afraid that if they
dig into cases they will be perceived as haughty,” said one judge.500
Part of this concern may stem from a lack of consistency among case
management approaches among judges, as discussed above.501 The
same judge continued, “Judges who case manage are appreciated. If
497
498
499
500
501
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case management is done properly, it is not an issue.”502 Attorney
experience with state court case management is limited, based on
the interviews and the trial court administrator information. Predictability and consistency could allay these concerns, particularly as
part of a structured, systemic approach. The high no opinion rate
indicates a reluctance to address these issues.
Another factor that complicates civil court case management
identified throughout the interviews is the obsessive need for a trial
date. Most judges pointed out that many cases are noticed for trial
with no relationship to case readiness, but simply to get a trial date,
and then expect a continuance if (frequently when) the case is not
ready. Many expressed chagrin at the difficulty of attempting to persuade lawyers that there are effective means of organizing deadlines
in a case without issuing a largely fictitious trial date. Attorneys are
comfortable with the court case managing via trial order, because
then they can trigger the process by noticing the case for trial even
if they plan to seek continuances. They may perceive more transparent proactive case management from inception as a threat, according
to the interviews overall, because of the advanced planning required
as opposed to working backwards from a traditional trial order-created case management structure.

This statement was designed to continue pursuing the cross-incentive “anecdata.” With thirty-five percent (35%) of judges agreeing, it is clear that a sizable minority of judges recognize attorney
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apprehension and pecuniary interests as a case management consideration.503 Only eleven percent (11%) disagreed with this statement,
which speaks to a level of consciousness about this concern.504
However, fifty percent (50%) professed no opinion on the topic.505
For clients, the most expensive cost in a case is typically attorney
fees. The strong no opinion response here demonstrates possible reluctance to acknowledge the inherent tension between lawyers, who
earn their living by attorneys fees, and clients, who want to minimize those fees as much as possible while achieveing their soughtafter result. This question was designed to test whether judges believe that attorneys see case management as a threat to their living.
If case management is promoted to reduce cost, then that cost would
include unnecessary attorney fees.
Many judges may also be unaware of growing pressure on traditional fee structures. Alternative fee arrangements are growing as
clients responded to the cost issue in civil courts.506 Legal process
outsourcing, whether domestic or offshore, as well as technological
innovation in document review has been a reliable source of billable
hours and is changing business structures within the legal practice.507 A 2011 report by the Association of Corporate Counsel defined savings as a “reduction in historical spending patterns with
same or better outcomes.”508 To achieve that goal would draw business for firms, although potentially limiting fees in any single case.
503
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The failure of law firms to recognize utility and business opportunities in the predictability and consistency of civil case management
and instead focus on short-term perceived risks demonstrates the
same cultural failings that courts face.509

While fifty-seven percent (57%) of judges believe that there is a
reputational benefit to case management, thirty-six percent (36%)
have no opinion.510 This suggests that while a wide swath of the
bench is currently unconvinced, they are still convincible. Judges in
very large circuits strongly agreed at a rate fifteen points higher than
other circuit types. To some extent, this may be impacted by the
power of reputation in large circuits, as the size of the circuit bench
reduces the individual attorney’s knowledge and repeat experiences
with an individual judge.
Interviewed judges all believed that case management enhances
a judge’s reputation. There was solid consensus that case management paid dividends in terms of reputation. Judges generally felt that
as long as case management was conducted in a collaborative, nondictatorial fashion, lawyers accept and welcome it. On judge stated
that lawyers and litigants “just want to know about what’s going to
happen.”511 Another stated that “judges who are predictable, consistent, strong case managers are more successful and popular.
Judges who are reactive and situational are less so because lawyers
509
510
511
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don’t know what they will do.”512 Another acknowledged that while
judges “all think about bar polls,” it is important to do “stuff for the
right reasons and . . . the respectful way,” which includes “recognizing [that some] cases . . . need more managing.”513
One of the most significant reputational consequences of case
management is the ability to solve the problem of access. Interviewed judges all emphasized that using case management to set and
enforce deadlines, monitor compliance, and prioritize workload resulted in more open hearing time and easier access as matters resolved. The biggest complaint from parties and lawyers reflected in
the trial court administrator responses and by interviews was access:
waiting too long for hearing time. In other words, long delays result
in bad reputations. Across the board, interviewed judges agreed that
case management provided swift and predictable access to hearing
time at critical points. Across the country, state court judges who
proactively case manage a civil docket are convinced it reaps significant reputational benefits.514

Eighteen percent (18%) of judges associate case management
with political risk.515 Combined with the thirty-eight percent (38%)
who profess no opinion, it amounts to a total of fifty-six percent
(56%) of the responding judges.516 The strongest level of agreement
512
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came from brand new judges with zero to three years experience,
who agreed twelve points higher than any other subset. In contrast,
the strongest disagreement level came from judges with three to six
years experience, who disagreed at a rate nineteen points higher than
other subsets.
There may be some bias in these answers, in terms of a threat
that judges are reluctant to acknowledge. As one judge said, “it’s not
expressly a concern, but impliedly and inherently it’s a concern, attorney by attorney. It is an elected position. You don’t want to piss
people off. It is a thought in the back of people’s minds.”517 Another
judge compared it to the combination of water and electricity—
judges and lawyers seek the path of least resistance: “When you are
faced with an agreed motion to continue, it’s not pleasant to say
no.”518 The judge went on to say that lawyers may react differently
than their clients; clients want their cases resolved and may accept
rejection of an agreed continuance and insistence on a firm trial date
more enthusiastically than their lawyers who agreed to the continuance.519 Another judge felt that cross-incentives play a role close to
election times: “Judges don’t want to needlessly make enemies. Unless there are significant problems in a case, you try not to offend
anyone.”520
Again, there is a high amount of no opinion responses, which
indicates that, although the concerns are real and omnipresent according to the judges interviewed, there is a reluctance to
acknowledge these concerns. If courts are to effectively use case
management, how can court leaders effectively address these crossincentives if many judges cling to the pretext that they do not exist?521 One solution would be to deploy a structured case management system across the civil docket, so that no single judge would
517

Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282.
Telephone Interview 16, supra note 299.
519
Id.
520
Telephone Interview 5, supra note 367.
521
The author is reminded of the scene in the film classic, Casablanca, in
which the French police captain is forced into action at Rick’s Café because the
occupying Nazis have entered the club:
Rick [Humphrey Bogart]: How can you close me up? On what
grounds?
Renault [Claude Rains]: I am shocked, shocked to find that
gambling is going on in here!
518

2019]

WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE?

1173

bear the burden of any initial resistance, and so that the consequences would be borne by the court as a whole as opposed to any
single judge. Creating a systemic approach may also permit attorneys and users to have a voice in its design, which may ameliorate
these potential unacknowledged barriers.
While some interviewed judges did not believe that case managing caused political consequences, they still believed that many of
their colleagues do believe there is risk. This is particularly because
institutional inertia has prohibited those judges from seeing the reputational dividends that case management produces.
5. INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA AND LOCAL COURT CULTURE
Judges are all members of their local circuit courts. Each has its
own practices and procedures, many of which have been in place
many years. These practices are frequently referred to as a “local
court culture.”522 Within circuits, there can be multiple geographic
courthouses which may also have their own organizational practices.523
Court operations and institutional design choices made at a particular time can be influenced by geography, budget, strength of personality, competing priorities, and frequently suffer from a “set it
and forget it” mentality.524 As a result, system architecture can become archaic without anyone’s noticing. This includes many embedded procedures, the logic of which either evaporated years ago
or has been long forgotten, but is institutionalized habit. Local court
culture is undergoing a significant challenge to adapt its processes
to new technologies, but frequently replicates existing obsolete paper process due to the effort to continue existing operations while
adapting.525 Local court culture poses significant challenges to court
[a croupier approaches, hands Renault a pile of money]
Croupier: Your winnings, sir.
Renault [sotto voce]: Oh. Thank you very much.
Renault [loudly]: Everybody out at once!
Perhaps “no opinion” judges would express similar shock that other judges are
aware of cross-incentives. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942).
522
Steelman, supra note 93, at 145–66; OSTROM & HANSON, supra note 357,
at 21–25.
523
OSTROM & HANSON, supra note 357, at 21–25.
524
Steelman, supra note 93, at 159–60.
525
See OSTROM & HANSON, supra note 357, at 52–64.
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case management due to the embedded barriers in antediluvian processes that are not examined in an organized way, because “this is
how we do things.” Local court culture is frequently spread through
ad hoc verbal advice about how to perform court jobs among clerks,
bailiffs, judicial assistants, and even judges.526
However, in an age of swift technological change in which technology is increasingly integrated in every aspect of life, outmoded
court processes from the last century will no longer be acceptable,
particularly if all courts do is digitize them without improving them
by taking advantage of new processes available through technological innovation.527 We live in a day in which the vast majority of
people carry a computer in the palm of their hand, which is instantly
linked to every other computer in everyone else’s palm as well as to
most every source of information in the world. The Department of
Motor Vehicles, the bureaucratic butt of a thousand jokes, better utilizes technology than the court system. One example would be
online scheduling and push notifications: if one can schedule and
get an automatic reminder from the DMV about an upcoming appointment, why can’t they get a reminder about a court date? Florida’s Department of Motor Vehicle has had online scheduling for
driver’s license appointments for years, yet few courts in Florida offer online scheduling of court dates, instead relying on a cumbersome human system of date coordination.528 Courts across the country are working hard to deploy new technologies that are essential to

526

Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294; Telephone Interview 11, supra
note 282; Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282.
527
JOHN M. GREACEN, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., EIGHTEEN WAYS COURTS SHOULD USE TECHNOLOGY TO BETTER SERVE
THEIR CUSTOMERS 1–3 (2018), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/
publications/eighteen_ways_courts_should_use_technology.pdf.
528
Locations, FLORIDA HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES,
https://www.flhsmv.gov/locations/.
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meet public expectations.529 If courts expect to hold public trust for
deciding disputes, they are going to have to do better than the DMV.

While a total of sixty-two percent (62%) of judges agreed or
strongly agreed with this statement, there is no empirical evidence
of a widespread systemic case management culture in Florida.530 In
addition, when the interviewed judges were asked to rate their degree of civil case management activity on a scale of one to ten, ten
being active case management, the judges generally rated themselves between seven and nine but rated their colleagues between
two and three. Those that rated their colleagues more highly described case management in reactive terms as opposed to proactive
terms.
The surveys from the TCAs confirm that no circuit has a widely
used proactive case management system across its civil division.
Trial court administrators reported that the degree of case management and what was entailed was up to the individual judges, and that
hearings were largely set by attorneys on their timetable or at attorney request.531

529

GREACEN, supra note 527, at 1–3.
See Figure 28.
531
Eleventh Circuit TCA Response, supra note 242; E-mail from Gina Justice,
Court Adm’r, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla., to Jennifer D. Bailey, Admin.
Judge, Circuit Civil Div., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. (Oct. 10, 2017, 08:32
EST) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review); Eighteenth Circuit TCA
Response, supra note 236; Sixth Circuit TCA Response, supra note 250; Twelfth
Circuit TCA Response, supra note 246.
530
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One indicator of a culture of case management is routine data
distribution, so that delays can be identified. There is no state-wide
systemic approach to data sharing that is evident from the responses
from either TCAs or the interviewed judges.532 The caseload data
that is distributed varied from circuit to circuit and sometimes from
county to county. According to the interviewed judges, data reports
regarding time standards or other case management information
such as age of pending caseload, time to disposition, or clearance
rates are seldom provided to judges. In fact, several of the interviewed judges reported that no data reports are routinely issued to
them.533 As most of the interviews indicated, information is frequently available upon request, but only upon a judicial officer’s initiative. Most judges interviewed actively used available data, most
frequently being the extensive use of a list of pending cases which
enabled them to use dates of last activity to spot inactive cases, or
lack of prosecution calendars. This data set and the corresponding
actions all suggest the use of modest and reactive case management
as opposed to proactive case management, which would prevent undue delay from inception. There are no reports distributed in any
circuit that identify case types and controversy characteristics that
would provide a means to triage cases and anticipate their needs in
advance.534
The interviewed judges provided a wealth of insights about the
role of institutional culture. One judge provided that “local court
culture” starts the day new judges walks in the door and are “told
this is how things are done, this is the way we do things. After day
one, there is not a lot of thought that goes into whether that’s the

532

See supra Section IV.B.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294; Telephone Interview 9,
supra note 288; Telephone Interview 13, supra note 267; Telephone Interview 14,
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299.
534
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 18–20, 31–32. The CJI Report (Recommendations 2, 3, and 10) reflects an approach to case management based on case need.
The initial sorting of cases by identifiers of complexity as a triage was the subject
of follow-up reports suggesting the use of technology to support human effort.
See CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CRITERIA FOR AUTOMATING PATHWAY TRIAGE IN CIVIL CASE PROCESSING (2017),
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Civil-Justice/Automated%20
Civil%20Triage.ashx; See generally GREACEN, supra note 527.
533

2019]

WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE?

1177

most effective way to do things.”535 Another judge agreed, observing that “rookie judges” talk to old judges, new judicial assistants
talk to old judicial assistants, which results in the old ways continuing to pass from generation to generation, “with a perception that
other people run the system.”536 Noted across the interviews was the
fact that even simply changing the day for a motion calendar can
generate confusion and work, so many judges believe it is easier to
just go along with the existing practices and traditions. Another
judge described it as a “large bureaucracy, [where] . . . any kind of
change is almost insurmountable.”537 Another judge noted that,
since he or she began practice, “not much has changed other than
the digital file,” and observed that “courts are definitely behind the
private practice curve on technology.”538 One judge described the
result this delay causes as “the institution is not as responsive to people as we should be.” 539 This is supported by the previous research
and data as the CJI Report specifically identified the need to take
full advantage of technology for case management and litigant-court
interaction, particularly with the self-represented.540
Many judges are reluctant to advocate for changes to a longstanding system. As Judge Posner points out, “there is even a cult of
ordinariness in judging. Exceptionally able judges arouse suspicion
of having an ‘agenda,’ that is, of wanting to be something more than
just corks bobbing on waves of litigation or umpires calling balls
and strikes.”541 Several judges interviewed referenced difficulties in
advocating case management or change. “[It is] very difficult as an
individual judge in an individual division to change a culture that
predominates throughout an area,” one judge ruefully observed.542
Overall, judges reported that there may be implied disapproval of
judges who do something different, ‘ruining the curve’ sort of thing.
Many of the judges felt the idea that “that’s the way we’ve always
done it” was not a good answer to any question.
535

Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.
Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282.
537
Telephone Interview 5, supra note 367.
538
Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282.
539
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Judge 6 (transcript on file with the
University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Telephone Interview 6].
540
See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 31, 37.
541
Posner, supra note 429, at 4.
542
Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282.
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An overall theme among interviewed judges established that
case managing judges were the exception, not the rule; and that
judges who do case manage enjoy an exceptional reputation. Interviewed judges who case manage currently put in extra effort on their
own to design their own processes and systems with their staff, without systemic support. They see the dividends personally as worth the
effort, and the time investment upfront saves more time later.543
One judge shared a story of attending an outstanding national
educational program on case management.544 Upon his return, he
proposed a simple case triage system to his fellow judge, only to
face total rejection. “If they had understood it, the benefits, they
would have been gung ho,” he said.545 “A lot of people don’t want
to hear about it. Just let me do my job and go home.”546 The judge
felt that strong leadership support would be critical to widespread
use of court case management.547

Florida Time Standards are contained in Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.250, which establishes a “presumptively reasonable time period for the completion of cases[.]”548 Civil jury cases
should be completed within eighteen months from filing to disposition, while non-jury cases should be completed within twelve
months from filing to disposition.549 Thirty-nine percent (39%) of
543

See, e.g., Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.
Id.
545
Id.
546
Id.
547
Id.
548
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.250(a).
549
Id. at 2.250(a)(1)(B). The time standards recognize that complex cases incur reasonable delays, which are undefined in the Rule of Judicial Administration.
544
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judges think the Florida Time Standards are a good guide, and thirtyfour percent (34%) have no opinion.550 Twenty-five percent (25%)
disagree.551 Because percentages of disagreement and no opinion responses total seventy-four percent (74%), it appears that roughly
three-fourths of the bench are not using the time standards as a relevant performance measure. Certain data subsets expressed strong
agreement with the Florida Time Standards: small circuits agreed at
fifty percent (50%) and judges with three to six years of experience
agreed at forty-eight percent (48%).
Interviewed judges had strong views on the time standards. The
standards are, in their view, ignored without repercussion among
Florida judges, which is generally consistent with the survey responses. According to the interviewed judges, lawyers are unaware
of the standards despite their codification in the rules. One judge
explained that the first time he raised the time standards in a
crowded courtroom, the room fell absolutely silent.552 Another
judge exclaimed: “Who follows up on the time standards? Nobody!
It’s representative of the problem!”553 Many judges throughout the
interviews pointed out that if the time standards are to serve as a
baseline measure of performance, then that information needs to be
shared with and emphasized to the judges. Overall, the TCAs did

Id. at 2.250(a). However, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that except
when good cause is shown, cases meeting the definition of “complex litigation”
shall be set for trial no later than 24 months from an initial case management
conference. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.201(b)(3).
550
Figure 29.
551
Id.
552
Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294.
553
Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.
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not identify this information as routinely distributed, and the interviewed judges confirmed by generally indicating that they were also
not provided with time standard compliance reports.

The results to this statement show that the judges of Florida are
ambivalent about their use of the time standards.554 As reflected
above, the compliance information is not generally distributed or
even available to many judges. More than a third of the respondent
judges have no opinion as to the use of Time Standards, which suggests these judges are not using the standards. Combined with the
level of disagreement at thirty-six percent (36%), this suggests a disregard for the standards as a meaningful measure. Agreement with
the time standards was strongest with judges three to six years on
the bench, with fifty-two percent (52%) of those judges in agreement, and small circuits at fifty percent (50%) agreement. Most
other subsets ranged between eighteen and thirty-four percent (18%
to 34%) agreement. However, if only a third of the judges agree that
judges use the time standards, and the balance has no opinion or
does not use them as a meaningful measure, then there is little incentive to manage cases to completion by those deadlines or to rely
upon those deadlines as setting public or litigant expectations.

554

Figure 30.
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The fifty-fifty split in responses to this statement reflects the ambivalence toward the use of available data to manage caseloads.555
This also reflects the challenge of evaluating management on a
docket-wide level versus a view of case management at the single
case level. Because the competition for judicial resources occurs at
a docket-wide level, the failure to use reports that provide a broader
picture suggests an ad hoc approach to allocating time and attention,
the critical judicial resources for every case. The typical judicial performance measures are age to disposition, age of pending caseload,
and clearance rate.556 According to interviewed judges and the trial
court administrator responses, this information is not commonly distributed to Florida’s civil judges.
Court manager Aikman discussed these institutional challenges
with candor:
Some judges still do not believe that the time to disposition is a concern. They see and deal with one
case at a time. Their focus is substantive justice in
each case, not on the days or months required to

555

Figure 31.
Trial Court Performance Measures, COURTOOLS, http://www.courtools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
556
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achieve that. The negative macro impact of delay occurring as a result of delay in a lot of individual cases
is not apparent to them.557
As one judge stated,
Judges who are reactive view their reputation on a
case by case basis—the wisdom of a ruling in an individual case, reactive, in the moment. Judges who
view their reputation as their caseload or docket are
thinking about how moving this case fits in with
other cases and making sure each gets access, while
at the same time trying to deliver identical high quality hearings—the bigger picture of access to justice.558
Aikman also noted, “[s]ome judges believe that shortening the time
to disposition means they are really being asked to work harder and
longer hours and they are not interested in either, as they already are
working long enough and hard enough.”559

This statement, which I added based on the national data generated by the NCSC in its Landscape of Civil Litigation and Examining the Work studies, brought to light the judges’ lack of essential

557
558
559

Aikman¸ supra note 280, at 10.
Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282.
Aikman, supra note 280, at 10.

2019]

WHY DON’T JUDGES CASE MANAGE?

1183

data regarding their own caseloads.560 There is no statewide data
available in Florida on the pending civil caseload, which was not
anticipated when this survey was drafted.561 The data is kept by the
individual court clerks at a local county level. While the number of
cases filed by action type is available state-wide, as well as dispositions, pending case information is not provided, which diminished
the value of the question. Therefore, the accuracy of this statement
is not verifiable based on available data and the statement was admittedly not well-framed, although it still provides interesting insights.
Based on the Florida Office of the State Court Administrator
(“OSCA”) data regarding filings and dispositions, contract cases
seem to be the second highest case category.562 Foreclosures still top
out the filings.563 Between 2015 and 2016, there were 40,028 contract actions filed in circuit court, and 64,777 foreclosures.564 Professional malpractice and products liability case filings totaled 2,949
statewide, which is similar to national patterns of complexity.565
Auto negligence totaled 25,199 filings, and other negligence cases
totaled 12,033 filings.566 Dispositions reflected similar patterns.567
With regard to the survey responses overall, forty-four percent
(44%) of judges had no opinion,568 which suggests that nearly half
of judges do not know what case types predominate their dockets.
The type of cases pending has case management implications, especially given the opportunity for prompt resolution presented by most
contract cases, as the parties are aware of the underlying facts due
to their preexisting relationship. Although contracts cases fall in second place behind foreclosures in amount of cases filed, it is interesting that only eight percent (8%) of judges thought contract cases
were dominant, as contract matters still form a significant bulk of
560

See supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text. See LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION, supra note 26; EXAMINING THE WORK, supra note 3.
561
See supra notes 212–18 and accompanying text. FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE
COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162.
562
FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 4-2 to 4-5.
563
Id.
564
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 4-12 to 4-15.
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Figure 32.
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the caseload and exceed every other case type except for foreclosures.569 Improved observation of these filing patterns could lead to
smart management decisions and judicial economies. If cases are to
be triaged and managed from outset, providing this information is
essential.
Notably, most of the interviewed judges do not believe that
judges overall have a good understanding of their caseload.570
Again, many felt this was because judges were operating at an eventby-event, case-by- case level as opposed to a docket-wide level. Interviewees felt that the breadth of the civil docket made understanding the caseload a critical case management component. “Process
and procedure,” as one judge pointed out, “can vary greatly [between a] product liability case [and a] mortgage foreclosure
[case].”571

Eighty-eight percent (88%) of judges agreed with this statement,
with five percent (5%) disagreeing and eight percent (8%) having
no opinion.572 This again ratifies earlier responses regarding judicial
perception of value of case management.573 It suggests further potential recognition of the benefits of proactive case management versus reactive case management. This statement also provides insight
569

5.

570

FLA. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMN’R, supra note 162, at 4-2 to 4-

See, e.g., Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 8,
supra note 442; Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 14,
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294; Telephone Interview 10,
supra note 282; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 367.
571
Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282.
572
Figure 33.
573
See supra Figures 10, 11 & 12.
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regarding the question of the scope of case management. If the court
only gets involved for enforcement purposes upon the request of the
parties, then the exploitive value of noncompliance is already being
experienced in the case. The only way case management can prevent
exploitation is to assure prompt access at critical times and proactive
prevention of delay and gamesmanship.
It is challenging to reconcile the broad support for case management expressed here with the reluctance to consider the cross-incentives reflected earlier. If judges believe parties and lawyers exploit
the process, there must be some benefit to doing so, which the high
“no opinion” response on cross-incentives seems to avoid.

Responding judges agreed at eighty-seven percent (87%), disagreed at only six percent (6%), and expressed no opinion at seven
percent (7%).574 Forty-seven percent (47%) of large circuits shows
a disproportionate level of strong agreement, 17 points higher than
any other circuit set. Question 13 in the survey, discussed earlier,
had a twenty-three percent (23%) no opinion response,575 evidencing a lack of knowledge about when and where cases lose momentum. The strong agreement here evidences consensus on the court’s
obligation to intervene where cases become inactive and to get them
moving again, which is a hallmark of reactive case management.
Proactive case management would envision a structure from outset
with embedded deadlines that would prevent the case from falling
into inactivity. This statement also speaks to scope: judges want to
ensure and monitor the appropriate pace of litigation. The question
is how?
574
575

Figure 34.
See supra Figure 17.
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While eighty-six percent (86%) agreed with this statement,
eleven percent (11%) had no opinion, and three percent (3%) disagreed,576 notwithstanding the admonition of Florida’s Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.010 as to “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution.577
It is worth noting that one-hundred percent (100%) of small circuit
judges agreed with the statement and the most significant disagreement came from newer judges, who disagreed at eleven percent
(11%). This question again provides some insight on scope, there is
not strong objection to using case management to achieve these
goals, but there is a lack of shared vision or information as to how
that is to be accomplished.

576
577

Figure 35.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010.
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This statement produced relatively higher “no opinion” responses from the judges.578 Agreement/strong agreement was consistent across the subsets, with minimal disagreement. The seventyseven percent (77%) who agree must envision proactive case management at the beginning of the case because case management can
only produce a targeted discovery if it precedes the discovery effort.
The “no opinion” rate could be reflective of the limited discussion
of targeted discovery or proportionality in Florida state courts, as no
rule change or broad debate has occurred on discovery limits or disclosures, unlike such discussions that have occurred in connection
with the federal rules and in states such as Utah and New Hampshire.579 As described by one commentator in connection with the
federal process,
[b]ecause discovery must be tailored to fit the particulars of each case, it is one phase of litigation where
the debate about active judges crystalizes: do the parties make the alterations themselves, or does the
judge fashion the process? . . . Although the Rules
authorize the judge to “right-size” discovery in the
initial case management order, much of the scaling is
typically delegated to the parties in the first instance,
with the judge engaging only upon request. In our
adversarial system, however, cooperation among the
parties on how to configure discovery, without ongoing monitoring and assistance of the judge, is simply
not realistic in many cases.580

578

Figure 36.
E.g., Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 358; Utah: Impact of the Revisions to Rule 26 on Discovery Practice in the Utah District Courts, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, at iii-iv (Apr. 2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Civil%20Procedure/Utah%20Rule%2026%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report(2015).ashx; NEW HAMPSHIRE: PAD PILOT RULES, supra note 47, at 3.
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Baicker-McKee, supra note 109, at 355–56.
579

1188

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1071

Advocates for court case management see an essential role for
case management in addressing discovery cost and delay with a discovery plan from inception.581 Generally, the interviewed judges felt
early judicial intervention and prompt access made a significant difference in reducing discovery delays, costs and hostilities.
Judicial views about direct involvement in settlement seems to
depend on local practice and court culture in specific areas. Based
on the responses, Florida judges do not have a strong inclination to
get involved in settlement.582 The responses were consistent across
circuit types.

581

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 21, at 19 (compiling an
exhaustive list of studies and articles on judicial involvement with discovery
abuse).
582
Figure 37.
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Judges strongly believe that they appropriately share information about case management with each other.583 Only twenty-four
percent (24%) disagreed.584 This is in distinct contrast with the interviewed judges, as most interviewed judges felt that the case management levels across their benches was at a two to three on a scale
from one to ten, ten being highest. Across the interviews, they expressed that judges who case manage enthusiastically share information, but judges who are disinclined to case manage are much less
likely to share information or seek information. Smaller circuits disagreed at a ninety percent (90%) rate, perhaps because the size of
the bench lends itself to informal information sharing.

There was strong agreement across all subsets that the ideal vision for case management is as a group effort involving all stakeholders.585 However, some of the judges interviewed commented on
the lack of preparation on the part of attorneys when case management opportunities are presented.586 Judge Rosenthal and Professor
Gensler have the same issue:
Our point is this: for active case management to serve
as a platform for interaction, the lawyers and the parties must buy in to the scheme as much as judges.
The types of live case-management interactions we
583

Figure 38.
Id.
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Figure 39.
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See, e.g., Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299; Telephone Interview
17, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282.
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advocate are not one-way events during which the
judge does all the work while the lawyers simply observe. Rather, the value of these live interactions is
that they are the best—and often the only—opportunity for the trial judge and the lawyers to have an
informed dialogue that penetrates the surface gloss
and exposes the core issues, whether those issues relate to priorities in discovery or the merits of a proposed summary-judgment motion. For these interactions to thrive, the attending lawyers must be prepared. This is so obvious that it hardly seems worth
saying. Yet judges from different parts of the country
continue to tell us that they schedule live Rule 16
conferences with the intention of developing a tailored case-management plan, only to have the lawyers say they didn’t know what their pretrial needs
were because they hadn’t really thought about the
subject. Judges tell us that they present opportunities
for oral argument, only to have lawyers announce
that they are resting on their briefs. That is a waste of
everyone’s time and a wasted chance for lawyers to
interacting with the judge.
. . . Judges will do it only if it proves to be worth their
time. The surest way to kill an emerging culture of
interactive case management is for it to be a waste of
time, and the surest way for it to be a waste of time
is if the lawyers have nothing to contribute when
called upon to do so. . . . It is again an obvious point:
lawyers who want the judge to spend more time being accessible must show the judge that it will be
time well spent.587
The concerns originally articulated by traditionalists, that judges
could not effectively case manage because they lacked sufficient information about the case, can only be solved with engaged litigants

587

Gensler & Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, supra note 22, at 873–74.
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fully utilizing the opportunity case management presents.588 Additionally, courts must consider and weigh genuine concerns about
necessary time frames, competing business demands, and assure
sufficient access at critical junctions in the case. “Lawyers clamor
for judges to take a more active role in case management, but if the
lawyers do not make the effort to know their own case needs, how
can they expect the judges to enter thoughtful, case-specific casemanagement orders?”589 Courts can and should tailor case management to the needs of the case, but critical information can only be
secured from the parties and their lawyers. Where lawyers appear
without adequate information about the case, without decision-making authority, without calendars, or without a vision as to how the
case will be litigated, it is difficult for the court to tailor case management. Creating a performance standard for attorney preparation
is easier to achieve when the system demands uniform participation
and preparation as opposed to recalibrating for varying demands
from judge to judge.
The need to secure appropriate information to make sure that a
case is proceeding in an organized, timely fashion typically requires
court attention and monitoring.590 While this should not require judicial resources, it could be undertaken by trained staff.591 Interviewed judges repeatedly extolled the role that smart judicial assistants play in case management.592 Judges uniformly reported that
they would be unable to carve out the time to case manage if they
did not have the active involvement of their staff providing them
with the necessary monitoring and information to case manage, and
reported significant time and stress benefits once the effort was undertaken and operationally ingrained.593
6. LACK OF TIME, STAFF, AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT
Interviewed judges enthusiastically endorsed the time spent in
case management as saving significant time across their dockets,

588
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Easterbrook, supra note 319, at 639.
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, 735–36.
See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 16–20.
See id. at 29; cf. OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203, at 18–23.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294.
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even as they acknowledged that many judges who do not case manage do not believe that they have the time or support to case manage.594 One interviewed judge stated that “there is no question that
case management saves me work” and that, while it is more effort
upfront, the initial tasks are not labor intensive and they produce
great results as cases get to trial and are resolved sooner.595 This
view was supported by the survey results. One judge described the
bench as having the “general perception that I have plenty of cases,
so I will be reactive,” but went on to say that “[it’s] our fault we
don’t do a better job teaching [them] how to do case management
and the benefits derived from case management” both in terms of
time and reputation.596 Another judge said, “[The] more [you] push
cases, the more time you have. The more continuances you grant,
the less time you have to deal with everything.”597 Another judge
believed that case management creates more time, not less, and that,
when parties have deadlines and are coming face to face with the
judge, things get done and there are fewer “discovery squabbles.”598
The same judge also stated that, as a result of case management, “my
calendar has opened up. I don’t have to roll over trials—either settle
it or we try it.”599 Another judge was more blunt: “It’s in my personal home and life benefit to manage cases.”600 All interviewed
judges agreed that a case managed docket is a less stressful docket.
These comments reflect Parkinson’s Law: “work expands so as
to fill the time available for its completion.”601 Judges for whom
case management is a priority make the time and utilize their staff
to ensure it occurs, while judges who profess to lack time to case
manage overlook the time case management could save them. As
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in his 2016 report, “[a] lumberjack
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See Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288; Telephone Interview 8, supra
note 442; Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 1, supra
note 282; Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.
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Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.
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Telephone Interview 8, supra note 442.
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Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282.
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Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288.
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Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288.
600
Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.
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saves time when he takes the time to sharpen his ax.”602 The interviewed judges perceive their colleagues as chopping away with dull
axes. Other judges were even less sympathetic to their colleagues:
“If you want to get a job done, give it to the busiest person. If they
wanted to [case manage], they would.”603
At the same time, each of the interviewed judges described a
case management process that was highly human resource intensive.
They and their judicial assistants review the reports, identify the
cases, create the means of intervention, schedule the case management conferences, and prioritize the workload. Case management as
currently deployed in Florida is highly dependent on judges and
court staff.604 While without question, this approach produces results that benefit cases, there are legitimate questions about how
scalable such an approach would be across the entire court system.
One interviewed judge pointed out that case managers are far
cheaper than judges, and hiring case managers would give judges
much more time to judge.605 An important component of a case management initiative is to ensure that each person is used at the top
level of their skills to provide the most benefit to the judicial system.606 For example, push notifications confirming upcoming hearings can replace hours on the phone by staff confirming upcoming
hearings or answering whether a case “made calendar.” Courts must
better utilize existing staff to assist in court case management.
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2016 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.
Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288.
See generally OPPAGA REPORT, supra note 203.
Telephone Interview 10, supra note 282.
Cf. CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 31–32, 37–38.
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A significant omission in the discussion on case management is
the role of technology. Technology, if properly deployed, could provide cost-effective systemic support for case management in a predictable and consistent process that would afford smarter utilization
of human resources.607

This response suggests that judges have confidence that case
management can reduce overall caseloads, and also provides an educational opportunity with regard to the twenty-six percent (26%)
of judges who responded “no opinion.”608 Judges in very large circuits agreed at a rate twenty points higher than other circuit types.
An interviewed judge pointed out that “a backlog of cases makes the
system sclerotic, and backs up the entire system until cases only
come to the fore with an issue or an emergency, so cases only move
with crisis.”609 He went on to discuss how case management permits
prioritization of the total caseload on what needs to be done and
when it should be done, keeping the caseload moving instead of careening from problem to problem.610 “Every case has a beginning
point—a human event or crisis that starts the legal process and ultimately closes. In between, it should move in effective stages.”611
This is the description of proactive case management. This judge,
like other judges, pointed out that the criminal justice system already
has many of these structures in place.612
607
608
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610
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Id.
Figure 40.
Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Many of the interviewees pointed out that the more cases that
accrue, the more cases are competing for hearing time, the longer it
takes to get a hearing, and the more delay and cost occurs as a result.
The lack of access causes more backlog to accrue. 613 One judge
described the naysayers: “Some judges don’t worry about it. Cases
come in and cases go out. They just don’t really worry about numbers.”614 The judge felt that the naysayers failed to understand the
benefit of getting the caseload down.”615 As another judge observed,
“if you just sit back and wait until someone asks to schedule their
case, it’s still assigned to you” and not going anywhere until you
deal with it.616 Yet another said, “you can always sit back and let
your caseload swell.”617 Another stated, “you have to have the foresight and the faith and the skills to decide that life is easier because
you are not rushing from crisis to crisis. You know exactly what’s
coming. You are prepared for what’s coming next, and hearings are
more effective.”618
All interviewed judges recognized that access is essential to
moving a docket and expressed dismay over the lack of access that
occurs when judges don’t case manage and prioritize to guarantee
timely hearings. One judge noted the following:
The major complaint is never about rulings, it’s
about access. I hear more about access than brilliance
in a hearing. A part of the brilliance is case management. People use judicial unavailability as an asset to
gain leverage and stall a case. With some judges, it’s
like searching for the Rosetta Stone to get on the calendar.619
The same judge pointed out that the fact that he is available for hearings reduces the demand for hearing time, because matters resolve
themselves:

613
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See, e.g., id.
Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294.
Id.
Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440.
Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282.
Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282.
Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282.
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The imminent threat of seeing me beats actually seeing me,” because that deadline prompts resolution by
agreed orders between parties. “The reality is you
can be efficient and great, but if the lawyers have to
wait two months or more for a hearing, it won’t matter as much. Lawyers put a premium on timely access
beyond just a great hearing and thoughtful wise ruling.620
At the same time, the Federal Judicial Center notes that,
A small amount of a judge’s time devoted to case
management early in a case can save vast amounts of
time later on. Saving time also means saving costs,
both for the court and for the litigants. Judges who
think they are too busy to manage cases are really too
busy not to. Indeed, the busiest judges with the heaviest dockets are often the ones most in need of sound
case-management practices.621

620

Id.
Gensler, Caught in the Crossfire, supra note 73, at 685 (quoting WILLIAM
W. SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF CASE
MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006)).
621
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Sixty-eight percent (68%) of judges agree that courts need better
training, with modest disagreement at fourteen percent (14%).622 Interestingly, the judges who expressed the least disagreement regarding greater need for more training were the most experienced (eighteen or more years of experience) with a disagreement rate of seven
percent (7%), while other subsets based on level of experience
ranged from nineteen percent to thirteen percent (19% to 13%) disagreement.

At the same time, the interviewed judges strongly emphasized
the need for training both in terms of defining a common scope to
the case management task, wise use of staff, and importantly from a
training standpoint, use of technology.623 One judge with twentyseven years of experience reported that he would welcome as much
training as he could get on case management—and would take it
whenever and wherever offered, and jump at the chance.624 Most
line judges have not even begun to imagine the ways in which technology could improve their case handling, and yet cannot put down
their cell phones. For case management to work, every level of the
court system will need to engage and share information, which
means that education about information sharing and common consistent and predictable systems must be created and deployed with

622
623
624

Figure 41.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282.
Telephone Interview 8, supra note 442.
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solid training on technology that is user friendly on the judicial interface as well as the public interface.
Strong consensus on this statement existed across all circuit
types and experience levels.625 Court resources—including judges,
court technology and all line staff—have to be utilized to produce
forward case momentum. As several judges observed, it is not that
judges do not want to case manage, but that they perceive they do
not have the time.626 Many judges feel that they need resources to
help case manage, and because they don’t have those resources, they
won’t case manage.627 Interviewed judges all reported that at the beginning, case managing requires extra time and effort, but that the
savings in time and effort later in the case more than compensated
for the initial investment.628
Several interviewed judges acknowledged a significant role in
case management for their secretaries, referred to in Florida as a judicial assistant or “J.A.”629 One judge explained that there are many
judges who would love to case manage, but their JA cannot do it
because of the other demands on their time, and there are no other
resources.630 At the same time, some scholars have noted that basic
technology could relieve staff of burdensome tasks of scheduling,
confirming, information sharing, and in many instances, assisting
self-represented litigants.631
One judge specifically pointed out the benefits of dealing with
pro se litigant cases as an area where trained staff and technology
could be of unique assistance.632 The CJI Report also pointed out the
structural benefits to the self-represented. All judges felt that many
of the compliance, follow-up, and rule conformity issues inherent in
case management could be appropriately delegated to trained staff
625

Figure 42.
Telephone Interview 9, supra note 288; Telephone Interview 17, supra
note 282; Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 20, supra
note 294; Telephone Interview 21, supra note 282.
627
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282.
628
Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.
629
Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440; Telephone Interview 12, supra
note 294; Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 17, supra
note 282.
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Telephone Interview 17, supra note 282.
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Cabral et al., supra note 190, at 247.
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Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294; CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29.
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under judicial supervision. A smart judicial assistant was key to all
the interviewed judges.633 Those judges who had the opportunity to
work with trained case management staff felt that the additional help
turbo-charged their effectiveness exponentially and rendered significant justice value at relatively minor cost.634
If case management is to be successfully deployed as a systemic
tool against cost and delay, judges need help. It is simply not enough
to give judges another job to do, particularly if poorly defined as to
the scope of the task, without support. Resentment and resistance
would inevitably result. In contrast, creating a supportive court case
management system with the staff and technology to help would significantly reduce resistance and barriers to case management, with
demonstrable benefits across the branch.635 A systemic response
would also increase predictability, consistency, and provide standards upon which performance could be judged “apples to apples.” It
would potentially increase public trust and confidence by having a
plan laid out that created systemic and individual case expectations
for civil justice. It would reduce waste both in fees spent trying to
comply with varying individual judicial procedures as well as staff
time educating parties and lawyers about individual judicial procedures and correcting noncompliance, particularly parties without
lawyers. By organizing access, it would potentially reduce unnecessary delay between court events.

633
634
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See, e.g., Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288.
Id.
See CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29.
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This statement probably suffered due to the lack of sufficient
definition regarding how to better utilize court staff, which may account for the twenty percent (20%) “no opinion” response.636 However, seventy percent (70%) of judges did agree,637 which speaks to
the willingness to explore more intelligent methods of providing effective civil justice within existing resources.
Given state budgets, judges recognize overall that additional resources may be difficult and the place to start is to work smarter. As
one interviewed judge said,
we could accomplish so much more for the people
we serve if there were additional case management
capacity [referencing both technology and staff]. Especially given the cost of a case manager versus the
cost of a judge. Technology needs to play a role in
monitoring, preparing and presenting information.
Utilize judges for what judges are needed for.638
In addition, several judges pointed out that providing staff support
for case management would create an opt-out system for case management in which cases and judges would receive the benefit of the
structure automatically, much like criminal court. It would make
civil case management the rule instead of the exception, while retaining to the judge the right to decide each case’s individual issues
as needed. The non-judge jobs that judges do not think they should
636
637
638

Figure 43.
Id.
Telephone Interview 10, supra note 282.
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do or have time to do could be done by trained staff. Then judges
have more time for judging.639
Even Professor Resnik contemplated the need for necessary support staff in decrying managerial judging: “Perhaps scarce judicial
resources should be conserved and employed only when judges’
special skill—adjudication—is required.”640 A judge is the most expensive and most highly trained asset in the court system. The tasks
performed should be assigned according to the level of training and
experience required to deal with them, which means that many case
management tasks could be assigned to administrative staff, clerks,
and case managers. This conclusion was also reflected in recommendation eight to the Conference of Chief Justices CJI Report.641

Many in the court system joke that the court technology slogan
is “yesterday’s technology tomorrow.”642 The strongest agreement
was from small circuits and very large circuits, at ninety percent
(90%) agreement levels each. New judges with zero to three years
experience agreed at a seventy percent (70%) rate, lower than any

639
Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282; Telephone Interview 13, supra
note 267; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 299; Telephone Interview 20, supra
note 294.
640
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 435.
641
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“For right-size case management to become the norm, not the exception, courts must provide judges and court staff with
training that specifically supports and empowers right-sized case management.”).
642
Chawn Ganguly, Dutch Blockchain Company Aims to Update Criminal
Justice, CORESECTOR COMMUNIQUE (Dec. 22, 2017), http://corecommunique.com/dutch-blockchain-company-aims-update-criminal-justice/.
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other data subset, but also had a significantly higher rate of “no opinion” at twenty six percent (26%), twice as much as any other subset.
There was little disagreement. One interviewed judge noted,
it’s a cultural thing to establish a baseline of performance and who is closing what. There really is no
way to measure how we are doing—bar polls are
popularity contests, lawyers blow smoke—so you
have to use statistics. You cannot teach a love of
numbers or statistics, but paying attention pays a reputational dividend.643
Technology will build necessary transparency and accountability
into the system, according to the interviews.644
Given the slow pace of digitizing state court files, some twentyfive years after PACER revolutionized the federal docket, that comment is fair.645 As noted earlier, courts struggle with technology due
to budget limitations and diffuse responsibility. Florida is particularly dysfunctional in that each county provides its court with its
technology, resulting in many different systems. Some multi-county
circuits are dealing with different computer systems in each constituent county. Florida courts have approached this by providing statewide functional standards, but despite best efforts, they lag far behind what is available in the private sector. Florida has only recently
digitized its court files beginning in 2009, and many circuits are still
transitioning some aspect of their operations. Civil dockets are generally digitized. This technology facilitates reporting on essential
case management data points—if the data is captured, distributed,
and understood. The case management methods currently in use in
Florida among judges who case manage are significantly dependent
on human review and action, as opposed to benefitting from technology advances that could assist in deadline calculation, order
preparation, and compliance and status monitoring. These tasks are
currently being performed by case-managing judges and their judicial assistants, according to interviews.

643
644
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Telephone Interview 2, supra note 282.
Id.
See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
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The creation of a case management infrastructure seems to draw
strong consensus, which is interesting considered in tandem with the
ambivalence in regards to statements about judicial independence
and case management.646 This response seems to suggest that if an
infrastructure of support is built, judges are less likely to see case
management as a question of philosophy, since it would not be entirely dependent on the judge, but rather would become embedded
in the circuit’s process. Small circuits are fully on board at one hundred percent (100%) agreement/strong agreement. There is strong
consensus by most data subsets, in the eighty to ninety-six percent
(80 to 96%) range, with two outliers: judges with zero to three years
experience only agreed at seventy percent (70%), and judges with
twelve to eighteen years of experience agreed at seventy-three percent (73%). New judges also expressed a disproportionate disagreement, at thirteen percent (13%), more than double any other subset.
New technology provides a unique window of opportunity, particularly as new judges are added from the private sector who react
with disbelief to the state of court technology.647 The RAND study
described specific examples for binary case management actions in
1996, much of which could be monitored and addressed by technology today: monitoring for service and answer deadines and taking
action where deadlines are missed; monitoring for signs of early termination of the case and capturing that resolution; and initiating a
case management schedule when an active case is identified with
646
647

Figure 45.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440.
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scheduled cutoff time for discovery and a firm, appropriate, trial
date.
For cases that do not yet have issue joined, have a
clerk monitor them to be sure deadlines for service
and answer are met, and begin judicial action to dispose of case if those deadlines are missed. Wait
a . . . month, to see if the case terminates and then
begin judicial case management. Include setting of a
firm trial date as part of the early management package, and adhere to that date as much as possible. Include setting of a reasonably short discovery cutoff
time tailored to the case as part of the early management package.648

Following the prior statement, support dropped once the system
was described as mandatory.649 While small circuits remained almost completely on board at ninety percent (90%) agreement, from
medium circuits dropped to fifty-two percent (52%), large circuit
support stood at fifty-seven percent (57%), and very large circuit
support was at seventy-six percent (76%). A similar drop in enthusiasm was evidenced across the experience subsets. “No opinion”
responses doubled, as did disagreement. This response evidences the
648
649

KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 28.
Compare Figure 46, with Figure 45.
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strong sense of independence that judges possess, and the overall
dislike of mandates.
That said, most of the judges that were interviewed felt that if a
system were made available, the benefits would become clear in
short order to attorneys and the judges, and a combination of peer
pressure and self-interest would result in adoption.650 Interviewed
judges felt that external structure would assist deployment of civil
case management, as referenced earlier in the repeated comparisons
to criminal court.651 Molot suggests formalizing case management
and standardizing across judges for uniformity: “One could imagine
a regime designed to vary from case to case but not from judge to
judge.”652 Civil case management faces the unique problems of a
lack of uniformity and a variety of enforcement levels as it currently
exists. “Using technology and case management systems would
bring in judges who wouldn’t do it on their own, and they would be
able to see the impact and the benefit on their docket. If they knew
that case management was part of the system, and they had to do it,
they would do it,” said one judge who served in an administrative
capacity.653
Judges also emphasized accountability and consequences. “If we
measure things, it changes behavior.”654 They also emphasized the
need for the systemic support: “If we want it to happen, it cannot be
another unfunded mandate from the Supreme Court. Judges need
resources to case manage. Currently, we don’t have the data management tools and don’t have the case management tools.”655
One judge described the lack of systemic civil case management
with a classic television analogy: the episode of “I Love Lucy” at
the chocolate factory, where the heroine desperately attempts to
keep up with an accelerating assembly line of chocolates by shoving
chocolates in her pocket, in her mouth, and dropping them on the
floor as candy goes everywhere—instead of choosing to simply unplug the machine, resetting and reorganizing the speed and the task,
and making sure the line proceeded at a consistent and effective
650
651
652
653
654
655

See, e.g., Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 7, supra note 440.
Molot, supra note 108, at 89–90.
Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.
Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299.
Id.
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speed. 656 “It’s easy to manage,” said the judge, “if you have a good
system.”657
At the same time, interviewed judges emphasized their interest
in tailoring case management to meet case needs, as every case does
not need the same level of case management.658 Case management
systems needs to be flexible and compliant with the rules and procedural fairness standards. They also felt that it was important to
create buy-in among judges to demonstrate that case management
on the front end produces less work and effort and better results on
the back end,659 winnowing down cases that need judicial time, and
not spending time on cases that don’t need judicial resources.660 One
strong judicial supporter stated that,
The only true resolution for case management is a
uniform system imposed on all, with tailoring permitted, required to be followed. If you leave it in the
judge’s hands, you will get all different directions.
Justice should not depend so significantly on which
judge you fall in front of. We need uniform standards
and uniform requirements with the necessary support
to make it happen. Judicial case management is
changing and becoming a part of court culture, especially with legislative emphasis on accountability
and performance measures.661
Implicit in all the discussions were overriding basic justice values. The emphasis on working more efficiently cannot compromise
the positive values of public justice. In other words, creating systems
in addition to measures assures that innovation comes packaged
with the necessary precautions to preserve the justice mission, as
opposed to simply creating a new generation of judges obsessed
with numbers.
656

Telephone Interview 12, supra note 294.
Id.
658
Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview 17, supra
note 282; Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288.
659
Telephone Interview 10, supra note 282.
660
Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166; Telephone Interview 17, supra
note 282; Telephone Interview 19, supra note 288.
661
Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166.
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As one judge simply concluded: “If you put together a civil case
management system and place it in the judge’s lap, most judges
would say, ‘Sure, I’ll do it.’ Just make it easy for them to do it.”662

Three quarters of judges responding felt that creating an expectation of case management would encourage case management, in
other words, changing the culture and overcoming institutional inertia.663 There was minimal disagreement, except for judges with
nine to twelve years of experience who disagreed at ten percent
(10%) but also had a “strong agreement/agreement” rate of eightythree percent (83%). Small circuits again expressed enthusiasm at
one hundred percent (100%) agreement.

662
663

Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.
Figure 47.
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Eighty-five percent (85%) of judges agreed with this statement,
with ten percent (10%) “no opinion”—a relatively larger amount
than in other statements.664 Ninety–five percent (95%)of judges in
small circuits agreed/strongly agreed while judges from very large
circuits seemed the most skeptical with only seventy-eight percent
(78%) agreeing/strongly agreeing.
As one judge pointed out, civil is the last division to adopt active
case management—criminal has had it for decades and the family
division has had it for more than twenty years.665 An interviewed
judge felt that case management would not be widely adopted until
there is strong leadership from the state supreme court on down.666
“Even if judges have to be dragged kicking and screaming,”667 there
has to be accountability and enforcement if judges want to sit in a
civil assignment. “One of the weakest aspects of our branch is very
little accountability for judges—it’s totally opposite of the ordinary
corporate or military environment.668 The best way to get rank and
file judges engaged is through peer pressure and setting expectations—that is what good judges do.669
As judges rotate through assignments, they come to expect and
accept case management as a responsibility, but the challenge of adequately defining and executing the task remains. As one former
Chief Judge recommended,
664
665
666
667
668
669

Figure 48.
Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282.
Telephone Interview 3, supra note 294.
Id.
Telephone Interview 11, supra note 282.
Id.
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Most judges are motivated to do a good job, and almost every judge agrees that we gotta get it right—
no matter if it’s a multi-million dollar lawsuit or a
landlord-tenant case. Timeliness is a very important
part of getting it right, because you need the right answer at the right time. There needs to be a ‘vivid conversation’ with fellow chief judges. Judges have to
embrace the concept that case management is part of
the job. So you take their best intentions and surround it with resources and commit everyone to the
process, allowing judges to be creative and innovative, and come up with a process that works for the
majority—and let peer pressure deal with the minority. Harness the distinct legal culture to your advantage.670
Another judge noted that case management has become more critical with public pressure to improve the process: “We have an obligation to learn as we go and to find better ways to work.”671
CONCLUSION
This research attempts to understand why, in the face of years of
advocacy and demand, judges in state civil courts do not case manage. The survey was designed to identify attitudes and the role of
various factors on that decision. In evaluating the impact of these
factors, there were measurable differences in the level of influence.
The factors focusing on individual judge perspectives were less influential: lack of awareness, judicial philosophy, view of the task as
administrative versus judicial function, and cross-incentives. Other
factors focused on the broader systemic issues. The research overall
evidenced that the systemic factors were more important than the
individual factors.
With regard to individual factors, the traditionally-touted concerns about lack of awareness of case management, philosophical
opposition, or “not my job,” were only modestly evident in the surveys and rejected by the majority of respondents, and sharply rejected by interviewed judges. There was little evidence of cloistered
670
671

Telephone Interview 14, supra note 282.
Telephone Interview 1, supra note 282.

1210

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1071

ivory-tower intellectual rejection of the job. Equally, most judges do
not view case management as the responsibility of non-judge court
administrators.
Assessing the role of cross-incentives as a factor is more challenging. Taken at face value, thirty-six percent to fifty percent (36%
to 50%) of surveyed judges had no opinion about the cross-incentives in considering case management.672 Therein lie the challenges
in examining the cross-incentive factor. Many judges don’t want to
even acknowledge the existence of self-interest that might be implicated. Additionally, it is difficult to gauge whether these concerns
are actually valid in light of the strong assertions by interviewed
judges that lawyers and clients who experience fair, predictable, and
reliable case management like it, as well as the plethora of surveys
in which attorneys request active judicial engagement. While survey
responses here suggest that judges ignore cross-incentives, comments by the interviewed judges suggest “wishful thinking.” The internal inconsistencies revealed by the survey would suggest that additional research on cross-incentives would be very beneficial.
However, one of the challenges inherent in trying to measure attorney and litigant resistance is the diverse and individual nature of judicial approaches to case management. One judge may impose unreasonable and arbitrary deadlines as a function of case management, and another may build a collaborative case management plan
with the parties that gets them the essential information to resolve
the case as early as possible, or to take it to trial within a reasonable
period. Comparison, as well as public acceptance, is challenging
with variation.
The results reveal that the most influential factors affecting judicial case management engagement are institutional: lack of definition of the case management task,673 institutional inertia,674 and
lack of time and support.675 These are factors that are closely related
and can be significantly affected by resource allocation and process
choices that are within the control of court leaders. The survey established that judges clearly recognize that case management is an

672
673
674
675

See supra Figures 22–27.
See supra Section IV.C.2.
See supra Section IV.C.5.
See supra Section IV.C.6.
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essential component of the judicial task.676 Judges see the need but
do not engage in case management. This research suggests that
judges are open to the task of civil case management, and see its
potential value, but do not have a starting point.
Court leaders would be wise to tackle the task of defining case
management first. The variety of approaches was evident in the interviews as well as in the survey results. Disarray was reflected in
the conflicting responses. Defining the task is essential. If judicial
case management is to be an effective tool within this lifetime, then
state justice leaders should consider simplifying this long-standing
debate into a process designed to give trial judges clear guidance
about the case management task: what it is, how to do it, and the
expected benefits. The research summarized here demonstrates that
the lack of a clear definition of case management has reduced the
effectiveness of efforts at deployment.677 A judge said, “Case management is so generally misunderstood by the rank and file judges
and is used only sporadically or improperly by judges who don’t
understand and then question the benefit.”678 The need for clarity in
the case management task and the need for accountability was a
strong theme in the interviews.
It is also important to understand that adoption can be a process.
Very few judges expressed any opposition to reactive case management, which would be among the easiest and least controversial systems to deploy to prevent case inactivity and access issues.679 Court
leaders may be wise to begin systemic deployment with a supportive
framework for reactive case management as a bridge from old approaches to new approaches, which would produce tangible and relatively immediate results.
The importance of defining the task was encapsulated in a recent
article:
Someone once said the difference between a vision
and a hallucination is simply how many people see
it. Thus, court leaders need to provide a comprehensive vision for their court that a significant number
676
677
678
679

See supra Figure 8.
See supra Figure 46.
Telephone Interview 8, supra note 442.
See supra Figures 33 & 34.
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of judges and other court staff will embrace and buy
into. Setting and communicating a leadership vision
statement is a critically important and deeply strategic activity that many court leaders fail to do adequately. . . . [and] judges and court staff must see
how the . . . [vision] direct[s] the daily work they
carry out.680
At the same time, “organizing and mobilizing judges and court
staff members around court improvement is a process requiring attention, patience, and compromise . . . the idea that the few can consistently command the abiding support of the many is a dubious expectation.” 681 These comments capture the effect of the institutional
inertia challenge.682 State courts face challenges due to institutional
inertia from the sheer number of judges, court staff and lawyers to
be convinced, the wide variation in local court cultures, technology
shortfalls, and funding, accountability, and transparency issues.
These are all significant barriers that must be addressed to diminish
restraints preventing case management. But building underlying
system architecture based upon a framework of court case management would significantly reduce the drag of resistance, and would
provide the evidence needed to map the path forward.
The judges who are the strongest proselytizers for court case
management believe that it will not occur unless court leaders require court case management, cheerlead for court case management,
and measure compliance with accountability consequences.683 In order to support civil case management, judges need to understand that
leaders are not asking them to do more work, they are being asked
to work differently—to work “smarter” not “harder.”684 Courts need
to make conscious design choices in creating a system to provide
680
Ostrom et al., supra note 25, at 80; see also VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS
M. CLARKE, REIMAGINING COURTS: A DESIGN FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
163–65 (2015).
681
Id.
682
See supra Section IV.C.5.
683
See, e.g., Telephone Interview 18, supra note 299.
684
See generally INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
WORKING SMARTER NOT HARDER: HOW EXCELLENT JUDGES MANAGE CASES
(2014), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/working_
smarter_not_harder.pdf.
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direct incentives for appropriate behavior. RAND outlined the path
to court case management in 1996: “Studies of change in the courts
and in other organizations provide some guidelines for improving
implementation. They include: clearly articulating what the change
is to accomplish and generating a perceived need for it; a governance structure and process that coordinates individuals’ activities
and assigns accountability for results; and meaningful performance
measures to help both implementers and overseers gauge progress.”685 One judge stated the following:
The only true solution for case management is a uniform system imposed on all, required to be followed
by all. If you leave it in the judge’s hands, you will
get all different directions and variations. Justice
should not depend so significantly on which judge
you fall in front of. We need uniform standards and
uniform requirements with the necessary support to
make it happen. Judicial case management is changing and becoming a part of court culture, especially
with legislative emphasis on accountability and performance measures.686
Another significant factor that court leaders can control is the
level of support in terms of staff and technology.687 Judges need to
do judicial work and those tasks which do not require judicial decision-making need to be moved to appropriately trained support staff
and technology. Much of case management involves assessing compliance and status information. As pointed out in the interviews,
many of these questions do not have to be resolved by a judge. An
appropriately trained and supervised staff person, much in the way
law firms have relied on smart legal secretaries and paralegals over
the past sixty years, can handle these tasks. Using staff and technology support effectively was a significant component of the CJI recommendations eight, ten, and thirteen,688 and given state budgets, is

685

KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 79, at 30.
Telephone Interview 4, supra note 166.
687
See supra Figures 43 & 44.
688
CJI REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“Recommendation 8: . . . Courts should
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likely to be essential for successful use of proactive case management in state civil courts. With regard to the original debate of the
traditionalists and the case management advocates, pushing the administrative end of case management to staff resources is likely to
leave judges with more time to engage in traditional adjudicatory
functions, in addition to obvious cost-effectiveness.689 One judge
who had rotated out of a specialty assignment with proactive, structured case management sighed, “[w]hen you are used to a case manager, and then no longer have that support, you feel naked.”690
Encouraging civil court case management requires consensus
building across the entire court system. The interviewed judges
demonstrate leadership by example in which the tangible benefits of
case management can be identified, counted, and captured. There
are judges like them across the country, but court leadership will
have to reach out to identify them and ask them to help preach the
benefits to their colleagues and courts. Leaders will have to overcome a general resistance to change on the part of the bar and the
bench: the fear of the unknown; threats to competence of judges,
court staff, and attorneys by requiring new tasks and responsibilities;
altered relationships between the court, counsel, and the clients; and
the risk of a sense of loss of control over relationships that judges
traditionally craft on an individual basis. Leaders would be wise to
keep all judicial audiences in mind: the self-represented, the jurors,
the injured, the insurance companies, the business community, the
lawyers, as well as the judges with whom they directly correspond.
Judges are motivated by others’ assessments of their performance.
Protecting constitutional rights provides a public good reason why
criminal cases must be handled as soon as possible. Leaders must
articulate the public good reason that will be advanced by judicial
civil case management. As one judge said, “Judges think there is
good reason why criminal cases need to be resolved ASAP—a public good reason.” He went on to note that if courts seek to ensure
ments of newly instituted case management practices.”); id. at 31 (“Recommendation 10: Courts must take full advantage of technology to implement right-sized
case management and achieve useful litigant-court interaction.”); id. at 37 (“Recommendation 13: Courts must take all necessary steps to increase convenience to
litigants by simplifying the court-litigant interface and creating on-demand court
assistance services.”).
689
Id. at 4.
690
Telephone Interview 20, supra note 294.
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widespread support for case management efforts, “there has to be a
public good reason articulated for civil case management, inherent
evident benefit that can be articulated and emphasized for the civil
docket.”691 Those reasons come down to access, cost and delay, and
the continued relevance of the civil courts as a matter of public trust
and confidence. People cannot be forced to change. They can be led
to accept that change will occur and to adjust to its consequences.
The good news from this research is that removing barriers is
key, as the most significant impediments to judicial case management are factors that are within the control of institutional leaders.
Transparency—an inevitable result of technological improvements,
and legislatures and a public that want to understand the branch—
could result in more interest in case management as judicial performance is measured. In order to build case management into the system and eliminate institutional inertia as an impediment to judicial
case management, judicial case management must become an institutional keystone. Leaders need to build case management into the
civil court system, as much as it is an institutional bedrock in criminal divisions across the country.
Court leaders are in the position to create frameworks which define the task of judicial case management; provide the necessary
training, education, and information about judicial case management; as well as the organizational support for implementation in
terms of technology and staffing. Courts can design and build systems, through choice architecture, that support case management
and make a clean, monitored process with a tangible end date as the
default process, with flexibility and tailoring as appropriate for the
case. The broad use of reactive case management suggests that creating a means of attacking cases that have not progressed and preventing cases from stalling out, may be the easiest place to start and
a good way to quickly demonstrate the value of a case management
system.
Additional research needs to be done, with empirical measurement.692 The results of civil case management can be measured
691

Telephone Interview 16, supra note 299.
It can be done. Miami, my home jurisdiction, served as a site for a national
pilot project to test civil case management team approaches in 2017. Notwithstanding significant operational challenges including Hurricane Irma, the Miami
project reflects an early reduction of pending caseloads of sixteen to twenty-two
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when definitions and metrics are adequately established. Courts
should measure these projects to assure they are meeting the delay
reduction goals. Research about attorney and litigant experiences in
cases with and without case management would determine which
practices are most beneficial. Evaluation of which events or time
points in a case generate a need for court access would enable courts
to block preset hearing times over the life of a case with confidence.
There should also be a closer look at pro se, minimally contested
and uncontested matters, in terms of case management impacts. Another area of research should examine whether the effect of crossincentives differ based on judicial selection methodology; for example, where judges are appointed or retained once in office without
risk of direct opposition. An examination of what drives those
judges who see case management as an essential element of judicial
excellence might help normalize case management in other judges’
choices. Finally, the role of choice architecture in creating case management systems that judges would opt-out of instead of opt-in to
may prove of benefit to court leaders who wish to integrate court
case management into the business process of civil courts.
Better results cannot be measured simply by speed of process or
even reduction in cost, even though these are the easiest data points.
This change must be consistent with core values: it must deliver better justice. Cost and delay cannot be improved at the expense of fair
and just results. How parties experience court in terms of procedural
fairness cannot be sacrificed for swiftness or efficiency. At the same
time, current processes that handle cases in crowd settings, with only
moments for each case and litigants, deserve rethinking. The overwhelming response from the interviewed judges established that
they viewed case management as essential to delivering better justice, because they could spend more time judging and less time juggling, with the luxury of paying appropriate attention to each matter’s needs. As one interviewed judge stated, “[c]ase management is
the ultimate delivery system for fairness and efficiency.”693
percent (16%–22%) at twelve months compared with a non-case management
control group. For an example of more recent empirical research, see LYDIA HAMBLIN & PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIVIL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE: EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE PILOT PROJECT
(CJIPP) (2019).
693
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In the end, courts are being asked to engage in fundamental behavioral change in the way judges handle civil cases. This research
indicates that rather than face burdens of persuasion, the challenge
for court leaders is to eliminate the barriers that prevent judges from
case managing. Given the limited carrots and sticks available to
court leaders, creating a solid scope and definition of case management, providing judicial training, and reengineering staff positions,
are much easier and cost-effective prospects than the inevitably unsuccessful task of trying to force judges to conform. These barriers
in the way of civil case management are significantly under the control of Chief Justices and Chief Judges, and can be the subject of
objective measurement likely to encourage legislative budget support. One judicial interview reflected on limited court resources:
“Currently we allow parties to demand and allocate judicial resources instead of the court. If we are to work smarter in this era of
tight budgets, we have to take control of our resources and make
sure we are using them wisely, and the most expensive and essential
resource in the judicial branch is the judge.”694
When an individual can choose from hundreds of thousands of
products on a website, buy their selection with a click, and then track
its delivery from seller to doorstep in 48 hours, and the only information a litigant can access is a court docket listing pleadings and
events, the disconnect between courts and their customers is evident.
Any idea that the court system can continue with its current opacity
bodes poorly for the continued relevance of courts, and if transparency provides a window into how cases move through the court system, interest in better case management will likely result from
judges seeking to deliver great justice—or protect their reputations.
Doing nothing risks obsolescence.
The critical motivation for civil judicial case management is
public trust and confidence in the ability of our state courts to fairly,
timely, and cost-effectively resolve our disputes.695 Judges repeatedly expressed concern that the traditional creaky and flawed systems currently in place will not meet twenty-first century demands.
Many acknowledged the need to be more transparent and accountable. All interviewed judges made reference in one way or another to
the public’s expectation of timely, cost-effective, fair justice that
694
695
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every judge should honor, and they all believe civil case management is an important tool to meet that expectation. Some judges,
particularly those who had served in judicial branch leadership positions, also pointed out broader public concerns. As one judge
pointed out,
time is valuable to the justice system. It’s not just
working harder, it’s working smarter with our resources. Some judges see themselves as efficient just
by giving access and hearing cases, equating hard
work with what is needed; but there are ways of
working that are so much more effective. Case management helps by setting reasonable goals and defining expectations. . . . Some judges think, ‘I can’t
handle anything else,’ but this gets you more time,
less stress for everyone—it’s good for the parties, it’s
good for the lawyers, it’s good for the judges, and it’s
good for the system. Case management is a tool that
makes life better in so many ways. Business people
know how they can plan for the future. It enhances
public trust and confidence in every way.696
If the problems in our justice system evidenced in these survey
results are this clear to judges, how can we guarantee justice to litigants who must navigate these flawed processes in seeking solutions
to their problems in court? Courts and court leaders have to confront
the disconnect that is evident throughout the survey responses:
judges don’t think the system works and they don’t think the parties
can manage it, but judges aren’t taking action on it. A challenging
element of the change process is providing motivation.697 In terms
of effecting change, the judicial branch has few resources and little
means to incentivize changes in judicial behavior. Many judges,
once the scope of the case management task is defined, may be motivated by the same mission that animated the interviewed judges: a
simple dedication to excellence and to the people we serve. Other,
more self-interested motivations, should also be explored: better use
696
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of and less frustration for staff, particularly when dealing with pro
se litigants; less waste of judicial time; and less stress as reflected in
the interviews.
Most citizen experience with the judicial branch comes through
the doorway of their community state courthouse. This is where
America’s reputation for justice is built or destroyed, where justice
is delivered face-to-face. If lawyers and litigants do not see the state
courts as being able to deliver timely, cost-effective, and fair justice,
then state courts will continue to lose customers and disputes as controversies shift to other private-sector options, or are simply abandoned. A diminishing role for courts, particularly the state courts
which handle the vast majority of the peoples’ problems, has significant consequences for democracy. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in
Federalist No. 17,
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the
province of the State governments . . . [By which] I
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and
civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful,
most universal, and most attractive source of popular
obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the
immediate and visible guardian of life and property,
having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity
before the public eye, regulating all those personal
interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.698
Another judge described the challenge of case management in
personal terms. He is the only active case managing judge in his
area. His colleagues ask him: what’s the point? He replies with a
uniquely Floridian response: “You walk on the beach and see starfish left by the departing tide all over the beach, dying on the sand.
You pick them up one by one and throw them back into the water.
People say you can’t save them all. But you know, it made a real

698

THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).

1220

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1071

difference to that starfish I threw back.”699 That’s the difference he
sees case management making case by case to the litigants, and with
enough cases, to the entire justice system.700
“Great reform movements require the fuel of a pressing social
need, the oxygen of optimism, and the spark of a great idea.”701
America needs effective state courts. This research shows that
judges understand the need, but not the solution. The type of case
management that has a real chance to make a material difference in
civil litigation is not dependent on the philosophy, resolve, or workload of any individual judge, but is built into the court system. Systemic, structured court case management can use the rules, guarantee access and prompt high quality and accurate rulings, avoid waste
and delay, and limit unnecessary process-imposed costs. If court
leaders wish to improve use of case management as a tool to improve the reputation of state civil courts as a place to solve problems,
to attract a diverse caseload representing all sectors of our society
and economy, and to allow the law to fully reflect the diversity of
American life, then they must understand how to get judges engaged. This Article hopes to fill a gap in the literature regarding what
we know about judicial attitudes towards civil court case management today, how it can help, and further identify what potential next
steps should be taken to make civil case management part of the
mechanics of civil case processing. Experts for years have advocated for case management as essential to public trust in state civil
courts to resolve their disputes effectively. This Article hopes to add
clarity to that effort.
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